HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020521.jpg
1.94 MB
Extraction Summary
5
People
5
Organizations
4
Locations
2
Events
1
Relationships
7
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Government report / congressional oversight document
File Size:
1.94 MB
Summary
This document appears to be page 62 of a House Oversight report detailing Chinese influence operations targeting American think tanks. It describes how Chinese embassy and consular officials use a mix of praise, access, and threats to influence scholars' views on sensitive topics like Taiwan, Tibet, and Hong Kong. Specific incidents from 2018 are cited, including warnings regarding the Dalai Lama and US-Taiwan relations.
People (5)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Xi | President of China (implied) |
Mentioned in the context of 'Xi's reform efforts' and presidential term limits.
|
| Dalai Lama | Spiritual Leader |
Mentioned as a sensitive topic; projects related to him prompted calls from Chinese officials.
|
| Unnamed Hong Kong activist | Activist |
Invited to an event at US headquarters after being denied access elsewhere.
|
| Unnamed Think-Tank Analyst (Female) | Scholar/Analyst |
Subjected to both threats and praise by Chinese officials; taken to lunch.
|
| Unnamed Military Attaché | Chinese Official |
Visited an analyst to convey opposition to US-Taiwan acts; issued a stern warning.
|
Organizations (5)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Chinese Embassy |
Officials from here frequently meet with interviewees to influence views.
|
|
| Communist Party |
Meetings often requested after important Party events.
|
|
| National People's Congress |
Mentioned regarding the 2018 annual meeting.
|
|
| US Navy |
Mentioned regarding ship visits.
|
|
| House Oversight Committee |
Implied by the footer label 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT'.
|
Locations (4)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Topic of sensitivity; home of mentioned activist.
|
|
|
Location of headquarters and think tanks.
|
|
|
Subject of political tension; mentioned in warnings by military attachés.
|
|
|
Topic of sensitivity warned against by Chinese officials.
|
Relationships (1)
Chinese Embassy Officials
→
Influence/Pressure
→
US Think Tank Analysts
Officials use threats, praise, lunches, and warnings to influence the analysts' output and choice of speakers.
Key Quotes (7)
"We are no longer weak, and can inflict pain on Taiwan, if the United States is not careful and does not abide by the Three Communiques."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020521.jpg
Quote #1
"This is very troubling—it will have consequences."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020521.jpg
Quote #2
"concern with her mind set"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020521.jpg
Quote #3
"just do[es] not understand the situation"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020521.jpg
Quote #4
"knows too much about Chinese policy"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020521.jpg
Quote #5
"too gloomy"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020521.jpg
Quote #6
"didn’t have the correct data"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020521.jpg
Quote #7
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,755 characters)
62
in one instance, inviting a well-known Hong Kong activist denied access at one center
event to participate in an event at the US headquarters later.
event to participate in an event at the US headquarters later.
Chinese Outreach to US Think Tanks
Chinese outreach to American think tanks takes several forms, including via embassy
and consular officials, Chinese think-tank scholars, and representatives of China’s
state-run media.
and consular officials, Chinese think-tank scholars, and representatives of China’s
state-run media.
Embassy and Consular Officials
Chinese embassy and consular officials meet frequently with many (but not all) of
the interviewees. Sometimes their aim is to assess Americans’ views on particular
issues or offer feedback on particular articles (generally those that are critical of
China). In one case, for example, a Chinese official stated that a particular analyst’s
understanding was “too gloomy,” and in another that a scholar “didn’t have the
correct data.” One think-tank scholar noted that Chinese officials use both threats
and praise to try to influence her. On the one hand, they took her to lunch and
expressed “concern with her mind set” indicating that she just “just do[es] not
understand the situation.” But embassy and Chinese government officials can also be
effusive in their praise and offers of assistance, suggesting that she “knows too much
about Chinese policy.”
the interviewees. Sometimes their aim is to assess Americans’ views on particular
issues or offer feedback on particular articles (generally those that are critical of
China). In one case, for example, a Chinese official stated that a particular analyst’s
understanding was “too gloomy,” and in another that a scholar “didn’t have the
correct data.” One think-tank scholar noted that Chinese officials use both threats
and praise to try to influence her. On the one hand, they took her to lunch and
expressed “concern with her mind set” indicating that she just “just do[es] not
understand the situation.” But embassy and Chinese government officials can also be
effusive in their praise and offers of assistance, suggesting that she “knows too much
about Chinese policy.”
Oftentimes officials ask for meetings with think tankers to transmit messages after
important Communist Party or government events. After the annual meeting of
China’s legislature (the National People’s Congress) in 2018, for example, one think-
tank analyst was invited to lunch, only to endure an hour-and-a-half lecture on how
US media and analysts misunderstood the new change in presidential term limits and
Xi’s reform efforts. Another was visited by military attachés from the Chinese embassy
in an effort to convey China’s opposition to the Taiwan Travel Act, US Defense
Authorization Act, possible prospects for US Navy ship visits, and submarine sales to
Taiwan. In concluding his stern warnings, one attaché warned: “We are no longer
weak, and can inflict pain on Taiwan, if the United States is not careful and does not
abide by the Three Communiques.”
important Communist Party or government events. After the annual meeting of
China’s legislature (the National People’s Congress) in 2018, for example, one think-
tank analyst was invited to lunch, only to endure an hour-and-a-half lecture on how
US media and analysts misunderstood the new change in presidential term limits and
Xi’s reform efforts. Another was visited by military attachés from the Chinese embassy
in an effort to convey China’s opposition to the Taiwan Travel Act, US Defense
Authorization Act, possible prospects for US Navy ship visits, and submarine sales to
Taiwan. In concluding his stern warnings, one attaché warned: “We are no longer
weak, and can inflict pain on Taiwan, if the United States is not careful and does not
abide by the Three Communiques.”
On other occasions, Chinese embassy officials ask for meetings to warn think tanks
against hosting speakers on topics often related to Taiwan, Hong Kong, or Tibet.
Several think-tank analysts reported that they or others in their institutions had
received calls from senior Chinese embassy officials regarding projects related to the
Dalai Lama, in one case stating, “This is very troubling—it will have consequences.”
As far as the analysts were concerned, however, there turned out to be no consequences.
Another received a complaint from the Chinese embassy after the think tank hosted
against hosting speakers on topics often related to Taiwan, Hong Kong, or Tibet.
Several think-tank analysts reported that they or others in their institutions had
received calls from senior Chinese embassy officials regarding projects related to the
Dalai Lama, in one case stating, “This is very troubling—it will have consequences.”
As far as the analysts were concerned, however, there turned out to be no consequences.
Another received a complaint from the Chinese embassy after the think tank hosted
Think Tanks
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020521
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