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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 642 Filed 03/11/22 Page 42 of 66

a serious concern as to whether an ordinary person in [Juror No. 50’s] shoes would be
able to disregard [his] own experiences in evaluating the evidence.” Id. Moreover, like
the juror in Ashfar, Juror No. 50’s post-trial conduct further supports a finding of implied
bias. The juror in Ashfar communicated with a victim of sexual assault; here, Juror No.
50 communicated with Annie Famer. The juror in Ashfar viewed himself as “advocate for
people;” here, Juror No. 50 proclaimed that the verdict against Ms. Maxwell was a
verdict “for all the victims.”

The bias of Juror No. 50 should be implied for another reason: “[R]epeated lies in
voir dire imply that the juror concealed material facts in order to secure a spot on the
particular jury.” Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 472. Here, not only did Juror No. 50
falsely deny on the questionnaire that he had been a victim of a crime and a victim of
sexual assault and sexual abuse, he also falsely answered the Court’s questions about
social media. According to Juror No. 50, he used only Facebook and Instagram and he
deleted all his social media accounts. In fact, Juror No. 50 was a Twitter user, having
joined Twitter in April 2021. His Twitter account appears to have been active during trial
and voir dire, notwithstanding his claim that he deleted all his social media accounts.
Moreover, after trial, Juror No. 50 used Twitter to publicize his interviews with the press
and to communicate directly to Annie Farmer. It also appears Juror No. 50 did not delete
his Instagram account.

Crucially, “[e]ven when prospective jurors are dishonest for reasons other than a
desire to secure a seat on the jury, dishonest answers to voir dire questions indicate that a
juror is unwilling or unable ‘to apply the law as instructed by the court to the evidence

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