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Extraction Summary
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Document Information
Type:
Court filing / legal memorandum (page 5 of 9)
File Size:
673 KB
Summary
This is page 5 of a court filing (Document 122) from the case United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell, filed on January 25, 2021. The text presents a legal argument regarding 'double jeopardy' and 'multiplicity,' citing the 'Blockburger' test and the Second Circuit's 'Korfant factors' to determine if two conspiracy charges constitute the same offense. It lists eight specific factors courts use to analyze whether distinct conspiracies are actually the same legal offense.
People (1)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ghislaine Maxwell | Defendant |
Referred to as 'the defendant' (implied by Case Number 1:20-cr-00330-AJN which is USA v. Maxwell).
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Organizations (3)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| United States District Court |
Filing location (Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN)
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| Second Circuit Court of Appeals |
Cited for establishing the 'multifactor test' (Korfant factors).
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| Department of Justice (DOJ) |
Indicated by Bates stamp DOJ-OGR-00002304
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Key Quotes (3)
"Generally, “where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test . . . to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”"Source
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"These factors include: (1) the criminal offenses charged in successive indictments; (2) the overlap of participants; (3) the overlap of time; (4) similarity of operation; (5) the existence of common overt acts; (6) the geographic scope of the alleged conspiracies or location where overt acts occurred; (7) common objectives; and (8) the degree of interdependence between alleged distinct conspiracies."Source
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Quote #2
"“[N]o dominant factor or single touchstone determines whether the compared conspiracies are in law and fact the same.”"Source
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Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (1,920 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 122 Filed 01/25/21 Page 5 of 9
the defendant from the repetition of detail of a single course of conduct.” United States v.
Swaim, 757 F.2d 1530, 1534 (5th Cir. 1985).
Swaim, 757 F.2d 1530, 1534 (5th Cir. 1985).
Generally, “where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct
statutory provisions, the test . . . to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is
whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). However, where an accused is charged with two or more
conspiracies in violation of the same statutory provision—in this case, the general conspiracy
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371—the Second Circuit has adopted a multifactor test for determining
whether the conspiracies amount to the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. These factors
include: (1) the criminal offenses charged in successive indictments; (2) the overlap of
participants; (3) the overlap of time; (4) similarity of operation; (5) the existence of common
overt acts; (6) the geographic scope of the alleged conspiracies or location where overt acts
occurred; (7) common objectives; and (8) the degree of interdependence between alleged distinct
conspiracies. United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173, 180-81 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing the “Korfant
factors” from United States v. Korfant, 771 F.2d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam)); accord
United States v. Macchia, 35 F.3d 662, 667-68 (2d Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Diallo,
507 Fed. App’x 89 (2d Cir. 2013) (referring to Korfant factors as correct test to determine
whether two conspiracies charged in same indictment are same offense and therefore
multiplicitous). “[N]o dominant factor or single touchstone determines whether the compared
conspiracies are in law and fact the same.” Estrada, 320 F.3d at 181 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
statutory provisions, the test . . . to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is
whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). However, where an accused is charged with two or more
conspiracies in violation of the same statutory provision—in this case, the general conspiracy
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371—the Second Circuit has adopted a multifactor test for determining
whether the conspiracies amount to the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. These factors
include: (1) the criminal offenses charged in successive indictments; (2) the overlap of
participants; (3) the overlap of time; (4) similarity of operation; (5) the existence of common
overt acts; (6) the geographic scope of the alleged conspiracies or location where overt acts
occurred; (7) common objectives; and (8) the degree of interdependence between alleged distinct
conspiracies. United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173, 180-81 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing the “Korfant
factors” from United States v. Korfant, 771 F.2d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam)); accord
United States v. Macchia, 35 F.3d 662, 667-68 (2d Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Diallo,
507 Fed. App’x 89 (2d Cir. 2013) (referring to Korfant factors as correct test to determine
whether two conspiracies charged in same indictment are same offense and therefore
multiplicitous). “[N]o dominant factor or single touchstone determines whether the compared
conspiracies are in law and fact the same.” Estrada, 320 F.3d at 181 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
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DOJ-OGR-00002304
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