HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_031852.jpg
2.64 MB
Extraction Summary
3
People
1
Organizations
4
Locations
2
Events
2
Relationships
3
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Book excerpt / review / report page
File Size:
2.64 MB
Summary
This document appears to be a page from a book or a report analyzing Henry Kissinger's book 'On China'. It discusses the psychological and cultural differences between American and Chinese leadership, specifically referencing the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, the Korean War, and the philosophies of Mao Zedong and Jiang Zemin. The page bears a 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT' stamp, suggesting it was part of a document production for a congressional investigation.
People (3)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Henry Kissinger | Diplomat / Author |
Author of the book 'On China', discussed regarding his insights on Chinese psychology and leadership.
|
| Jiang Zemin | Chinese Leader |
Described as China's first Anglophone leader; quoted explaining Chinese principles to Kissinger in 1991.
|
| Mao Zedong | Chinese Leader |
Referred to as 'Mao'; discussed regarding the Korean War and his use of the 'Empty City Stratagem'.
|
Organizations (1)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| House Oversight Committee |
Indicated by the footer stamp 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_031852'.
|
Timeline (2 events)
1950-1953 (implied)
June 1989
Tiananmen Square pro-democracy demonstrations and subsequent military crackdown.
Tiananmen Square, China
Chinese Military
Demonstrators
Locations (4)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Subject of the book and geopolitical analysis.
|
|
|
Location of June 1989 pro-democracy demonstrations.
|
|
|
Location of war between US and China.
|
|
|
Referred to as 'Americans' or 'American elite'.
|
Relationships (2)
Kissinger 'has dealt with four generations of Chinese leaders.'
Jiang Zemin explained principles to Kissinger in 1991.
Key Quotes (3)
"Western concepts of human rights and individual liberties may not be directly translatable … to a civilization for millennia ordered around different concepts."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_031852.jpg
Quote #1
"We never submit to pressure … It is a philosophical principle."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_031852.jpg
Quote #2
"We may lose more than 300 million people. So what? War is war. The years will pass, and we’ll get to work producing more babies than ever before"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_031852.jpg
Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,059 characters)
19
Americans are better placed to answer that question than Kissinger,
who has dealt with four generations of Chinese leaders.
The most profound insights of On China are psychological. They
concern the fundamental cultural differences between a Chinese elite
who can look back more than two millennia for inspiration and an
American elite whose historical frame of reference is little more than
two centuries old. This became most obvious in the wake of June
1989, when Americans recoiled from the use of military force to end
the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy demonstrations. To
Kissinger’s eyes, it was doubly naive to retaliate to this crackdown
with sanctions: “Western concepts of human rights and individual
liberties may not be directly translatable … to a civilization for
millennia ordered around different concepts. Nor can the traditional
Chinese fear of political chaos be dismissed as an anachronistic
irrelevancy needing only ‘correction’ by Western enlightenment.”
As China’s first Anglophone leader, Jiang Zemin, explained to
Kissinger in 1991: “We never submit to pressure … It is a
philosophical principle.” The United States and China went to war
in Korea because of another cultural gap. It came as a surprise to the
Americans when Mao ordered Chinese intervention because the
military odds looked so unfavorable. But, argues Kissinger, his
“motivating force was less to inflict a decisive military first blow than
to change the psychological balance, not so much to defeat the enemy
as to alter his calculus of risks.” Mao was a master of the ancient
Empty City Stratagem, which seeks to conceal weakness with a show
of confidence, even aggression. To Westerners, his insistence that he
did not fear a nuclear attack seemed unhinged or, at best, callous
(“We may lose more than 300 million people. So what? War is war.
The years will pass, and we’ll get to work producing more babies
than ever before”). But this was classical Chinese bravado, or
“offensive deterrence.” “Chinese negotiators,” observes Kissinger
who has dealt with four generations of Chinese leaders.
The most profound insights of On China are psychological. They
concern the fundamental cultural differences between a Chinese elite
who can look back more than two millennia for inspiration and an
American elite whose historical frame of reference is little more than
two centuries old. This became most obvious in the wake of June
1989, when Americans recoiled from the use of military force to end
the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy demonstrations. To
Kissinger’s eyes, it was doubly naive to retaliate to this crackdown
with sanctions: “Western concepts of human rights and individual
liberties may not be directly translatable … to a civilization for
millennia ordered around different concepts. Nor can the traditional
Chinese fear of political chaos be dismissed as an anachronistic
irrelevancy needing only ‘correction’ by Western enlightenment.”
As China’s first Anglophone leader, Jiang Zemin, explained to
Kissinger in 1991: “We never submit to pressure … It is a
philosophical principle.” The United States and China went to war
in Korea because of another cultural gap. It came as a surprise to the
Americans when Mao ordered Chinese intervention because the
military odds looked so unfavorable. But, argues Kissinger, his
“motivating force was less to inflict a decisive military first blow than
to change the psychological balance, not so much to defeat the enemy
as to alter his calculus of risks.” Mao was a master of the ancient
Empty City Stratagem, which seeks to conceal weakness with a show
of confidence, even aggression. To Westerners, his insistence that he
did not fear a nuclear attack seemed unhinged or, at best, callous
(“We may lose more than 300 million people. So what? War is war.
The years will pass, and we’ll get to work producing more babies
than ever before”). But this was classical Chinese bravado, or
“offensive deterrence.” “Chinese negotiators,” observes Kissinger
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_031852
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