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interest or an initial intention to do so. Iranian civilian casualties, for
example, could provoke Iran to step up its response. This becomes
more likely as the scale of a U.S. attack increases. Downed U.S.
aircrews could lead to search and rescue operations that could
become significant military actions in their own right. The need to
restrike targets that were missed or inadequately damaged could also
prolong the conflict and involve additional forces. As the conflict
developed, internal and external political pressures could press both
antagonists to escalate the fighting.
On the other hand, there may also be countervailing pressures. A very
successful operation could cause Iran to seek a rapid exit, at least
from the military aspect of the war. So, too, could increased domestic
unrest within Iran. International political pressure brought about by
economic disruption of the oil market and fears of military escalation
could work to restrain the United States. But we cannot rule out the
possibility of escalation, and that knowledge should reinforce the
need for clarity of purpose and a full understanding of the risks
involved before we pull the trigger.
How It Ends
Just as we cannot rule out escalation, we cannot rule out the harmful
protraction of a war. Every war has to end, but how it does so is no
simple matter. Even if it were soundly defeated, Iran could
complicate the endgame. It’s not simply a matter of our declaring
“mission accomplished” and bringing the troops home. As retired
Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege writes:
Although Sun Tzu warned statesmen and generals many centuries
ago that long wars benefit no one, they continue to occur, and for
some very fundamental human reasons. Statesmen and generals who
start wars commit themselves to worthy war aims that are expressed
far too specifically—and too soon—in order to get the polity on
board. Then they conceive of a strategy based on what they think they

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