EFTA00035925.pdf
596 KB
Extraction Summary
4
People
4
Organizations
2
Locations
3
Events
2
Relationships
5
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Government memorandum (response to oig draft report)
File Size:
596 KB
Summary
This document is a formal memorandum from the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) responding to an Office of Inspector General (OIG) draft report dated June 15, 2023, concerning the custody and death of Jeffrey Epstein at MCC New York. The BOP addresses eight specific recommendations, concurring with some regarding camera maintenance and lieutenant rounds, but disagreeing with others related to cellmate assignment policies and the assertion that staffing shortages caused the negligence leading to Epstein's suicide. The BOP explicitly states that the failure to conduct rounds was due to employee misconduct/negligence rather than understaffing, noting that the unit was fully staffed at the time.
People (4)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Jeffrey Epstein | Deceased Inmate / Subject of Report |
The subject of the OIG investigation regarding his death while in BOP custody at MCC New York.
|
| [Redacted] | Assistant Inspector General, Investigations Division |
Recipient of the memorandum.
|
| [Redacted] | Director/Official, Federal Bureau of Prisons |
Sender of the memorandum (Office of the Director).
|
| Unspecified Employees | MCC New York Staff |
Accused of negligence, failure to conduct rounds, and falsifying logs. Two employees worked a 24-hour shift.
|
Organizations (4)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) |
The agency responding to the report; responsible for federal prisons.
|
|
| Office of Inspector General (OIG) |
The oversight body that issued the draft report and recommendations.
|
|
| Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) New York |
The facility where Jeffrey Epstein was held and died.
|
|
| U.S. Department of Justice |
Parent agency of BOP.
|
Locations (2)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Location of the incident (Epstein's death).
|
|
|
Location of BOP Central Office.
|
Relationships (2)
Report discusses 'Supervision of Jeffrey Epstein at the Metropolitan Correctional Center'.
BOP
→
Oversight
→
OIG
Memorandum responding to OIG recommendations.
Key Quotes (5)
"Using the Jeffrey Epstein incident as a basis for overhauling national policies and practices without evaluating whether similar trends exist at other locations or considering the role of employee accountability and training could be detrimental to sound correctional practices."Source
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Quote #1
"The negligence of specific employees at MCC New York in their duties should not be excused by reinforcing BOP’s staffing challenges as the basis for misconduct."Source
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Quote #2
"BOP was unaware of any changes to Mr. Epstein’s last will and testament prior to his death, yet it is consistently mentioned in the report, leading the reader to conclude differently..."Source
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Quote #3
"Identifying appropriate cellmates is best done in real time with the most current information, resulting in the safest outcomes."Source
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Quote #4
"Although these employees volunteered to work beyond 16 hours, BOP is examining options to ensure employees no longer work a consecutive 24-hour shift absent an institution emergency."Source
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Quote #5
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (15,706 characters)
U. S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Prisons
Central Office
Office of the Director
Washington, DC 20534
June 16, 2023
Federal Bureau of Prisons
Central Office
Office of the Director
Washington, DC 20534
June 16, 2023
MEMORANDUM FOR [REDACTED]
ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL
INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION
ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL
INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION
FROM: [REDACTED]
SUBJECT: Response to the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) Draft Report:
Investigation and Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Custody, Care,
and Supervision of Jeffrey Epstein at the Metropolitan Correctional Center
in New York, New York
Investigation and Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Custody, Care,
and Supervision of Jeffrey Epstein at the Metropolitan Correctional Center
in New York, New York
The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) appreciates the opportunity to formally respond to the Office of the
Inspector General's above-referenced draft report. BOP values OIG's careful review of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the death of Jeffrey Epstein and will utilize this report to apply lessons
learned where applicable to the broader BOP correctional landscape. Under its current leadership, BOP
is committed to improving the agency's ability to meet its mission. In fact, in April of this year, BOP
announced its new mission as "corrections professionals who foster a humane and secure environment
and ensure public safety by preparing individuals for successful reentry into our communities." BOP
must treat the adults in its custody with dignity and respect and ensure they receive necessary medical
and mental health care on an individualized basis, consistent with sound correctional judgment.
