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718 KB
Extraction Summary
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People
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Organizations
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Locations
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Events
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Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
718 KB
Summary
This legal document, filed on June 22, 2022, is a portion of a court filing arguing that the judge (the Court), not the jury, is responsible for determining which version of the Sentencing Guidelines to apply in a case. The filing cites legal precedent from the Second Circuit and the text of the Guidelines themselves to refute the defendant's claim that this factual determination must be made by a jury, particularly regarding the date of an offense for ex post facto considerations.
People (2)
Organizations (3)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Second Circuit | government agency |
Cited as having established precedent relevant to the case.
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| S.D.N.Y. | government agency |
Abbreviation for the Southern District of New York court, mentioned in a case citation.
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| United States | government agency |
Party in the cited cases 'United States v. Fusco' and 'United States v. Morel'.
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Locations (1)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
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Stands for the Southern District of New York, a federal judicial district.
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Relationships (2)
The Court
→
professional
→
The Jury
The document argues that the Court, not the Jury, is responsible for determining which version of the Sentencing Guidelines manual to apply.
The defendant
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legal
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The Court
The defendant is making a legal argument to the Court, which the document argues the Court should reject.
Key Quotes (1)
"For example, if the offense of conviction (i.e., the conduct charged in the count of the indictment or information of which the defendant was convicted) was determined by the court to have been committed between October 15, 1991 and October 28, 1991, the date of October 28, 1991 is the controlling date for ex post facto purposes."Source
— Application Note 2 (of the Sentencing Guidelines)
(Quoted as an example from the Sentencing Guidelines to support the argument that the court, not the jury, determines the date of the offense.)
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Quote #1
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,113 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 670 Filed 06/22/22 Page 20 of 55
1. The Court, and not the Jury, Determines Which Manual to Apply
The defendant claims that a jury must determine which version of the Sentencing Guidelines to apply, but the defendant offers not a single case that has ever so held. That argument is inconsistent with the plain text of the Guidelines and established Second Circuit precedent. The Court should reject this argument.
As an initial matter, it is well settled that a question of fact that increases a defendant’s offense level under the Guidelines need not be submitted to a jury. United States v. Fusco, 560 F. App’x 43, 45-46 (2d Cir. 2014); United States v. Morel, No. 10 Cr. 798 (PAC), 2021 WL 2821107, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2021). In addition, with respect to the sentencing court’s determination of which Guidelines Manual to apply, the text of the Guidelines expressly contemplates that the court should determine the last date of the conspiracy. Application Note 2 provides the following example of a calculation of the last date of the offense: “For example, if the offense of conviction (i.e., the conduct charged in the count of the indictment or information of which the defendant was convicted) was determined by the court to have been committed between October 15, 1991 and October 28, 1991, the date of October 28, 1991 is the controlling date for ex post facto purposes.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(b)(1), app. n.2 (2004) (emphasis added). As the underlined language makes plain, the Guidelines direct sentencing courts to make this factual determination, and not juries.
As the defendant acknowledges, not one of the cases cited in the defendant’s motion involved increases in the Sentencing Guidelines, and instead, the defendant rests her argument entirely on cases involving Ex Post Facto challenges to increases of the applicable statutory penalties. (Dkt. No. 662 (“Def. Mem.”) at 3-4). The law is clear that, so long as a fact at sentencing does not increase the statutory maximum or minimum penalty, that fact is for the sentencing court
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DOJ-OGR-00010555
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