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Extraction Summary
4
People
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Organizations
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Locations
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Events
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Relationships
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Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Court filing / legal memorandum (case 1:20-cr-00330-pae)
File Size:
699 KB
Summary
This document is page 6 of a legal filing (Document 621) from the case United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell (1:20-cr-00330-PAE), filed on February 25, 2022. The text presents legal arguments defining the differences between 'constructive amendment' and 'variance' regarding indictments. It cites Second Circuit precedents (Lebedev, Gross, McGinn, D'Amelio) to argue that minor factual divergences at trial do not invalidate a conviction as long as the 'core of criminality' remains the same.
People (4)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Lebedev | Legal Precedent |
Cited in case law (Lebedev, 932 F.3d at 53) regarding flexibility in proof.
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| Gross | Legal Precedent |
Cited in case law (Gross, 2017 WL 4685111) regarding evidence diverging from an indictment.
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| McGinn | Legal Precedent |
Cited in case law (United States v. McGinn) regarding proof at trial not needing to be a precise replica of charges.
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| D'Amelio | Legal Precedent |
Cited in case law (United States v. D'Amelio) regarding constructive amendment.
|
Organizations (2)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Second Circuit Court of Appeals |
Cited as the authority establishing legal standards for constructive amendment and variance.
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| Department of Justice |
Indicated by the Bates stamp 'DOJ-OGR'.
|
Key Quotes (4)
"The 'object of a conspiracy constitutes an essential element of the conspiracy offense.'"Source
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Quote #1
"The Second Circuit has 'consistently permitted significant flexibility in proof, provided that the defendant was given notice of the core of criminality to be proven at trial.'"Source
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Quote #2
"a defendant 'cannot simply show that the facts diverged greatly from those alleged in the indictment,' but rather that 'the evidence and jury instructions created a substantial likelihood that a defendant was convicted for behavior entirely separate from that identified in the indictment.'"Source
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Quote #3
"In contrast to a constructive amendment, a variance occurs when the charging terms of the indictment are left unaltered, but the evidence offered at trial proves facts materially different"Source
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Quote #4
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,093 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 621 Filed 02/25/22 Page 6 of 51
crime, in general terms,” but not “the particulars of how a defendant effected the crime.” Id. at
*20. The “object of a conspiracy constitutes an essential element of the conspiracy offense.”
Id. However, text in an indictment, such as “factual allegations that do not prove essential
elements of a charge” and “general factual allegations leading into the statutory allegations” are
not limitations on the core of criminality alleged in an indictment. Id.
*20. The “object of a conspiracy constitutes an essential element of the conspiracy offense.”
Id. However, text in an indictment, such as “factual allegations that do not prove essential
elements of a charge” and “general factual allegations leading into the statutory allegations” are
not limitations on the core of criminality alleged in an indictment. Id.
Once a court identifies the core of criminality, the court “must then determine whether the
evidence or jury instructions at trial created a substantial likelihood that the defendant was not
convicted of the crime described in that core, but of a crime ‘distinctly different’ from the one
alleged.” Id. The Second Circuit has “consistently permitted significant flexibility in proof,
provided that the defendant was given notice of the core of criminality to be proven at trial.”
Lebedev, 932 F.3d at 53. Accordingly, a defendant “cannot simply show that the facts diverged
greatly from those alleged in the indictment,” but rather that “the evidence and jury instructions
created a substantial likelihood that a defendant was convicted for behavior entirely separate from
that identified in the indictment.” Gross, 2017 WL 4685111, at *21; see United States v. McGinn,
787 F.3d 116, 128 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[T]he proof at trial need not, indeed cannot, be a precise replica
of the charges contained in an indictment . . . .”). “[T]he Second Circuit has made clear that a
constructive amendment does not occur where the facts at trial involve not a ‘distinctly different
complex set of uncharged facts’ but ‘a single set of discrete facts consistent with the charge in the
indictment.’” Id. (quoting United States v. D’Amelio, 683 F.3d 412, 419 (2d Cir. 2012)).
evidence or jury instructions at trial created a substantial likelihood that the defendant was not
convicted of the crime described in that core, but of a crime ‘distinctly different’ from the one
alleged.” Id. The Second Circuit has “consistently permitted significant flexibility in proof,
provided that the defendant was given notice of the core of criminality to be proven at trial.”
Lebedev, 932 F.3d at 53. Accordingly, a defendant “cannot simply show that the facts diverged
greatly from those alleged in the indictment,” but rather that “the evidence and jury instructions
created a substantial likelihood that a defendant was convicted for behavior entirely separate from
that identified in the indictment.” Gross, 2017 WL 4685111, at *21; see United States v. McGinn,
787 F.3d 116, 128 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[T]he proof at trial need not, indeed cannot, be a precise replica
of the charges contained in an indictment . . . .”). “[T]he Second Circuit has made clear that a
constructive amendment does not occur where the facts at trial involve not a ‘distinctly different
complex set of uncharged facts’ but ‘a single set of discrete facts consistent with the charge in the
indictment.’” Id. (quoting United States v. D’Amelio, 683 F.3d 412, 419 (2d Cir. 2012)).
“In contrast to a constructive amendment, a variance occurs when the charging terms of
the indictment are left unaltered, but the evidence offered at trial proves facts materially different
the indictment are left unaltered, but the evidence offered at trial proves facts materially different
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DOJ-OGR-00009568
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