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(UNITEC), and Xidian University (Otago, VUW). New Zealand regularly hosts doctoral students who were graduates of these universities and also hosts current students and staff on short-term fellowships. Some New Zealand academics have roles at PLA-linked universities. The potential for these relationships to be exploited requires a reevaluation of government policies on scientific exchange.6

Civil Society

Media are a key target of China’s influence efforts. New Zealand’s local Chinese-language outlets all have content cooperation agreements with China’s Xinhua News Service, participate in annual media training conferences in China, have at times employed senior staff affiliated with the Communist Party, and have hosted CCP propaganda officials. CCP officials have given direct editorial instructions to Chinese-language media in New Zealand as part of the CCP’s strategy to blend overseas content with that in the PRC. On television, a Chinese-language channel has removed Taiwanese programming from its network. Xinhua has also established its own television station.

With respect to English media, China Daily in 2016 established a partnership with the Fairfax newspapers in Australia and New Zealand. The Chinese embassy has sponsored the travel of journalists and politicians. In other instances, donors with close connections to the Chinese government have donated to organizations that provide research funding and subsidize journalist and youth visits to China, as well as exhibitions, book publications, and other activities that “promote a non-critical view of China.”

China’s representatives in New Zealand also put considerable pressure on New Zealanders who speak up critically on China-related issues. Since publication of her initial report on Chinese influence operations in the country, Anne-Marie Brady has experienced break-ins at her office and home, according to testimony before the Australian Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee.7

Conclusion

New Zealand’s government, unlike that of Australia, has taken few steps to counter foreign interference in its internal affairs. Charity fund-raising, which has been used by Chinese United Front organizations to mask contributions, remains excluded from disclosure requirements. New Zealand’s intelligence service still cannot investigate cases of subversion and foreign influence inside its political parties without the approval of the service’s minister, whose political calculations may inhibit action. And media regulations remain inadequate to address improper influence by means other than outright ownership, which may also merit reform.

Appendix 2

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