HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019649.jpg
1.63 MB
Extraction Summary
4
People
7
Organizations
5
Locations
3
Events
3
Relationships
2
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Book manuscript page / congressional oversight document
File Size:
1.63 MB
Summary
This document appears to be page 161 from a book manuscript (likely 'How America Lost Its Secrets' by Edward Jay Epstein based on the filename ISBN) produced during a House Oversight investigation. The text analyzes Edward Snowden's actions, questioning whether he was a Russian asset or a whistleblower. It argues that Snowden's contact with journalists Greenwald and Poitras contradicts the behavior of a controlled Russian intelligence asset, as it risked exposing the operation.
People (4)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Snowden | Subject / Whistleblower |
Discussed in the context of his recruitment scenario and contacts with journalists.
|
| Greenwald | Journalist / Blogger |
Contacted by Snowden in December 2012; described as a high-profile blogger in Brazil.
|
| Poitras | Journalist |
Contacted by Snowden in January 2013 in Berlin; described as a magnet for NSA dissidents.
|
| Former CIA officer | Source |
Provided a quote regarding intelligence operations and Russian intelligence behavior.
|
Organizations (7)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| NSA |
National Security Agency; target of Snowden's data copying.
|
|
| Russian intelligence service |
Discussed as a potential handler of Snowden in a theoretical scenario.
|
|
| U.S. intelligence agencies |
Opponents of the journalists mentioned.
|
|
| CIA |
Implied by 'Former CIA officer'.
|
|
| British intelligence services |
Potential surveillance of journalists.
|
|
| Brazilian intelligence services |
Potential surveillance of journalists.
|
|
| German intelligence services |
Potential surveillance of journalists.
|
Locations (5)
Key Quotes (2)
"while anything could 'go haywire' in an intelligence operation, it would be 'unthinkable' that the Russian intelligence service would permit an undercover source"Source
— Former CIA officer
(Discussing the likelihood of Russian intelligence allowing a source to contact journalists.)
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019649.jpg
Quote #1
"the purpose of an espionage operation is to steal secrets without alerting anyone to the theft."Source
— Author
(Explaining why visible contact with journalists contradicts standard espionage tactics.)
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019649.jpg
Quote #2
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,432 characters)
The Question of When | 161
him to gain proximity to the super-secret lists of the telecommuni-
cations systems that the NSA had penetrated in Russia and China.
This could account for how he managed to acquire the necessary
passwords to accrue privileged information. It could also account for
why the documents he copied that pertained to NSA operations in
Russia were not among those he gave to Poitras, Greenwald, and
other journalists. Because Russia has had an active intelligence-
sharing treaty with China since 1996, it could further explain why
his first stop was Hong Kong, a part of China. It was a safe venue for
debriefing Snowden, as well as establishing his credentials among
journalists as a whistle-blower, before a decision was made to allow
him to proceed to Russia.
cations systems that the NSA had penetrated in Russia and China.
This could account for how he managed to acquire the necessary
passwords to accrue privileged information. It could also account for
why the documents he copied that pertained to NSA operations in
Russia were not among those he gave to Poitras, Greenwald, and
other journalists. Because Russia has had an active intelligence-
sharing treaty with China since 1996, it could further explain why
his first stop was Hong Kong, a part of China. It was a safe venue for
debriefing Snowden, as well as establishing his credentials among
journalists as a whistle-blower, before a decision was made to allow
him to proceed to Russia.
The nearly fatal problem with this early recruitment scenario is
Snowden’s contacts with journalists. Snowden, it will be recalled,
had contacted Greenwald in December 2012. Greenwald was a high-
profile blogger in Brazil who did not use encryption or any security
safeguards. Next, he contacted Poitras in January 2013 in Berlin;
she was a magnet for NSA dissidents. Both of these contacts put
Snowden’s clandestine downloading at grave risk. As known oppo-
nents of U.S. intelligence agencies, these journalists might be, as they
themselves suspected they were, under surveillance by American,
British, Brazilian, or German intelligence services. Greenwald and
Poitras might also tell others who were either under surveillance or
informers. So no matter what precautions Snowden took, his secret
enterprise, or just the fact he was in contact with anti-government
activists, might be detected. At minimum, he could lose his access to
secrets and be of no further use as a source at the NSA. He could also
be interrogated and reveal the way he was brought under control. If
Snowden had actually been under the control of the Russian intel-
ligence service, the last thing it would allow was for him to take such
a risk—or even to contact a single journalist. After all, the purpose
of an espionage operation is to steal secrets without alerting anyone
to the theft.
Snowden’s contacts with journalists. Snowden, it will be recalled,
had contacted Greenwald in December 2012. Greenwald was a high-
profile blogger in Brazil who did not use encryption or any security
safeguards. Next, he contacted Poitras in January 2013 in Berlin;
she was a magnet for NSA dissidents. Both of these contacts put
Snowden’s clandestine downloading at grave risk. As known oppo-
nents of U.S. intelligence agencies, these journalists might be, as they
themselves suspected they were, under surveillance by American,
British, Brazilian, or German intelligence services. Greenwald and
Poitras might also tell others who were either under surveillance or
informers. So no matter what precautions Snowden took, his secret
enterprise, or just the fact he was in contact with anti-government
activists, might be detected. At minimum, he could lose his access to
secrets and be of no further use as a source at the NSA. He could also
be interrogated and reveal the way he was brought under control. If
Snowden had actually been under the control of the Russian intel-
ligence service, the last thing it would allow was for him to take such
a risk—or even to contact a single journalist. After all, the purpose
of an espionage operation is to steal secrets without alerting anyone
to the theft.
A former CIA officer told me that while anything could “go hay-
wire” in an intelligence operation, it would be “unthinkable” that
the Russian intelligence service would permit an undercover source
wire” in an intelligence operation, it would be “unthinkable” that
the Russian intelligence service would permit an undercover source
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 161 9/29/16 5:51 PM
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