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was off the agenda. The diplomatic process with the Palestinians was stalemated. I
could see no point in remaining in the government.

Like my last period in Olmert’s government, my final few months were
dominated by finding a way to end Hamas attacks from Gaza. During one 24-hour
period in November, Hamas launched more than 100 rockets at towns in the south,
while also attacking two military units across the border. Especially since our
military response would be the last during my time as Defense Minister, I was
determined that, this time, it would have a strictly defined objective and a finite
time frame. The overall objective hadn’t changed since Olmert’s premiership: to
hit Hamas hard, bring down the number of rocket attacks to as near zero as
possible, and reach an agreement, through the Egyptians, which established a
period of calm on our border for as long as we could. Bibi’s “victimhood”
narrative notwithstanding, one aspect of the military balance in the south was now
dramatically different. With my backing as Defense Minister, we now had Iron
Dome, which I was confident would help deal with the inevitable shower of Hamas
rockets that would follow our initial attack. Again, I felt it was essential to start
with a quick, unexpected, damaging first strike. Then, through sustained air
bombardment, to keep up enough pressure to secure the political arrangement we
wanted. And, unlike under Olmert, to end the operation as soon as we’d achieved
its aim.

On the afternoon of November 14, we launched a targeted air strike on Hamas’s
de facto chief of staff, Ahmed Jabari. We’d gone after Jabari in the past but, for
one reason or another, had failed. We also hit nearly two dozen other Hamas
targets, including all of the main missile sites we had identified. The whole
operation lasted a week. Hamas fired nearly 1,500 rockets into Israel, not just
locally manufactured Qassems but longer-range Iranian Fajr-5s and Russian Grads.
For the first time since the 1991 Gulf war, several were targeted at Tel Aviv and
Jerusalem. Fortunately, they were not significantly more accurate than in the past.
More than half landed in fields or orchards. And with Iron Dome deployed around
our major towns and cities, more than 80 per cent were intercepted.

We hit nearly 1,500 targets over the seven-day period, mostly launch-pads,
Hamas government installations and weapons stores, but also a number of
apartment complexes being used by Hamas as bases or firing points. Bibi rightly
pointed out that we were forced to fight a fundamentally asymmetric battle. While
Israel began with the principle of directing our fire away from civilian areas,

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