Inspector General's above-referenced draft report. BOP values OIG's careful review of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the death of Jeffrey Epstein and will utilize this report to apply lessons
learned where applicable to the broader BOP correctional landscape. Under its current leadership, BOP
is committed to improving the agency's ability to meet its mission. In fact, in April of this year, BOP
announced its new mission as "corrections professionals who foster a humane and secure environment
and ensure public safety by preparing individuals for successful reentry into our communities." BOP
must treat the adults in its custody with dignity and respect and ensure they receive necessary medical
and mental health care on an individualized basis, consistent with sound correctional judgment.
However, certain recommendations from this report appear to reflect an assumption that because a
limited number of employees at MCC New York failed to adhere to BOP policies and practices, those
policies and practices must themselves be flawed. As an agency with more than 35,000 employees
across more than 120 facilities, BOP believes that employees who fail to adhere to the law, regulations,
and BOP's own policies must be held accountable. However, the vast majority of BOP's employees
work tirelessly under challenging conditions. We must be careful not to ascribe the facts specific to the
Jeffrey Epstein incident at MCC New York to BOP's entire workforce. Using the Jeffrey Epstein
incident as a basis for overhauling national policies and practices without evaluating whether similar
trends exist at other locations or considering the role of employee accountability and training could be
detrimental to sound correctional practices.
limited number of employees at MCC New York failed to adhere to BOP policies and practices, those
policies and practices must themselves be flawed. As an agency with more than 35,000 employees
across more than 120 facilities, BOP believes that employees who fail to adhere to the law, regulations,
and BOP's own policies must be held accountable. However, the vast majority of BOP's employees
work tirelessly under challenging conditions. We must be careful not to ascribe the facts specific to the
Jeffrey Epstein incident at MCC New York to BOP's entire workforce. Using the Jeffrey Epstein
incident as a basis for overhauling national policies and practices without evaluating whether similar
trends exist at other locations or considering the role of employee accountability and training could be
detrimental to sound correctional practices.
BOP previously provided OIG its technical assessment of these recommendations in an effort to
resolve potential concerns prior to the publication of this report. BOP appreciates OIG's review of this
information and looks forward to working with OIG to address any remaining unresolved issues in the
immediate future. BOP's specific comments regarding OIG's recommendations are as follows:
resolve potential concerns prior to the publication of this report. BOP appreciates OIG's review of this
information and looks forward to working with OIG to address any remaining unresolved issues in the
immediate future. BOP's specific comments regarding OIG's recommendations are as follows:
Recommendation One: The BOP should implement a process for assigning a cellmate
following suicide watch or psychological observation.
following suicide watch or psychological observation.
BOP's Response: Although BOP cannot concur with this recommendation based on its current
wording, BOP agrees to implement a process for assigning a cellmate following suicide watch or
psychological observation whenever appropriate for the individual and when security concerns
allow.
wording, BOP agrees to implement a process for assigning a cellmate following suicide watch or
psychological observation whenever appropriate for the individual and when security concerns
allow.
BOP's current process, updated in the years following Jeffrey Epstein's death, already takes an
individualized approach to the care and custody of adults in custody in the context of suicide
watch and psychological observation. Upon removal from suicide watch or psychological
observation, psychologists make individualized care recommendations about clinical follow-up
and other custodial concerns, including housing and cellmates. Mental health, custody, and unit
team staff work collaboratively to ensure each individual removed from suicide watch has a
cellmate whenever clinically and correctionally appropriate. In the event an individual is
determined to have moderate to high baseline risk for suicide and no suitable cellmate can be
identified, continued placement on suicide watch is to be considered. BOP provides guidance
through national trainings each fiscal year for its psychologists about individualized care
recommendations.
individualized approach to the care and custody of adults in custody in the context of suicide
watch and psychological observation. Upon removal from suicide watch or psychological
observation, psychologists make individualized care recommendations about clinical follow-up
and other custodial concerns, including housing and cellmates. Mental health, custody, and unit
team staff work collaboratively to ensure each individual removed from suicide watch has a
cellmate whenever clinically and correctionally appropriate. In the event an individual is
determined to have moderate to high baseline risk for suicide and no suitable cellmate can be
identified, continued placement on suicide watch is to be considered. BOP provides guidance
through national trainings each fiscal year for its psychologists about individualized care
recommendations.
