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9

Palestinian feelings cut across most, if not all, opposition groups. It is
a singular, unifying force that might suffice to break the military's
power, or at least to force the military to shift its Israeli policy.
Hamas in conflict with Israel as the United Nations votes for a
Palestinian state also places Fatah on the political defensive among
the Palestinians. Fatah cooperation with Israel while Gaza is at war
would undermine Fatah, possibly pushing Fatah to align with Hamas.
Having the U.N. vote take place while Gaza is at war, a vote possibly
accompanied by General Assembly condemnation of Israel, could
redefine the region.
Last week's attack on the Eilat road should be understood in this
context. Some are hypothesizing that new Islamist groups forming in
the Sinai or Palestinian groups in Gaza operating outside Hamas'
control carried out the attack. But while such organizations might
formally be separate from Hamas, I find it difficult to believe that
Hamas, with an excellent intelligence service inside Gaza and among
the Islamist groups in the Sinai, would not at least have known these
groups' broad intentions and would not have been in a position to
stop them. Just as Fatah created Black September in the 1970s, a
group that appeared separate from Fatah but was in fact covertly part
of it, the strategy of creating new organizations to take the blame for
conflicts is an old tactic both for the Palestinians and throughout the
world.
Hamas' ideal attack would offer it plausible deniability - allowing it
to argue it did not even know an attack was imminent, much less
carry it out - and trigger an Israeli attack on Gaza. Such a scenario
casts Israel as the aggressor and Hamas as the victim, permitting
Hamas to frame the war to maximum effect in Egypt and among the
Palestinians, as well as in the wider Islamic world and in Europe.
Regional Implications and Israel's Dilemma

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