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strongly for their pain or confinement and future. In part, this kind of empathic extension may be motivated by the kind of anthropomorphic attitudes we have about non-human entities as discussed by Nick Epley in his chapter. The fact that we are adept at “feeling for” very different others whom we can observe but not truly understand suggests that we possess a capacity to cognitively re-represent others in our mind in a way we can understand. Indeed, second-order representation is a key component of empathy in humans, and may be a useful adaptation for human survival because it maximizes the range of individuals with whom we can form a social bond.

The Components of Empathy

The psychological components that make up full-blown empathy are supported by distinct and separable psychobiological systems. Empathy can be decomposed into an affective component that includes the perception and sharing of an emotional state observed in another individual, and a cognitive component that includes the motivation and intention to respond. Closely related is a regulatory component that involves adjustment of one’s emotional and behavioral response. The affective, cognitive, and regulatory aspects of empathy involve interacting, yet partially non-overlapping neural circuits. The initial component in the overall process leading to empathy draws on somatic mimicry, also known as “emotion contagion.” This affective component of empathy develops earlier than the cognitive component. Affective responsiveness is present at an early age, is involuntary, and relies on mimicry and linking of actions perceived in others with actions in oneself (i.e., perception-action coupling). For instance, newborns and infants become vigorously

distressed shortly after another infant begins to cry. Facial mimicry of basic emotional expressions also contributes to affective sharing, and this phenomenon starts very early in life, by approximately 10 weeks of age. This primitive mimicry mechanism, which may be based on mirror neurons, which are sensorimotor neurons found in the premotor, motor, and posterior parietal cortex of the brain that become active when observing as well as when enacting a behavior as discussed in Steven Small’s chapter. This kind of mechanism may contribute to the development of empathy in the early preverbal period, and continues to operate past childhood. There is evidence that when we perceive emotions and actions of others, we use the same neural circuits as when we produce the same emotions and actions ourselves (e.g., watching another individual being disgusted and experiencing disgust in oneself activate similar neural circuits). For instance, viewing facial expressions triggers expressions on one’s own face, even without explicit identification of what we’re seeing (4).

The cognitive component of empathy is closely related to processes involved in “theory of mind” (i.e., the ability to attribute mental states to others and to understand that others’ mental states can differ from one’s own) and self-regulation. The capacity for two people to resonate with each other emotionally, prior to any cognitive understanding, is the basis for developing shared emotional meanings, but it is not enough for mature empathic understanding and concern. Such an understanding requires the observer to form an explicit representation of the feelings of another person, a process that

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