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Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 54 Filed 09/08/20 Page 5 of 6
The Honorable Alison J. Nathan
August 24, 2020
Page 5

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Protective Orders May Be Modified As Circumstances Change
Finally, the government suggests in a myriad of ways without directly arguing that this Protective Order cannot be modified, that Ms. Maxwell somehow waived her ability to seek modification by agreeing to a Protective Order before she knew what was contained in the criminal discovery, or that there is no precedent for such a modification. These suggestions are disingenuous. Of course, the Government ignores that the Protective Order itself provides that it may be modified “by further order of the Court.” Id, ¶ 18(b).

There is no precedence for this case. That is true because the Second Circuit has outlined a process for the government to seek civil materials subject to protective orders for use in grand jury investigations, a process the government circumvented. It also is true because typically, the government is the party to intervene in civil cases and seek a stay where materials the government has marked “Confidential” may be disclosed publicly or where the government contends the rules of criminal discovery will be circumvented. Finally, there is no other case that defense counsel has located where [REDACTED BLOCK]

That Ms. Maxwell did not know what was in the sealed materials before she signed the Protective Order, or proposed a draft, is self-evident. That a Court can modify a protective order at any time is likewise well-established. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1) authorizes the Court to regulate discovery through protective orders and modification of those orders. See Smith Kline Beecham Corp. v. Synthon Pharmaceuticals, Ltd., 210 F.R.D. 163, 166 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (“[c]ourts have the inherent power to modify protective orders, including protective orders arising from a stipulation by the parties”); see also United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1211 n.15 (5th Cir. 1977) (trial court's decisions as to which documents “will be placed in the public domain, and which are entitled to privacy and confidentiality” are discretionary and “form an integral part of trial management”); United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 211 (3d Cir. 2007), as amended (July 2, 2007) (“it would have been proper for the District Court to unseal the records pursuant to its general discretionary powers”); Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 532 & 535 (1st Cir. 1993).

“The standard of review for a request to vacate or modify a protective order depends on the nature of the documents in question. There is a presumptive right of public access to judicial

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