HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019727.jpg
1.69 MB
Extraction Summary
3
People
7
Organizations
3
Locations
2
Events
2
Relationships
2
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Book proof / congressional record
File Size:
1.69 MB
Summary
This document appears to be a page from a book (likely by Edward Jay Epstein given the filename) included in a House Oversight investigation. The text details the pervasive surveillance capabilities of Chinese intelligence in Hong Kong around 2013, noting that the U.S. State Department required personnel to use altered phones to avoid data theft. It argues that Edward Snowden, having arrived in May 2013 with NSA secrets, would have been aware of these capabilities and relied on the Chinese presence to protect him from the CIA.
People (3)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Edward Snowden | Subject / Former NSA |
Former NSA employee who fled to Hong Kong with secrets; knowledgeable about Chinese intelligence capabilities.
|
| Tyler Drumheller | Former CIA Officer |
Quoted describing Hong Kong as 'hostile territory' for the CIA in 2013.
|
| Greenwald | Journalist/Contact |
Referenced as the person Snowden told he was counting on Chinese presence for protection (likely Glenn Greenwald).
|
Organizations (7)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Chinese intelligence service |
Described as having a massive presence in Hong Kong and sophisticated cyber espionage capabilities.
|
|
| U.S. State Department |
Issued instructions in 2013 for personnel to avoid using standard smartphones in HK/China.
|
|
| NSA |
National Security Agency; Snowden's former employer.
|
|
| CIA |
Central Intelligence Agency; found operating in HK difficult.
|
|
| British intelligence |
Found operating in HK difficult.
|
|
| Hong Kong Police |
Infiltrated by Chinese intelligence informers.
|
|
| House Oversight Committee |
Implied by the Bates stamp 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT'.
|
Timeline (2 events)
2013
U.S. State Department implements security protocols for phones in Hong Kong.
Hong Kong
U.S. State Department Personnel
May 2013
Locations (3)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Primary setting of the text; described as a base for Chinese intelligence.
|
|
|
Located in Central Hong Kong; houses Chinese intelligence officers.
|
|
|
Referenced in comparison to Hong Kong operations.
|
Relationships (2)
He told Greenwald that he was counting on the Chinese presence...
Snowden, whose prior position at the NSA included teaching military personnel...
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,504 characters)
The Chinese Puzzle | 239
tains there its largest intelligence base outside mainland China. A
large contingent of its officers are stationed officially in the Prince
of Wales skyscraper in central Hong Kong and unofficially main-
tain informers in Hong Kong’s police, governing authority, airport
administration, and other levers of power. It checks the computer-
ized visitors entering Hong Kong and has the capability to ferret
names that match those in the immense database its global cyber
espionage has amassed. When it detects the entry of any person of
possible intelligence interest, it can use its sophisticated array of
cyber tools to attempt to remotely steal data from that individual.
Such remote surveillance was so effective in 2013 that the U.S. State
Department had instructed all its personnel in Hong Kong to avoid
using their iPhones, Androids, BlackBerry phones, and other smart
phones when traveling to Hong Kong or China. Instead, it supplied
them with specially altered phones that disable location tracking
and have a remotely activated switch to completely cut off power
to its circuitry. No one in the intelligence community doubts the
prudence of taking such precautions in China, and it is nearly incon-
ceivable that Snowden, whose prior position at the NSA included
teaching military personnel about Chinese capacities, could himself
be unaware of Chinese intelligence service capabilities to acquire
travelers’ data in Hong Kong.
large contingent of its officers are stationed officially in the Prince
of Wales skyscraper in central Hong Kong and unofficially main-
tain informers in Hong Kong’s police, governing authority, airport
administration, and other levers of power. It checks the computer-
ized visitors entering Hong Kong and has the capability to ferret
names that match those in the immense database its global cyber
espionage has amassed. When it detects the entry of any person of
possible intelligence interest, it can use its sophisticated array of
cyber tools to attempt to remotely steal data from that individual.
Such remote surveillance was so effective in 2013 that the U.S. State
Department had instructed all its personnel in Hong Kong to avoid
using their iPhones, Androids, BlackBerry phones, and other smart
phones when traveling to Hong Kong or China. Instead, it supplied
them with specially altered phones that disable location tracking
and have a remotely activated switch to completely cut off power
to its circuitry. No one in the intelligence community doubts the
prudence of taking such precautions in China, and it is nearly incon-
ceivable that Snowden, whose prior position at the NSA included
teaching military personnel about Chinese capacities, could himself
be unaware of Chinese intelligence service capabilities to acquire
travelers’ data in Hong Kong.
Once Hong Kong had served as a window into China for West-
ern intelligence, but in the first decade of this century the Chinese
intelligence service had achieved such a pervasive presence in Hong
Kong, and such ubiquitous electronic coverage of diplomats and
other foreigners even suspected of involvement in foreign intelli-
gence work, that the CIA and British intelligence found it almost
as difficult to operate in Hong Kong as in mainland China. Even
though the CIA kept officers there in 2013, it was considered “hos-
tile territory,” according to the former CIA officer Tyler Drumheller.
ern intelligence, but in the first decade of this century the Chinese
intelligence service had achieved such a pervasive presence in Hong
Kong, and such ubiquitous electronic coverage of diplomats and
other foreigners even suspected of involvement in foreign intelli-
gence work, that the CIA and British intelligence found it almost
as difficult to operate in Hong Kong as in mainland China. Even
though the CIA kept officers there in 2013, it was considered “hos-
tile territory,” according to the former CIA officer Tyler Drumheller.
Snowden apparently knew the limits of CIA operations in Hong
Kong, which provided him with an envelope of protection. He told
Greenwald that he was counting on the Chinese presence in Hong
Kong to deter the CIA from intruding on their meetings.
Kong, which provided him with an envelope of protection. He told
Greenwald that he was counting on the Chinese presence in Hong
Kong to deter the CIA from intruding on their meetings.
When he flew to Hong Kong in May 2013, he took with him
NSA secrets, which he knew would be of great interest to China.
NSA secrets, which he knew would be of great interest to China.
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 239
9/30/16 8:13 AM
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9/30/16 8:13 AM
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