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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 188 of 239

C. Discussion

The defendant’s motion to strike should be denied—or at a minimum deferred until after
the conclusion of the Government’s direct case—because all of the challenged allegations pertain
to evidence that will be relevant and admissible at trial, and are not unduly prejudicial.

First, the allegations regarding Minor Victim-3 are properly included in the Indictment’s
description of the conspiracies charged in Counts One and Three because evidence of those
incidents is relevant and admissible at trial as direct evidence of the crimes charged. Counts One
and Three allege that the defendant participated in conspiracies with Epstein both to transport
minor victims and to entice minor victims to travel with the intent to commit illegal sex acts.
Indictment ¶¶ 9-11, 15-17. In the course and as part of those conspiracies, the defendant groomed
multiple minor victims for sexual abuse by Epstein through multiple methods, including
befriending victims and encouraging minor victims to provide massages to Epstein knowing he
would engage in sex acts with them. Id. ¶¶ 1, 4, 7, 14. As detailed in the Indictment, that grooming
was a fundamental part of both conspiracies because it encouraged minor victims to be alone with
and to engage in sex acts with Epstein. Id. ¶¶ 1, 4, 14. It follows that the defendant’s role grooming
Minor Victim-3 to engage in sex acts with Epstein was a part of and therefore constitutes evidence
of these conspiracies. Id. ¶¶ 7(c), 11(d), 17(d).

The defense claims that because the Indictment does not allege that each element of
substantive violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 and 2423(a) was met as to Minor Victim-3, her
experiences cannot be direct evidence of the conspiracies to violate those statutes charged in
Counts One and Three. But that argument ignores a fundamental tenet of conspiracy law. It is
axiomatic that a conspiracy does not require a completed substantive crime. See Salinas v. United
States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997) (“It is elementary that a conspiracy may exist and be punished
whether or not the substantive crime ensures, for the conspiracy is a distinct evil, dangerous to the

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