DOJ-OGR-00000057.tif
42.4 KB
Extraction Summary
7
People
1
Organizations
1
Locations
2
Events
2
Relationships
2
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document (court filing or legal analysis)
File Size:
42.4 KB
Summary
This document is a legal analysis discussing principles of statutory interpretation, particularly concerning the meaning of 'United States' in plea agreements. It details how language placement in a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) informs intent, specifically noting how a co-conspirator immunity clause was severed from Epstein's immunity clause and how the NPA's terms may preclude Maxwell's prosecution.
People (7)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Williams | Party in a legal case |
Cited in Williams, 102 F.3d at 927
|
| Margalli-Olvera | Party in a legal case |
Cited in Margalli-Olvera, 43 F.3d at 352
|
| Rubbo | Party in a legal case |
Cited in United States v. Rubbo, 396 F.3d 1330, 1334 (11th Cir. 2005)
|
| Antonin Scalia | Author |
Co-author of Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
|
| Bryan A. Garner | Author |
Co-author of Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
|
| Epstein | Individual central to the NPA negotiations |
Epstein's immunity clause, Epstein's restrictive language
|
| Maxwell | Individual subject to potential prosecution |
NPA precludes Maxwell's prosecution
|
Organizations (1)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOJ-OGR |
Document identifier prefix
|
Locations (1)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Referred to as a country and a geographic area, relevant to jurisdiction
|
Relationships (2)
co-conspirator immunity clause was severed from Epstein's immunity clause; co-conspirator clause subsequently severed from Epstein's restrictive language
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (1,802 characters)
15
As to the first and most basic of these principles,
terms within a plea agreement are to be given their
ordinary meaning. See, e.g., Williams, 102 F.3d at 927;
Margalli-Olvera, 43 F.3d at 352; United States v.
Rubbo, 396 F.3d 1330, 1334 (11th Cir. 2005). See
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:
The Interpretation of Legal Texts at 69 (2012) ("The
ordinary meaning rule is the most fundamental
semantic rule of interpretation.") It should be beyond
reasonable dispute that the ordinary meaning of the
term "the United States" is the country as a whole.
This leads to the presumption that if a plea agreement
states that the "United States" cannot further prose-
cute an individual, this means that the United States
cannot do so anywhere in the United States. If that is
not what is intended, and the intent is to bind only a
particular district, this can easily be achieved by using
the ordinary descriptors for that district.
Second, the placement of language informs the in-
tent of the parties. During the course of the NPA
negotiations, the co-conspirator immunity clause was
severed from Epstein's immunity clause and moved
geographically to the end of the NPA after the 2255
section. This is significant because the 2255 sections
"were not limited to any district." The 2255 section
and the co-conspirator clause were negotiated in
tandem and the 2255 language was accepted in return
for the global immunity provided to the co-conspira-
tors.
The co-conspirator clause was subsequently
severed from Epstein's restrictive language and moved
geographically below the 2255 as a consequence. The
NPA was identified as a hybrid agreement where one
section referred to the district-specific language and
finding that the NPA precludes Maxwell's prosecution in this
case.
DOJ-OGR-00000057
As to the first and most basic of these principles,
terms within a plea agreement are to be given their
ordinary meaning. See, e.g., Williams, 102 F.3d at 927;
Margalli-Olvera, 43 F.3d at 352; United States v.
Rubbo, 396 F.3d 1330, 1334 (11th Cir. 2005). See
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:
The Interpretation of Legal Texts at 69 (2012) ("The
ordinary meaning rule is the most fundamental
semantic rule of interpretation.") It should be beyond
reasonable dispute that the ordinary meaning of the
term "the United States" is the country as a whole.
This leads to the presumption that if a plea agreement
states that the "United States" cannot further prose-
cute an individual, this means that the United States
cannot do so anywhere in the United States. If that is
not what is intended, and the intent is to bind only a
particular district, this can easily be achieved by using
the ordinary descriptors for that district.
Second, the placement of language informs the in-
tent of the parties. During the course of the NPA
negotiations, the co-conspirator immunity clause was
severed from Epstein's immunity clause and moved
geographically to the end of the NPA after the 2255
section. This is significant because the 2255 sections
"were not limited to any district." The 2255 section
and the co-conspirator clause were negotiated in
tandem and the 2255 language was accepted in return
for the global immunity provided to the co-conspira-
tors.
The co-conspirator clause was subsequently
severed from Epstein's restrictive language and moved
geographically below the 2255 as a consequence. The
NPA was identified as a hybrid agreement where one
section referred to the district-specific language and
finding that the NPA precludes Maxwell's prosecution in this
case.
DOJ-OGR-00000057
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