HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011834.jpg

/ BARAK / 77

moment in the summit. If we could find common ground, he said, Israel would
have achieved what had eluded it under Rabin, and even Ben-Gurion: “end of
conflict, and Jerusalem recognized internationally as your capital.” I told him that
the discussion with my negotiators had been moving and illuminating. “I could see
how much it weighed on everyone.” But I added that I still did not feel anything of
a similar nature, or remotely as serious, was happening on the Palestinian side. I
also said that in deciding how to proceed, I couldn’t ignore political realities back
home. I would have to get any major change in our position concerning Jerusalem
through the Knesset, even before putting a peace agreement to a referendum.

“When will you get back to me with your paper?” he asked. I said I’d try by
midnight. I also asked him whether he could delay going to the G8 summit in
Japan, for which he was due to leave Camp David on the morning of the 19th. That
meant we had just one full day left. I said even if the plan was to resume our talks
afterward, I couldn’t move on Jerusalem right before we recessed. It would mean
“putting my last and best offer on the table” and running the risk of leaks in Israel
while Clinton was gone. He said that he had to go to the G8, but would try to put
off leaving for a further day. Then, he asked me to draw up a list of questions for
him to present to Arafat so that we could solidify our understanding of how far he
was ready to go for peace.

I had Shlomo get busy on the list of questions. But it took time. We reconvened
around eleven at night, to discuss both the questions and the Jerusalem package.
Though it retained Israeli sovereignty over the entirety of the Old City, it did give
the Palestinians a greater measure of control over other areas of East Jerusalem
than any Israeli government had been willing to consider in the past. Still, almost
everyone in the negotiating team could live with it, assuming it became the critical
element in a final peace. Dan Meridor, alone, remained firmly opposed, though
Elyakim Rubinstein also had some reservations. Even Dan said he understood the
importance of getting a peace agreement, if indeed it was possible, and our
readiness to discuss new proposals on Jerusalem.

When I left for Clinton’s cabin at about 1:00 am on Wednesday, I had no idea I
was about to enter the most difficult meeting – and the only real fight – I had with
him during our long effort to achieve a Middle East peace. I brought Shlomo and
Danny with me, which meant that Madeleine Albright, Dennis and Sandy Berger
stayed as well. I sensed tension in all of them, in large part, I soon discovered,
because they took exception to the more than twelve hours we had spent discussing

363
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011834