It is not sound correctional practice to apply a one size fits all approach regardless of a person's
individual needs and without factoring the safety of others or the security concerns of the
institution. For example, some persons may be extremely violent or pose a risk to other adults in
custody at the conclusion of suicide watch. Additionally, some of these persons may require
protective custody from others and placing them with a cellmate may create additional risk to
their safety. An adult in custody's status post suicide watch or psychological observation cannot
be the sole factor considered in cellmate placement; sound correctional judgement must be
utilized and is vital to the safe and orderly operations of BOP's institutions. Therefore, at times,
single celling may be the only sound correctional decision for an individual who has been
removed from suicide watch or psychological observation. However, single-celling is routinely
monitored by each region in the BOP.
individual needs and without factoring the safety of others or the security concerns of the
institution. For example, some persons may be extremely violent or pose a risk to other adults in
custody at the conclusion of suicide watch. Additionally, some of these persons may require
protective custody from others and placing them with a cellmate may create additional risk to
their safety. An adult in custody's status post suicide watch or psychological observation cannot
be the sole factor considered in cellmate placement; sound correctional judgement must be
utilized and is vital to the safe and orderly operations of BOP's institutions. Therefore, at times,
single celling may be the only sound correctional decision for an individual who has been
removed from suicide watch or psychological observation. However, single-celling is routinely
monitored by each region in the BOP.
Recommendation Two: The BOP should establish procedures to ensure inmates at high risk for
suicide and for whom a cellmate is recommended will continue to have a cell mate until the
recommendation is changed or rescinded, including establishing a contingency plan for cellmate
re-assignment, ensuring that another cellmate can be assigned efficiently.
suicide and for whom a cellmate is recommended will continue to have a cell mate until the
recommendation is changed or rescinded, including establishing a contingency plan for cellmate
re-assignment, ensuring that another cellmate can be assigned efficiently.
BOP's Response: BOP concurs with this recommendation insofar as BOP agrees to establish
procedures to ensure adults in custody at high risk for suicide and for whom a cellmate is
appropriate and recommended will continue to have a cellmate until the recommendation is
changed or rescinded.
procedures to ensure adults in custody at high risk for suicide and for whom a cellmate is
appropriate and recommended will continue to have a cellmate until the recommendation is
changed or rescinded.
BOP's current process already takes an individualized approach to the care and custody of adults
in custody in the context of suicide watch and psychological observation. Upon removal from
suicide watch or psychological observation, individualized care recommendations are made by
psychologists, custody, and unit team for each individual. BOP already makes each celling
assignment on an individual basis for persons deemed to be at moderate to high risk for suicide.
These considerations include both mental health and custodial concerns. Psychology Services,
Correctional Services, and Unit Team work closely to monitor individuals identified to be at risk
for suicide to determine placement considerations. BOP uses the Psychology Advisory List
(PAL) and PSY ALERT status to monitor those individuals whom employees should have
heightened awareness. These codes ensure employees are better able to monitor individuals at
risk for suicide to ensure they have an appropriate cellmate.
in custody in the context of suicide watch and psychological observation. Upon removal from
suicide watch or psychological observation, individualized care recommendations are made by
psychologists, custody, and unit team for each individual. BOP already makes each celling
assignment on an individual basis for persons deemed to be at moderate to high risk for suicide.
These considerations include both mental health and custodial concerns. Psychology Services,
Correctional Services, and Unit Team work closely to monitor individuals identified to be at risk
for suicide to determine placement considerations. BOP uses the Psychology Advisory List
(PAL) and PSY ALERT status to monitor those individuals whom employees should have
heightened awareness. These codes ensure employees are better able to monitor individuals at
risk for suicide to ensure they have an appropriate cellmate.
