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Russian authorities. On Sept. 23, 2013, Mr. Kucherena gave a long interview to Sophie
Shevardnadze, a journalist for Russia Today television.
When Ms. Shevardnadze directly asked him if Mr. Snowden had given all the documents
he had taken from the NSA to journalists in Hong Kong, Mr. Kucherena said Mr.
Snowden had only given “some” of the NSA’s documents in his possession to journalists
in Hong Kong. “So he [Mr. Snowden] does have some materials that haven’t been made
public yet?” Ms. Shevardnadze asked. “Certainly,” Mr. Kucherena answered.
This disclosure filled in a crucial piece of the puzzle. It explained why NSA documents
that Mr. Snowden had copied, but had not given to the journalists in Hong Kong—such
as the embarrassing revelation about the NSA targeting the cellphone of German
Chancellor Angela Merkel—continued to surface after Mr. Snowden arrived in Moscow,
along with NSA documents released via WikiLeaks.
As this was a critical discrepancy in Mr. Snowden’s narrative, I went to Moscow in
October 2015 to see Mr. Kucherena. During our conversation, Mr. Kucherena confirmed
that his interview with Ms. Shevardnadze was accurate, and that Mr. Snowden had
brought secret material with him to Moscow.
Mr. Snowden’s narrative also includes the assertion that he was neither debriefed by nor
even met with any Russian government official after he arrived in Moscow. This part of
the narrative runs counter to findings of U.S. intelligence. According to the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence report, Mr. Snowden, since he arrived in
Moscow, “has had, and continues to have, contact with Russian intelligence services.”
This finding is consistent with Russian debriefing practices, as described by the ex-KGB
officers with whom I spoke in Moscow
Mr. Snowden also publicly claimed in Moscow in December 2013 to have secrets in his
head, including “access to every target, every active operation. Full lists of them.” Could
Mr. Snowden’s Russian hosts ignore such an opportunity after Mr. Putin had authorized
his exfiltration to Moscow? Mr. Snowden, with no exit options, was in the palm of their
hands. Under such circumstances, as Mr. Klintsevich pointed out in his June NPR
interview: “If there’s a possibility to get information, they [the Russian intelligence
services] will get it.”
The transfer of state secrets from Mr. Snowden to Russia did not occur in a vacuum. The
intelligence war did not end with the termination of the Cold War; it shifted to
cyberspace. Even if Russia could not match the NSA’s state-of-the-art sensors, computers
and productive partnerships with the cipher services of Britain, Israel, Germany and other
allies, it could nullify the U.S. agency’s edge by obtaining its sources and methods from
even a single contractor with access to Level 3 documents.
Russian intelligence uses a single umbrella term to cover anyone who delivers it secret
intelligence. Whether a person acted out of idealistic motives, sold information for money
or remained clueless of the role he or she played in the transfer of secrets—the provider
of secret data is considered an “espionage source.” By any measure, it is a job description
that fits Mr. Snowden.
Mr. Epstein’s book, “How America Lost Its Secrets: Edward Snowden, the Man and the
Theft,” will be published by Knopf in January.

Journal Video: Investigative Journalist Edward Jay
Epstein on Snowden;s Legend

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