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Congress
viewed such "engagement" as too often taking place at the expense of more important
interests, the Congress has usually been more wary than the White House of allowing hopes
for a more positive US-China relations to determine our policy. At times, such as during
the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 and in reaction to the Chinese crackdown
around Tiananmen Square in 1989, Congress has actively resisted the White House and
sought to turn American policy in directions both the Chinese leadership and the US
administration have opposed. However, often Congress has played a somewhat passive role,
especially in recent years. Still, the control it formally exercises over US government budget
outlays, legislation, and the approval of appointments of senior administration officials
makes Congress not only important in the formation of US-China policy but also a prime
target for Chinese influence efforts.
By providing historical background, the review that follows informs contemporary US
concerns about Chinese government efforts to influence American leaders and public
opinion. The record over the past four decades shows some success in Chinese efforts to
win influence over congressional opinion. However, more often than not, whatever positive
results they have won have not lasted in the face of enduring differences between the two
countries.
Congressional Visits to China, 1972-1977
President Nixon's second term featured the Watergate scandal, which forced his resignation
in 1974 and resulted in a lull in high-level communication with China. This circumstance
gave more prominence to the reports issued by the approximately eighty members of
Congress who traveled to China in the period between President Nixon's visit in 1972
and the start of the Carter administration in January 1977. The visits of these congressional
delegations-including (repeatedly) top leaders from both parties were by far the most
active channel of high-level communications between the United States and the PRC during
this time. And most of the members who went to China wrote reports that were published
as official documents. At the time, these congressional reports, as well as the media's
coverage of their visits, became important vehicles through which American congressional
leaders voiced their views and opinions on domestic Chinese politics and on Sino-American
relations, both of which were having an increasingly important impact on American
interests in Asia and the world.
By and large, these American visitors were pleased by the post-1972 developments in
US-China relations, seeing them as likely to be both a source of strategic leverage against
the Soviet Union and a stabilizing influence in Asian affairs. The government in Beijing
was seen as preoccupied with domestic affairs, no longer opposed to the presence of
American forces in East Asia, and anxious to work with the United States and other
noncommunist countries to offset Soviet pressure against China. The Americans saw the
Taiwan question as the main impediment to improved bilateral relations, but they differed
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