HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019710.jpg
1.64 MB
Extraction Summary
3
People
4
Organizations
8
Locations
3
Events
1
Relationships
3
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Book excerpt / evidentiary document
File Size:
1.64 MB
Summary
This document is page 222 from the book 'How America Lost Its Secrets' (ISBN implied in footer), stamped with 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019710'. The text discusses the history of espionage between Russian intelligence (SVR/KGB) and the US NSA, specifically focusing on Putin's strategy in 2013 and the historical defection of NSA mathematicians William Martin and Bernon Mitchell in 1960. While the content is historical non-fiction, the file naming convention ('Epst_...') suggests it was included in a document production related to the Jeffrey Epstein investigation.
People (3)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Vladimir Putin | President of Russia |
Mentioned in the context of 2013 intelligence strategies against the NSA.
|
| William Martin | NSA Defector |
Mathematician who defected to Moscow in 1960.
|
| Bernon Mitchell | NSA Defector |
Mathematician who defected to Moscow in 1960.
|
Organizations (4)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| NSA |
National Security Agency, primary target of Russian espionage discussed in text.
|
|
| SVR |
Russian foreign intelligence service.
|
|
| KGB |
Former Russian intelligence service.
|
|
| House Oversight Committee |
Implied by the footer stamp 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT'.
|
Timeline (3 events)
1960
Defection of William Martin and Bernon Mitchell to Moscow via Cuba.
Moscow via Cuba
1960-09-06
Ninety-minute press conference organized by the KGB for the defectors.
Moscow
2013
Putin reckoning with reality that Russia could not compete with NSA in intercepting communications.
Russia
Locations (8)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Country involved in intelligence activities.
|
|
|
Country mentioned regarding monitoring activities.
|
|
|
Country mentioned regarding nuclear proliferation.
|
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|
Country mentioned regarding nuclear proliferation.
|
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|
Country mentioned regarding nuclear proliferation.
|
|
|
Main enemy of Russian intelligence according to text.
|
|
|
Destination of defectors.
|
|
|
Transit point for defectors in 1960.
|
Relationships (1)
They were mathematicians working on the NSA's decryption machines who went to Moscow via Cuba in 1960.
Key Quotes (3)
"The Russian intelligence service is, as far as is known, the only intelligence service in the world that ever succeeded in penetrating the NSA."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019710.jpg
Quote #1
"One way to remedy the imbalance between Russian intelligence and the NSA was via espionage."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019710.jpg
Quote #2
"The first two defectors in the NSA's history were William Martin and Bernon Mitchell."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019710.jpg
Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,448 characters)
222 | HOW AMERICA LOST ITS SECRETS
the activities of Russia and China. It was charged with monitoring
nuclear proliferation in Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea, poten-
tial jihadist threats everywhere in the world, and much else. The
Russian foreign intelligence service, the SVR, could put its limited
resources to work on redressing the gap with its main enemy: the
United States.
nuclear proliferation in Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea, poten-
tial jihadist threats everywhere in the world, and much else. The
Russian foreign intelligence service, the SVR, could put its limited
resources to work on redressing the gap with its main enemy: the
United States.
Nevertheless, Putin had to reckon with the reality in 2013 that
Russia could not compete with the NSA in the business of inter-
cepting communications. And if the NSA could listen in on all the
internal activities of its spy agencies and security regime, the ability
of Putin to use covert means to achieve his other global ambitions
would be impaired. In the cold peace that replaced the Cold War,
Russia had little hope of realizing these ambitions unless it could
weaken the NSA's iron-tight grip on global communications intel-
ligence. One way to remedy the imbalance between Russian intel-
ligence and the NSA was via espionage. Here the SVR would be the
instrument, and the immediate objective would be to acquire the
NSA's lists of its sources in Russia. If successful, it would be a game
changer.
Russia could not compete with the NSA in the business of inter-
cepting communications. And if the NSA could listen in on all the
internal activities of its spy agencies and security regime, the ability
of Putin to use covert means to achieve his other global ambitions
would be impaired. In the cold peace that replaced the Cold War,
Russia had little hope of realizing these ambitions unless it could
weaken the NSA's iron-tight grip on global communications intel-
ligence. One way to remedy the imbalance between Russian intel-
ligence and the NSA was via espionage. Here the SVR would be the
instrument, and the immediate objective would be to acquire the
NSA's lists of its sources in Russia. If successful, it would be a game
changer.
Such an ambitious penetration of the NSA, to be sure, was a tall
order for Russian intelligence. Most of its moles recruited in the
NSA by the KGB had been code clerks, guards, translators, and low-
level analysts. They provided documents about the NSA's cipher
breaking, but they lacked access to the lists of the NSA's sources and
methods. These meager results did not inhibit Russian efforts. For
six decades, ever since the inception of the NSA in 1952, the Russian
intelligence service had engaged in a covert war with the NSA.
order for Russian intelligence. Most of its moles recruited in the
NSA by the KGB had been code clerks, guards, translators, and low-
level analysts. They provided documents about the NSA's cipher
breaking, but they lacked access to the lists of the NSA's sources and
methods. These meager results did not inhibit Russian efforts. For
six decades, ever since the inception of the NSA in 1952, the Russian
intelligence service had engaged in a covert war with the NSA.
The Russian intelligence service is, as far as is known, the only
intelligence service in the world that ever succeeded in penetrating
the NSA. A number of NSA employees also defected to Moscow.
The history of this venerable enterprise is instructive.
intelligence service in the world that ever succeeded in penetrating
the NSA. A number of NSA employees also defected to Moscow.
The history of this venerable enterprise is instructive.
The first two defectors in the NSA's history were William Mar-
tin and Bernon Mitchell. They were mathematicians working on the
NSA's decryption machines who went to Moscow via Cuba in 1960.
The Russian intelligence service, then called the KGB, went to great
lengths to get propaganda value from their defections. It even orga-
nized a ninety-minute press conference for them on September 6,
tin and Bernon Mitchell. They were mathematicians working on the
NSA's decryption machines who went to Moscow via Cuba in 1960.
The Russian intelligence service, then called the KGB, went to great
lengths to get propaganda value from their defections. It even orga-
nized a ninety-minute press conference for them on September 6,
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