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732 KB
Extraction Summary
3
People
3
Organizations
2
Locations
1
Events
1
Relationships
3
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Court filing (legal brief/memorandum)
File Size:
732 KB
Summary
This page from a court filing (Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE, likely the Ghislaine Maxwell trial) argues that attorney-client privilege protects communications between a witness named 'Jane' and her attorney 'Glassman.' It asserts that Glassman could not waive this privilege as it belongs to Jane, and distinguishes the situation from the 'Bergonzi' case precedent regarding documents prepared for the Government.
People (3)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Jane | Witness/Client |
The holder of attorney-client privilege regarding communications about assisting the Government.
|
| Glassman | Attorney |
Jane's attorney; the document argues his comments did not waive Jane's privilege.
|
| The Defendant | Defendant |
Referenced in footnote 2 as relying on the Bergonzi case (Implied to be Ghislaine Maxwell based on Case ID).
|
Organizations (3)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| General Motors LLC |
Cited in case law (In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig.).
|
|
| Government |
The prosecution/Department of Justice.
|
|
| DOJ |
Department of Justice (referenced in Bates stamp).
|
Timeline (1 events)
Key Quotes (3)
"In this case, it would have been improper for the Government to ask Jane how Glassman had advised her regarding her decision whether to assist the Government."Source
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Quote #1
"The reason is that Jane, not Glassman, was holder of the privilege, and it was not Glassman’s to waive."Source
DOJ-OGR-00008241.jpg
Quote #2
"There is no reason to believe that Glassman’s legal advice to Jane was made with the intent to turn over that legal advice to the Government."Source
DOJ-OGR-00008241.jpg
Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,250 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 528 Filed 12/06/21 Page 5 of 8
to divulge their conversations with counsel about how significant their attorneys assess the benefits
of immunity to be.
of immunity to be.
In such cases, it is not that these issues are irrelevant to the Government or to the defense.
They are highly relevant. But the attorney-client communications are privileged, and the
attorney’s advice is not presumptively expected to be shared with the Government because the
witness will testify for the Government. Instead, the client makes factual statements about the
issue—not about the attorney-client communications—which the Government turns over to the
defense. See, e.g., In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., 80 F. Supp. 3d 521, 528
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“It is well established, however, that the attorney-client privilege protects
communications rather than information.”). The fact that “certain information might later be
disclosed to others does not, by itself, create the factual inference that the communications were
not intended to be confidential at the time they were made.” Id. at 529 (emphasis in original,
internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, it would have been improper for the Government
to ask Jane how Glassman had advised her regarding her decision whether to assist the
Government.²
They are highly relevant. But the attorney-client communications are privileged, and the
attorney’s advice is not presumptively expected to be shared with the Government because the
witness will testify for the Government. Instead, the client makes factual statements about the
issue—not about the attorney-client communications—which the Government turns over to the
defense. See, e.g., In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., 80 F. Supp. 3d 521, 528
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“It is well established, however, that the attorney-client privilege protects
communications rather than information.”). The fact that “certain information might later be
disclosed to others does not, by itself, create the factual inference that the communications were
not intended to be confidential at the time they were made.” Id. at 529 (emphasis in original,
internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, it would have been improper for the Government
to ask Jane how Glassman had advised her regarding her decision whether to assist the
Government.²
Second, Glassman did not waive any privilege over Jane’s communications with him
through his comments to the Government. The reason is that Jane, not Glassman, was holder of
the privilege, and it was not Glassman’s to waive. See In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d at 100. And
through his comments to the Government. The reason is that Jane, not Glassman, was holder of
the privilege, and it was not Glassman’s to waive. See In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d at 100. And
______________________________________________________________________________
² United States v. Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. 487 (N.D. Cal. 2003), on which the defendant relies (Def.
Letter at 3), is inapposite. In that case, a company agreed to turn over certain documents to the
Government “before the documents had been prepared.” Id. at 493. Accordingly, the company
could not assert privilege over the documents, because they were made “for the purpose of relaying
communication to a third party.” Id. There is no reason to believe that Glassman’s legal advice
to Jane was made with the intent to turn over that legal advice to the Government.
5
² United States v. Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. 487 (N.D. Cal. 2003), on which the defendant relies (Def.
Letter at 3), is inapposite. In that case, a company agreed to turn over certain documents to the
Government “before the documents had been prepared.” Id. at 493. Accordingly, the company
could not assert privilege over the documents, because they were made “for the purpose of relaying
communication to a third party.” Id. There is no reason to believe that Glassman’s legal advice
to Jane was made with the intent to turn over that legal advice to the Government.
5
DOJ-OGR-00008241
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