HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011816.jpg
2.12 MB
Extraction Summary
5
People
3
Organizations
6
Locations
1
Events
2
Relationships
4
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Book manuscript / evidence exhibit (house oversight committee)
File Size:
2.12 MB
Summary
This document appears to be a page from a manuscript or memoir written by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (indicated by the header '/ BARAK / 59'). It details the diplomatic prelude to the 2000 Camp David Summit, including specific phone calls with President Bill Clinton in early July regarding land swaps and sovereignty in East Jerusalem. The text also recounts a briefing Barak gave to his ministers outlining his negotiating principles and the risks of failure. The document bears a 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT' Bates stamp, suggesting it was collected as evidence during a congressional investigation, likely related to Epstein due to Barak's known association, though Epstein is not mentioned in this specific text.
People (5)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ehud Barak | Author / Prime Minister of Israel (Implied) |
The narrator ('I') listed as '/ BARAK /' in the header, discussing negotiations with Clinton and his ministers.
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| Bill Clinton | US President |
Phoned the author to discuss the summit and land swaps.
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| Dennis Ross | US Diplomat/Negotiator |
Referred to as 'Dennis', mentioned as probing the author's position on land swaps.
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| Yasser Arafat | Palestinian Leader |
Mentioned regarding his willingness to move on core issues.
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| Ministers | Israeli Cabinet Members |
Gathered by the author two days before leaving for the US.
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Organizations (3)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Labor |
Israeli political party mentioned in the context of government stance.
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| Likud |
Israeli political party mentioned in the context of government stance.
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| House Oversight Committee |
Implied by the Bates stamp 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT'.
|
Timeline (1 events)
Locations (6)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Location of the summit and where Clinton called from.
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Subject of negotiation (Arab neighborhoods, East Jerusalem) and location of settlement blocs.
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Destination of the author's trip.
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Mentioned regarding borders and 1967 lines.
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Country mentioned regarding settlement blocs becoming part of it.
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Region mentioned regarding changing its map and history.
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Relationships (2)
Direct phone calls, negotiating terms for a summit, sharing confidential assurances.
Barak compares Clinton's probing questions to those of 'Dennis'.
Key Quotes (4)
"I said that, for his ears only, I was willing to give him the assurance that, assuming that Arafat was willing to move toward us on core issues, I would consider limited, symbolic moves on both land swaps and Palestinian sovereignty in part of East Jerusalem."Source
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Quote #1
"Clinton replied: the summit was on. It would begin at Camp David in one week’s time, on July 11."Source
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Quote #2
"If we sit idle and don’t even try, we’ll face an eruption of violence, and never know whether we could have avoided it."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011816.jpg
Quote #3
"There would be 'no return to the 1967 lines,' meaning that we would draw a new border with the West Bank to accommodate the largest settlement blocs."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011816.jpg
Quote #4
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,367 characters)
/ BARAK / 59
When Clinton phoned me at the beginning of July, however, he still hadn’t finally decided to hold the summit. I needed him to know that, on my side, he’d have a truly willing partner, aware of the political risk he’d be taking. Like Dennis, the President tried to probe my position on land swaps, and Palestinian sovereignty for at least some Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem. Finally, he asked if I would rule out those possibilities if they represented the difference between success or failure at a summit. I did not give him a definitive “yes.” I said we could think through those issues together. But when he phoned again, on July 4 from Camp David, I felt I had to go further. I said that, for his ears only, I was willing to give him the assurance that, assuming that Arafat was willing to move toward us on core issues, I would consider limited, symbolic moves on both land swaps and Palestinian sovereignty in part of East Jerusalem.
Clinton replied: the summit was on. It would begin at Camp David in one week’s time, on July 11.
* * *
Two days before leaving for the US, I brought my ministers together. “We can’t know what will happen at a summit,” I said. “But we have a responsibility to give it a chance, and recognize the situation in which we find ourselves. If we sit idle and don’t even try, we’ll face an eruption of violence, and never know whether we could have avoided it. If, God forbid, we fail to reach an agreement, there will also be violence. We will face a new reality more difficult than you can imagine. But if we do manage the strike a deal, we are going to change the map and history of the Middle East.” I reminded them it would be up to Israelis to say yes or no, in a referendum, to the terms of any agreement we negotiated. “If we achieve a breakthrough, I’m confident they will do so, by a landslide.”
I said I would hold fast to a number of principles. There would be “no return to the 1967 lines,” meaning that we would draw a new border with the West Bank to accommodate the largest settlement blocs. They were mostly around Jerusalem, or just beyond the 1967 border. In practical terms, over the years they had become part of Israel. Tens of thousands of people lived there. As the Americans and even the Palestinian negotiators recognized, no Israeli government, Labor or Likud,
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HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011816
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011816
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