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Extraction Summary
6
People
3
Organizations
0
Locations
2
Events
1
Relationships
3
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal filing (court memorandum/brief)
File Size:
686 KB
Summary
This document is page 44 of a legal filing (Document 613) from Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE (United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell), filed on February 24, 2022. The text presents legal arguments regarding 'inferable bias' in jury selection, citing precedents such as *United States v. Torres*, *Daugerdas*, and *Greer*. It specifically discusses a scenario where a juror might be dismissed if their past experiences (such as structuring cash transactions) are too similar to the incidents giving rise to the trial.
People (6)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Judge Preska | District Court Judge |
Mentioned in the context of the cited case United States v. Torres for dismissing a juror for cause.
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| Daugerdas | Legal Case Party |
Cited in case law regarding juror bias.
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| Greer | Legal Case Party |
Cited in case law (United States v. Greer).
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| Torres | Defendant (in cited case) |
Defendant in United States v. Torres, convicted of money laundering/heroin trafficking.
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| Gonzales | Legal Case Party |
Cited in case law (Gonzales v. Thomas).
|
| Thomas | Legal Case Party |
Cited in case law (Gonzales v. Thomas).
|
Organizations (3)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Second Circuit |
Court of Appeals cited in legal arguments.
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| 10th Cir. |
Court of Appeals cited in legal arguments.
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| District Court |
Referenced regarding Judge Preska's ruling in the Torres case.
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Timeline (2 events)
2022-02-24
Document 613 filed in Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE.
Court
N/A
Trial of United States v. Torres where a juror was dismissed for prior involvement in structuring cash transactions.
District Court
Relationships (1)
Judge Preska presided over the district court case involving Torres.
Key Quotes (3)
"‘Inferable’ or ‘inferred’ bias exists ‘when a juror discloses a fact that bespeaks a risk of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to excuse the juror for cause, but not so great as to make mandatory a presumption of bias.’"Source
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"Assuming this Court does not imply bias, it should nevertheless infer bias."Source
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Quote #2
"The crux of the implied bias analysis in a case like this one is found in an examination of the similarities between the juror’s experiences and the incident giving rise to the trial."Source
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Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (1,861 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 613 Filed 02/24/22 Page 44 of 66
2. Inferable bias
“‘Inferable’ or ‘inferred’ bias exists ‘when a juror discloses a fact that bespeaks a
risk of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to
excuse the juror for cause, but not so great as to make mandatory a presumption of bias.’”
Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 474 (quoting United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 171
(2d Cir. 2002)). A court should dismiss a potential juror for inferable bias “after having
received responses from the juror that permit an inference that the juror in question would
not be able to decide the matter objectively.” Torres, 128 F.3d at 47. “[T]his is so even
though the juror need not be asked the specific question of whether he or she could
decide the case impartially.” Id.
risk of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to
excuse the juror for cause, but not so great as to make mandatory a presumption of bias.’”
Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 474 (quoting United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 171
(2d Cir. 2002)). A court should dismiss a potential juror for inferable bias “after having
received responses from the juror that permit an inference that the juror in question would
not be able to decide the matter objectively.” Torres, 128 F.3d at 47. “[T]his is so even
though the juror need not be asked the specific question of whether he or she could
decide the case impartially.” Id.
“Moreover, once facts are elicited that permit a finding of inferable bias, then, just
as in the situation of implied bias, the juror’s statements as to his or her ability to be
impartial become irrelevant.” Id. “The crux of the implied bias analysis in a case like this
one is found in an examination of the similarities between the juror’s experiences and the
incident giving rise to the trial.” Torres, 128 F.3d at 48 (quoting Gonzales v. Thomas, 99
F.3d 978, 989 (10th Cir. 1996)). Assuming this Court does not imply bias, it should
nevertheless infer bias.
as in the situation of implied bias, the juror’s statements as to his or her ability to be
impartial become irrelevant.” Id. “The crux of the implied bias analysis in a case like this
one is found in an examination of the similarities between the juror’s experiences and the
incident giving rise to the trial.” Torres, 128 F.3d at 48 (quoting Gonzales v. Thomas, 99
F.3d 978, 989 (10th Cir. 1996)). Assuming this Court does not imply bias, it should
nevertheless infer bias.
In United States v. Torres, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to launder
the proceeds of a heroin trafficking scheme by structuring financial transactions. 128 F.3d
at 41. Over the defense’s objection, the district court (Judge Preska) dismissed for cause a
potential juror who admitted that she “had at one time engaged in the ‘structuring’ of
cash transactions.” Id. at 42. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that the
the proceeds of a heroin trafficking scheme by structuring financial transactions. 128 F.3d
at 41. Over the defense’s objection, the district court (Judge Preska) dismissed for cause a
potential juror who admitted that she “had at one time engaged in the ‘structuring’ of
cash transactions.” Id. at 42. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that the
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