Regarding contingency planning, BOP has serious concerns about "contingency-planning" for
cellmates for adults in custody at high risk for suicide. The process of assessing this procedure
is impossible given the number of individuals determined high risk, the frequency of movement,
and the complexity of security concerns. Movement is frequent among BOP's mainline facilities
and even more so at pre-trial facilities. It is not feasible to maintain accurate, individualized
contingency plans listing several back-up individuals for each high-risk individual in its custody.
Identifying appropriate cellmates is best done in real time with the most current information,
resulting in the safest outcomes.
cellmates for adults in custody at high risk for suicide. The process of assessing this procedure
is impossible given the number of individuals determined high risk, the frequency of movement,
and the complexity of security concerns. Movement is frequent among BOP's mainline facilities
and even more so at pre-trial facilities. It is not feasible to maintain accurate, individualized
contingency plans listing several back-up individuals for each high-risk individual in its custody.
Identifying appropriate cellmates is best done in real time with the most current information,
resulting in the safest outcomes.
Recommendation Three: The BOP should implement a process that requires approval to be
obtained and documented for social or legal visits while an inmate is on suicide watch or
psychological observation.
obtained and documented for social or legal visits while an inmate is on suicide watch or
psychological observation.
BOP's Response: Although BOP cannot concur with this recommendation based on its current
wording, BOP agrees to evaluate its processes and train its employees to ensure approval is
obtained and documented for social or legal visits while an adult in custody is on suicide watch
or psychological observation. Pre-trial institutions such as MCC New York have supplemental
policy to address legal visits for persons on suicide watch. MCC New York had an appropriate
institutional supplement to address this issue but did not adhere to that policy. As noted above,
BOP will evaluate Program Statement 5324.08 and other relevant program statements to
determine an effective method for integrating information from the local Suicide Prevention
Coordinator regarding individuals' current stressors and protective factors into the Warden's
decision-making process.
wording, BOP agrees to evaluate its processes and train its employees to ensure approval is
obtained and documented for social or legal visits while an adult in custody is on suicide watch
or psychological observation. Pre-trial institutions such as MCC New York have supplemental
policy to address legal visits for persons on suicide watch. MCC New York had an appropriate
institutional supplement to address this issue but did not adhere to that policy. As noted above,
BOP will evaluate Program Statement 5324.08 and other relevant program statements to
determine an effective method for integrating information from the local Suicide Prevention
Coordinator regarding individuals' current stressors and protective factors into the Warden's
decision-making process.
Recommendation Four: The BOP should improve its methods of accounting for inmate
whereabouts and wellbeing by expanding institutional controls, training, and documentation.
whereabouts and wellbeing by expanding institutional controls, training, and documentation.
BOP's Response: Although BOP cannot concur with this recommendation based on its current
wording, BOP agrees to improve its methods for holding employees accountable for failing to
account for adult in custody whereabouts and wellbeing as required through established
institutional controls and documentation. BOP respectfully asserts that its current policies already require personnel to account for adult in custody whereabouts and wellbeing.
Program Statement 5500.14 outlines basic principles of accountability, such as count procedures,
census checks, control center records, daily change/transfer sheet, adult in custody callouts.
Policy also mandates institutions to develop a supplement which outlines adult in custody
accountability, specifically census checks.
wording, BOP agrees to improve its methods for holding employees accountable for failing to
account for adult in custody whereabouts and wellbeing as required through established
institutional controls and documentation. BOP respectfully asserts that its current policies already require personnel to account for adult in custody whereabouts and wellbeing.
Program Statement 5500.14 outlines basic principles of accountability, such as count procedures,
census checks, control center records, daily change/transfer sheet, adult in custody callouts.
Policy also mandates institutions to develop a supplement which outlines adult in custody
accountability, specifically census checks.
The OIG report's findings indicate a lack of employee accountability at MCC New York during
the period when this incident occurred. BOP acknowledges the lack of accountability at MCC
New York and is committed to ensuring its employees are appropriately trained and held
accountable. This includes employees being held accountable for the completion of job duties
involving controlling and documenting adult in custody movement, observation, and related
activities.
the period when this incident occurred. BOP acknowledges the lack of accountability at MCC
New York and is committed to ensuring its employees are appropriately trained and held
accountable. This includes employees being held accountable for the completion of job duties
involving controlling and documenting adult in custody movement, observation, and related
activities.
