HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023489.jpg

3

force, while pursuing a further treaty to ban the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons.
Significant political hurdles must be overcome to make progress on
these last two aims. In the case of the CTBT, we must build support
in the US Senate by showing that the treaty will advance American
interests, especially by limiting the current nuclear build-up in Asia.
Meanwhile if a deal to proceed with negotiations for the Fissile
Material Cutoff treaty proves illusive, we will move to create a new
forum of like-minded states to move forward.
As we implement the new Start treaty, the next round of nuclear
weapons reductions must also begin. A review, under President
Obama’s direction, will develop options for new reductions in the US
stockpile. Once complete, this will shape our approach to a new
agreement with Russia. Past agreements have only dealt with some
categories of nuclear weapons, but we believe the next round must be
as wide as possible, including both non-deployed and tactical nuclear
weapons.
We must address the issue of Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons,
which have never been subject to numerical limits. To do this we
seek to reduce the role and number of US tactical nuclear weapons, as
Russia takes reciprocal measures to reduce its own tactical forces,
and also to relocate these away from Nato’s borders. We would also
like increased transparency concerning the numbers, locations and
types of these tactical forces in Europe.
These new reductions will not be easy. While protecting national
security information both sides will need to be able to monitor
nuclear weapons in storage and weapons awaiting destruction. This
means more demanding verification, to confirm that any future
agreements will actually be implemented – and we plan to begin
discussions on this with Russia in the near future.

HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023489