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Extraction Summary
8
People
6
Organizations
5
Locations
4
Events
2
Relationships
4
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Book excerpt / memoir (evidence exhibit)
File Size:
Summary
This document appears to be a page from a memoir by Ehud Barak (stamped 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT'), detailing his return to political power in Israel in 2007 following the fallout of the Lebanon War. It describes the criticism faced by Olmert, Peretz, and Halutz, Barak's appointment as Defense Minister, and the intelligence briefing he received regarding a secret Syrian nuclear reactor funded by Iran and North Korea. The text highlights the political tensions between Barak and Olmert regarding the handling of this threat.
People (8)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Ehud Barak | Author / Narrator |
Identified by header 'BARAK' and context of becoming Defense Minister in June 2007. Describes his return to politics.
|
| Ehud Olmert | Prime Minister of Israel |
Criticized in inquiry report; briefed Barak on Syrian nuclear threat; growing tension with Barak.
|
| Amir Peretz | Defense Minister (Former) |
Replaced by Barak; criticized as 'wrong man in the wrong cabinet post'.
|
| Dan Halutz | Military Official |
Singled out in inquiry; resigned due to taking personal responsibility.
|
| Tzipi Livni | Politician |
Called for Olmert and Peretz to quit.
|
| Dan Meridor | Likud Politician |
Member of Knesset defense committee; someone Barak became close to.
|
| Menachem Begin | Former Prime Minister |
Historical reference regarding the 1981 strike on Iraq.
|
| Saddam Hussein | Former President of Iraq |
Historical reference regarding 1981 reactor strike.
|
Organizations (6)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Labor Party |
Political party Barak returned to lead.
|
|
| Likud |
Political party of Olmert and Meridor.
|
|
| Hizbollah |
Mentioned as surviving and 'winning' the war.
|
|
| Mossad |
Uncovered evidence of Syrian nuclear reactor.
|
|
| Knesset |
Israeli parliament (Defense Committee mentioned).
|
|
| House Oversight Committee |
US Government body (Document stamp indicates this is from their files).
|
Timeline (4 events)
April 2007
Commission of inquiry released report on the war (Winograd Commission implied).
Israel
Locations (5)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Location of the war discussed.
|
|
|
Northeast region along Euphrates River; site of nuclear reactor.
|
|
|
Providing technical help to Syria.
|
|
|
Providing funding to Syria.
|
|
|
Tel Aviv (IDF Headquarters).
|
Relationships (2)
Knew each other for years; growing tension over dealing with Syrian nuclear threat.
Described as 'another rising Likud politician to whom I became closer'.
Key Quotes (4)
"“If you don’t win, you lose... Hizbollah survived. It won the war.”"Source
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Quote #1
"Without the botched handling of the war, I might well have remained a mere member of the Labor Party and a private citizen."Source
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Quote #2
"Amir Peretz was found to be the wrong man in the wrong cabinet post at the wrong time."Source
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Quote #3
"I had been briefed a few weeks earlier by Olmert on a threat hundreds of miles further away: a construction site in northeast Syria... where Mossad had uncovered evidence that the Syrians... were building a nuclear reactor."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028250.jpg
Quote #4
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,306 characters)
/ BARAK / 116
the beginning summed up the feeling of most of the country at the end: “If you
don’t win, you lose... Hizbollah survived. It won the war.”
don’t win, you lose... Hizbollah survived. It won the war.”
Without the botched handling of the war, I might well have remained a mere
member of the Labor Party and a private citizen. But when the commission of
inquiry released its report in April 2007, three people were singled out: Olmert,
Amir Peretz and Halutz. Olmert was portrayed as a military novice who’d gone
into battle without understanding the wartime role and responsibilities of a Prime
Minister. Halutz’s “excess of charisma” was held responsible for keeping
ministers, and military officers as well, from questioning his judgement or pressing
him for alternatives. Amir Peretz was found to be the wrong man in the wrong
cabinet post at the wrong time. Of the three, only Halutz seemed ready to take
personal responsibility. Even before the report came out, he resigned. Olmert and
Peretz were determined to stay put, despite calls to quit not just from the
opposition but from Tzipi Livni. Inside Labor as well, the war produced a clamor
for change. When a vote for party chairman was held in June 2007, I was chosen to
return in Peretz’s place.
member of the Labor Party and a private citizen. But when the commission of
inquiry released its report in April 2007, three people were singled out: Olmert,
Amir Peretz and Halutz. Olmert was portrayed as a military novice who’d gone
into battle without understanding the wartime role and responsibilities of a Prime
Minister. Halutz’s “excess of charisma” was held responsible for keeping
ministers, and military officers as well, from questioning his judgement or pressing
him for alternatives. Amir Peretz was found to be the wrong man in the wrong
cabinet post at the wrong time. Of the three, only Halutz seemed ready to take
personal responsibility. Even before the report came out, he resigned. Olmert and
Peretz were determined to stay put, despite calls to quit not just from the
opposition but from Tzipi Livni. Inside Labor as well, the war produced a clamor
for change. When a vote for party chairman was held in June 2007, I was chosen to
return in Peretz’s place.
Within days, I replaced him as Defense Minister as well. Yet the main item in
my in-box would no longer be Lebanon. I had been briefed a few weeks earlier by
Olmert on a threat hundreds of miles further away: a construction site in northeast
Syria, along the Euphrates River, where Mossad had uncovered evidence that the
Syrians, with technical help from North Korea and funding from Iran, were
building a nuclear reactor.
my in-box would no longer be Lebanon. I had been briefed a few weeks earlier by
Olmert on a threat hundreds of miles further away: a construction site in northeast
Syria, along the Euphrates River, where Mossad had uncovered evidence that the
Syrians, with technical help from North Korea and funding from Iran, were
building a nuclear reactor.
* * *
I had got to know Olmert fairly well over the years, initially when I was in the
kirya and both he and another rising Likud politician to whom I became closer,
Dan Meridor, were members of the Knesset’s defense committee. But from the day
I returned to the Israeli government in June 2007, there was growing tension
between us over dealing with the Syrian nuclear threat. It was not about whether
we should take military action to destroy the reactor, before the fuel rods arrived
on site and it could begin producing bomb-ready material. Just as under Menachem
Begin in 1981, when we’d launched our preemptive strike on Saddam Hussein’s
kirya and both he and another rising Likud politician to whom I became closer,
Dan Meridor, were members of the Knesset’s defense committee. But from the day
I returned to the Israeli government in June 2007, there was growing tension
between us over dealing with the Syrian nuclear threat. It was not about whether
we should take military action to destroy the reactor, before the fuel rods arrived
on site and it could begin producing bomb-ready material. Just as under Menachem
Begin in 1981, when we’d launched our preemptive strike on Saddam Hussein’s
402
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