Recommendation Five: BOP policy should clarify what is required of a lieutenant when
conducting a round.
conducting a round.
BOP's Response: BOP concurs with this recommendation and intends to clarify what is required
of a lieutenant when conducting a round.
of a lieutenant when conducting a round.
Recommendation Six: The BOP should develop and implement a plan to address staffing
shortages at its prisons.
shortages at its prisons.
BOP's Response: BOP agrees that hiring and retaining qualified personnel is a key priority.
BOP has already developed and implemented a multi-pronged approach that involves enhanced
recruitment efforts and appropriate incentives. However, the scope of OIG's work in this
product was limited to the investigation and review of Jeffrey Epstein's suicide at MCC New
York and OIG did not request or give the BOP an opportunity to address the significant work
that has already been undertaken regarding staffing.
BOP has already developed and implemented a multi-pronged approach that involves enhanced
recruitment efforts and appropriate incentives. However, the scope of OIG's work in this
product was limited to the investigation and review of Jeffrey Epstein's suicide at MCC New
York and OIG did not request or give the BOP an opportunity to address the significant work
that has already been undertaken regarding staffing.
Further, we disagree with the inference in this recommendation that a staffing shortage
compounded the issues in this incident. While we recognize the statement by one employee that
rounds were not conducted because they were tired, the incident did not result from lack of
staffing. The Special Housing Unit was fully staffed on all three shifts prior to Jeffrey Epstein's
suicide, with employees who chose not to conduct rounds. [1] OIG's position that employees failed
to attend to their duties as a result of staffing challenges is tenuous and alleviates the
responsibility of employees to perform duties during their scheduled shifts. This responsibility is
carried out by the vast majority of BOP's employees every day and ensures the safety and
security of those in our care and custody. The negligence of specific employees at MCC New
York in their duties should not be excused by reinforcing BOP's staffing challenges as the basis
for misconduct.
compounded the issues in this incident. While we recognize the statement by one employee that
rounds were not conducted because they were tired, the incident did not result from lack of
staffing. The Special Housing Unit was fully staffed on all three shifts prior to Jeffrey Epstein's
suicide, with employees who chose not to conduct rounds. [1] OIG's position that employees failed
to attend to their duties as a result of staffing challenges is tenuous and alleviates the
responsibility of employees to perform duties during their scheduled shifts. This responsibility is
carried out by the vast majority of BOP's employees every day and ensures the safety and
security of those in our care and custody. The negligence of specific employees at MCC New
York in their duties should not be excused by reinforcing BOP's staffing challenges as the basis
for misconduct.
[1] OIG notes that these employees worked a 24-hour shift. Although these employees volunteered to work beyond 16
hours, BOP is examining options to ensure employees no longer work a consecutive 24-hour shift absent an
institution emergency.
hours, BOP is examining options to ensure employees no longer work a consecutive 24-hour shift absent an
institution emergency.
Recommendation Seven: The BOP should clarify and improve the cell search policy.
BOP's Response: BOP does not agree with this recommendation. BOP has established policy,
Program Statement 5521.06, Searches of Housing Units, Inmates, and Inmate Work Areas, and
Program Statement 5580.08, Inmate Personal Property, that outlines what an adult in custody is
allowed to have in their possession and defines contraband, to include procedures for handling it.
Program Statement 5270.11, Special Housing Units, outlines conditions of confinement, as well
as personal property allowed, within the Special Housing Unit. Controlling excessive property
and specifically linens is an employee performance and conduct issue rather than a policy issue.
It is not realistic or sound correctional practice for BOP's policy to specifically list each piece of
property an adult in custody may possess and the appropriate quantity for those items.
Program Statement 5521.06, Searches of Housing Units, Inmates, and Inmate Work Areas, and
Program Statement 5580.08, Inmate Personal Property, that outlines what an adult in custody is
allowed to have in their possession and defines contraband, to include procedures for handling it.
