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[OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 10/9/2014, SPi]

The Crooked Course xxxiii

he invited me to meet him at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. During the course of the conversation, he surprisingly asked what I would do with the peace process if I were him. I had just re-read his autobiography, Warrior, and answered: “Both as a soldier and as a politician, you have a history of being bold, daunting, daring and making surprise moves. In that spirit, I would suggest that you dismantle the settlements and pull your troops completely out of Gaza.” For a minute I worried that this would anger him, but he answered very calmly. “I cannot do it.” I asked why. He said: “Because of the harbor.” I replied, rather perplexed: “But there is no harbor in Gaza.” He said: “That’s not the point. They could build one if we left Gaza.” Then I realized that, contrary to common opinion, Sharon had no ideological inhibitions about leaving Gaza. His concerns were only about security. This gave me high hopes that he would eventually do it. Three years of stalemate were to follow. And then in December 2003, out of the blue, Sharon made the sweeping and stunning pronouncement that Israel would leave Gaza and end its occupation of the Strip.

Ariel Sharon deserves praise for withdrawing from Gaza. But his unilateral move undermined the possibility of peaceful relations between the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip and Israel. The PLO and the Palestinian Authority were sidelined. They could not claim credit for the move, and thus had scant motivation for supporting it. Instead, militants in Gaza and the West Bank harvested all the benefits. The Disengagement plan undermined those on the Palestinian side who claimed that the negotiating table was a more efficient tool than the barrel of a gun in order to resolve the conflict.

ON PART II: PEACE PROPOSALS AND IDEAS

The formal agreements covered in Part I represent the conclusions of long and complex diplomatic processes. Part II encompasses proposals and ideas that contributed to breaking taboos and changing opinions that paved the way for precedent-setting agreements.

In the late 1970s and 1980s several plans and initiatives were put forward which maintain relevance for the future of the peace process. One idea was a comprehensive and unified Arab approach which was first proposed in the Fahd Plan (1981), and later refined in the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002. The latter peace proposal promoted by then Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah al-Saud represented a unified shift in the Arab States’ approach to Israel. Where there was once rejection, the Arab peace initiative created the possibility of universal recognition of the State of Israel. All 57 countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) endorsed the initiative.

The aftermath of the Gulf War of 1991 opened new opportunities to address the complex issue of peace in the Middle East. This was the backdrop for the groundbreaking Madrid Peace Conference, convened by the United States and the Soviet Union. It raised new hopes for peaceful resolution to the enduring conflicts of the region. The conference created an unprecedented platform for peace talks, based on the principle of “land for peace”. The Israelis would have to cede land to their Arab adversaries in return for peace and security. The Madrid formula for organizing such talks followed a

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