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Extraction Summary
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Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Court filing / legal brief
File Size:
721 KB
Summary
This page from a legal filing in the case US v. Ghislaine Maxwell argues against the retroactive application of extended statutes of limitations in criminal cases, citing the Ex Post Facto Clause and cases like Landgraf and Stogner. A crucial footnote asserts that the government is barred from prosecuting Maxwell for offenses against Minor Victim-3 because the statute of limitations had already expired when the victim turned 25 (year redacted) prior to the 2003 Amendment.
People (3)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ms. Maxwell | Defendant |
Subject of prosecution mentioned in Footnote 4 regarding time-barred offenses.
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| Minor Victim-3 | Accuser/Victim |
Identified in the indictment; prosecution regarding offenses against her is argued to be barred due to statute of lim...
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| Calabresi, J. | Judge |
Cited in legal precedent (Thom v. Ashcroft).
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Organizations (4)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Second Circuit |
Cited for legal precedents regarding civil vs. criminal contexts.
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| First Circuit |
Cited for United States v. Miller.
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| Congress |
Mentioned regarding the enactment of the 2003 Amendment and legislative intent.
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| DOJ |
Indicated by Bates stamp DOJ-OGR-00002664.
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Relationships (1)
Footnote 4 discusses prosecution of Maxwell for offenses against Minor Victim-3.
Key Quotes (3)
"In the criminal context, the retroactive application of an extended statute of limitations to revive a time-barred claim is not merely an impermissible effect under Landgraf; it violates the Ex Post Facto Clause."Source
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Quote #1
"For this reason, the government would be barred from prosecuting Ms. Maxwell for any offense against the third accuser (identified in the indictment as Minor Victim-3) even if the 2003 Amendment otherwise applied"Source
DOJ-OGR-00002664.jpg
Quote #2
"the third accuser reached age 25 in [REDACTED], and thus the statute of limitations as to her had expired by the time of the 2003 Amendment."Source
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Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,253 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 144 Filed 02/04/21 Page 16 of 25
In the civil context, the Second Circuit has acknowledged a distinction between
retroactively applying an extended limitations period to revive a stale claim, which has been held
impermissible under Landgraf, and retroactively extending the limitations period for a live claim,
which has been held permissible. See, e.g., Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 57-58 (2d Cir. 2017)
(collecting and comparing civil cases). The criminal context, however, is fundamentally
different.
retroactively applying an extended limitations period to revive a stale claim, which has been held
impermissible under Landgraf, and retroactively extending the limitations period for a live claim,
which has been held permissible. See, e.g., Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 57-58 (2d Cir. 2017)
(collecting and comparing civil cases). The criminal context, however, is fundamentally
different.
At a minimum, Toussie “potentially alters the second step in the Landgraf approach” in
criminal cases. United States v. Miller, 911 F.3d 638, 645 (1st Cir. 2018) (evaluating 2003
Amendment in adjudicating ineffective assistance of counsel claim). “In other words, when
Congress has sounded an uncertain trumpet, a court ought to refrain from applying an enlarged
criminal statute of limitations retrospectively.” Id. As shown in the first step of Landgraf, the
trumpet sounded by Congress in enacting the 2003 Amendment was anything but uncertain:
congressional intent is clear.
criminal cases. United States v. Miller, 911 F.3d 638, 645 (1st Cir. 2018) (evaluating 2003
Amendment in adjudicating ineffective assistance of counsel claim). “In other words, when
Congress has sounded an uncertain trumpet, a court ought to refrain from applying an enlarged
criminal statute of limitations retrospectively.” Id. As shown in the first step of Landgraf, the
trumpet sounded by Congress in enacting the 2003 Amendment was anything but uncertain:
congressional intent is clear.
In the criminal context, the retroactive application of an extended statute of limitations to
revive a time-barred claim is not merely an impermissible effect under Landgraf; it violates the
Ex Post Facto Clause. Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 618 (2003).4 As Landgraf itself
recognized, however, the principle against retroactivity is not simply an application of the Ex
Post Facto Clause; rather, it is a “deeply rooted” presumption based on “[e]lementary
considerations” of fundamental “fairness.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265-66. See also Thom v.
Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., writing for the majority but noting
he was speaking for himself) (stating that anti-retroactivity presumption in Landgraf is “triggered
revive a time-barred claim is not merely an impermissible effect under Landgraf; it violates the
Ex Post Facto Clause. Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 618 (2003).4 As Landgraf itself
recognized, however, the principle against retroactivity is not simply an application of the Ex
Post Facto Clause; rather, it is a “deeply rooted” presumption based on “[e]lementary
considerations” of fundamental “fairness.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265-66. See also Thom v.
Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., writing for the majority but noting
he was speaking for himself) (stating that anti-retroactivity presumption in Landgraf is “triggered
4 For this reason, the government would be barred from prosecuting Ms. Maxwell for any offense against the third
accuser (identified in the indictment as Minor Victim-3) even if the 2003 Amendment otherwise applied, because
the third accuser reached age 25 in [REDACTED], and thus the statute of limitations as to her had expired by the time
of the 2003 Amendment.
accuser (identified in the indictment as Minor Victim-3) even if the 2003 Amendment otherwise applied, because
the third accuser reached age 25 in [REDACTED], and thus the statute of limitations as to her had expired by the time
of the 2003 Amendment.
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DOJ-OGR-00002664
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