Program Statement 5270.11, Special Housing Units, outlines conditions of confinement, as well
as personal property allowed, within the Special Housing Unit. Controlling excessive property
and specifically linens is an employee performance and conduct issue rather than a policy issue.
It is not realistic or sound correctional practice for BOP's policy to specifically list each piece of
property an adult in custody may possess and the appropriate quantity for those items.
Additionally, institutions are required to supplement BOP cell search policy on a localized basis.
To insist upon an across-the-board national cell search requirement detailing specific item
restrictions fails to account for the wide variety of needs and diverse population of adults in
custody throughout BOP's many facilities. We do, however, believe that employees should be
held accountable when not following our policies.
To insist upon an across-the-board national cell search requirement detailing specific item
restrictions fails to account for the wide variety of needs and diverse population of adults in
custody throughout BOP's many facilities. We do, however, believe that employees should be
held accountable when not following our policies.
Recommendation Eight: The BOP should enhance existing policies regarding institutional
security camera systems to ensure they specifically state that such systems must have the
capacity to record video and that BOP institutions must conduct regular security camera system
functionality checks.
security camera systems to ensure they specifically state that such systems must have the
capacity to record video and that BOP institutions must conduct regular security camera system
functionality checks.
BOP's Response: BOP concurs with this recommendation and agrees to enhance policies that
already exist to ensure institutional security camera systems have capacity to record video and
are regularly checked for functionality. BOP notes that policies already exist concerning
institutional security camera systems. Program Statement 5500.15, Correctional Services
Manual, requires an Institutional Supplement for Security Inspections/Searches, and specifically
states, "The Warden is to establish, by Institution Supplement, a security inspection system that
involves all departments. The Institution Supplement will include posts and areas required to
submit inspection forms, frequency of submission, guidelines for checking security features, and
reporting of weaknesses and inconsistencies."
already exist to ensure institutional security camera systems have capacity to record video and
are regularly checked for functionality. BOP notes that policies already exist concerning
institutional security camera systems. Program Statement 5500.15, Correctional Services
Manual, requires an Institutional Supplement for Security Inspections/Searches, and specifically
states, "The Warden is to establish, by Institution Supplement, a security inspection system that
involves all departments. The Institution Supplement will include posts and areas required to
submit inspection forms, frequency of submission, guidelines for checking security features, and
reporting of weaknesses and inconsistencies."
Additional Concerns: While the above is our formal response to the recommendations, BOP
would also like to note our continued strong objections to some of the technical
language/inconsistencies/security concerns still included in the version of the report provided to
us on June 15th, 2023.
would also like to note our continued strong objections to some of the technical
language/inconsistencies/security concerns still included in the version of the report provided to
us on June 15th, 2023.
Specifically, BOP was unaware of any changes to Mr. Epstein's last will and testament prior to
his death, yet it is consistently mentioned in the report, leading the reader to conclude
differently (i.e., that BOP was aware prior to his death). Additionally, the report indicates that
there were delays in completing the camera upgrade/repair; however, BOP would like to note
that the upgrade/repair had been requested. Also, the BOP adamantly objects to the use of the
term "widespread" in relation to the failure of employees to follow policy. Finally, our concerns
regarding the specific language in relation to Special Housing Unit keys was inconsistent in the
report (i.e., differences in language were noted on pages iii, 23, and 96). We have attached all
of our technical comments to this memorandum.
his death, yet it is consistently mentioned in the report, leading the reader to conclude
differently (i.e., that BOP was aware prior to his death). Additionally, the report indicates that
there were delays in completing the camera upgrade/repair; however, BOP would like to note
that the upgrade/repair had been requested. Also, the BOP adamantly objects to the use of the
term "widespread" in relation to the failure of employees to follow policy. Finally, our concerns
regarding the specific language in relation to Special Housing Unit keys was inconsistent in the
report (i.e., differences in language were noted on pages iii, 23, and 96). We have attached all
of our technical comments to this memorandum.
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this report. We look forward to OIG closing the
recommendations that the BOP has agreed to address.
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