HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011484.jpg
2.28 MB
Extraction Summary
5
People
4
Organizations
7
Locations
2
Events
2
Relationships
3
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
House oversight committee document / memoir or manuscript excerpt
File Size:
2.28 MB
Summary
This document appears to be page 13 of a memoir, manuscript, or speech draft, marked with House Oversight Committee stamp 011484. The text is written in the first person, almost certainly by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, discussing the failures of the Camp David summit, his interactions with Bill Clinton and Yasser Arafat, and his criticisms of Benjamin 'Bibi' Netanyahu's approach to the Palestinian peace process. It analyzes the geopolitical landscape involving moderate Sunni states, Iran, and global powers like the US, Russia, and China.
People (5)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Bibi | Politician (Benjamin Netanyahu) |
Referred to by the author regarding negotiating challenges and political calculations.
|
| Yasir Arafat | Former Palestinian Leader |
Mentioned regarding his refusal of offers at Camp David and subsequent death.
|
| Churchill | Historical Figure |
Quoted regarding pessimists and optimists.
|
| Bill Clinton | Former US President |
Discussed the failure of the Camp David summit with the author.
|
| The Narrator | Author (Implied: Ehud Barak) |
The first-person narrator ('I') who presented proposals at Camp David and spoke with Bill Clinton. Contextually impli...
|
Organizations (4)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Hamas |
Mentioned in the context of the takeover of Gaza.
|
|
| Arab League |
Endorsed the Saudi 'peace plan'.
|
|
| Israeli government |
Successive governments mentioned regarding the dismissal of the Saudi peace plan.
|
|
| House Oversight Committee |
Source of the document (implied by footer stamp).
|
Timeline (2 events)
Locations (7)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Site of summit and failed negotiations.
|
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Mentioned regarding Hamas takeover.
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|
Country facing political and security challenges.
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Region requiring new political arrangements.
|
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|
Mentioned as having interest in Middle East arrangements.
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Mentioned as having interest in Middle East arrangements.
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Mentioned as having interest in Middle East arrangements.
|
Relationships (2)
Conversations at Camp David regarding peace proposals.
The Narrator (Ehud Barak)
→
Political Rivals/Colleagues
→
Bibi (Netanyahu)
Narrator repeatedly questioning Bibi's political calculations.
Key Quotes (3)
"Bibi is right about one thing. The negotiating challenges have become more difficult since Arafat’s refusal of our offer at Camp David."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011484.jpg
Quote #1
"“If you’re so sure you don’t have a negotiating partner in the Palestinians, who not at least try? Seriously. What do you have to lose?”"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011484.jpg
Quote #2
"In the final days of the Camp David summit... a disheartened Bill Clinton said to me that he could understand, just about, why Yasir Arafat had not accepted the unprecedentedly far-reaching proposals I had presented."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011484.jpg
Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,574 characters)
Bibi is right about one thing. The negotiating challenges have become more
difficult since Arafat’s refusal of our offer at Camp David. Arafat is no longer
alive. Palestinian politics have become ever more fragmented and messy, not
least as a result of the Hamas takeover of Gaza.
difficult since Arafat’s refusal of our offer at Camp David. Arafat is no longer
alive. Palestinian politics have become ever more fragmented and messy, not
least as a result of the Hamas takeover of Gaza.
But Churchill once said that the difference between a pessimist and an
optimist was that the pessimist always saw difficulties in every opportunity. The
optimist saw opportunities in the difficulties.
optimist was that the pessimist always saw difficulties in every opportunity. The
optimist saw opportunities in the difficulties.
I, of all people, do not look at such opportunities without hard-headed
analysis, even a dose of scepticism. But the opportunities are undeniably there,
and never has Israel risked paying a higher price for failing to see and at least to
try to act on them.
analysis, even a dose of scepticism. But the opportunities are undeniably there,
and never has Israel risked paying a higher price for failing to see and at least to
try to act on them.
The first port of call should still be the Palestinians. I have repeatedly asked
Bibi, and the right-wing rivals that seem often to loom large in his political
calculations: “If you’re so sure you don’t have a negotiating partner in the
Palestinians, who not at least try? Seriously. What do you have to lose?”
Bibi, and the right-wing rivals that seem often to loom large in his political
calculations: “If you’re so sure you don’t have a negotiating partner in the
Palestinians, who not at least try? Seriously. What do you have to lose?”
But beyond this, there is a whole range of relatively moderate countries –
and, as Sunni states, strongly anti-Iranian countries – which share with Israel a
real, practical interest in putting in place a new political arrangement in the
Middle East. So does the United States, Russia, even China. Each, in their own
ways, is threatened by a terror threat that will require international action, and
many years, finally to defeat.
and, as Sunni states, strongly anti-Iranian countries – which share with Israel a
real, practical interest in putting in place a new political arrangement in the
Middle East. So does the United States, Russia, even China. Each, in their own
ways, is threatened by a terror threat that will require international action, and
many years, finally to defeat.
A Saudi “peace plan”, for instance, has been on the table for years. Formally
endorsed by the Arab League, it proposes a swap: Israeli withdrawal for full and
final peace and Arab recognition. Successive Israeli governments have
dismissed it out of hand, arguing that the withdrawal which the Saudi proposal
demanded – every inch of territory, back to the borders before the Six-Day War
– would be not only politically unacceptable, but practically impossible.
endorsed by the Arab League, it proposes a swap: Israeli withdrawal for full and
final peace and Arab recognition. Successive Israeli governments have
dismissed it out of hand, arguing that the withdrawal which the Saudi proposal
demanded – every inch of territory, back to the borders before the Six-Day War
– would be not only politically unacceptable, but practically impossible.
In the final days of the Camp David summit, as our failure was becoming
inescapably clear, a disheartened Bill Clinton said to me that he could
understand, just about, why Yasir Arafat had not accepted the unprecedentedly
far-reaching proposals I had presented. But what he couldn’t grasp was how the
Palestinian leader could say no even to accepting them as a basis for the hard,
further work which we all knew a final peace agreement would entail. Wasn’t
Arafat capable of looking beyond the political risks, of understanding the
greater risks of inaction. Of seeing the rewards? Of looking ahead?
inescapably clear, a disheartened Bill Clinton said to me that he could
understand, just about, why Yasir Arafat had not accepted the unprecedentedly
far-reaching proposals I had presented. But what he couldn’t grasp was how the
Palestinian leader could say no even to accepting them as a basis for the hard,
further work which we all knew a final peace agreement would entail. Wasn’t
Arafat capable of looking beyond the political risks, of understanding the
greater risks of inaction. Of seeing the rewards? Of looking ahead?
13
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