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the summer of 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, which had been owned by the British and French.

Ben-Gurion was emboldened to go war by the fact that both Britain and France wanted to retake the canal. Under an agreement reached beforehand, Israel was to begin the hostilities, after which the British and French would enter under the guise of separating Israeli and Egyptian forces. Ben-Gurion’s hope was to end the threat of fedayeen strikes, at least in the south, by taking control both of Gaza and the enormous natural buffer afforded by the Sinai Desert. Militarily, it went to plan. On October 29, 1956, Yigal and other paratroopers from Battalion 890 were dropped deep into the Sinai. They landed near the entrance to the Mitla Pass, a sinuous route between two lines of craggy hills 25 miles from the canal. British and French air strikes began three days later. Nasser pulled most of his forces back across the canal. By early November, Israel was in control of Gaza and the whole of the Sinai.

Politically, however, Ben-Gurion and his European partners had catastrophically miscalculated. Britain and France were fading imperial powers. The balance of power after the Second World War rested with America and the Soviet Union. Both were furious over the obviously pre-arranged seizure of Sinai, Gaza and the canal. It took a while for the message to sink in. In a speech to the Knesset after the conquest was complete, Ben-Gurion declared the post-1948 armistice null and void, and said Israel would never again allow “foreign forces” to control the territory it had captured.

A few days later, however, he had no choice but to deliver a different message in a radio address to the country. He had at least managed to secure a concession with the help of the Americans. The Sinai and Gaza would be placed under supervision of a UN force. He also got a US assurance of Israel’s right of passage through the Straits of Tiran to the Red Sea, and an agreement that if the Egyptians blocked Israeli shipping we would have the right to respond. But he announced that we would be leaving every inch of territory taken in the war. By early 1957, we did so. The one lasting gain came in Gaza. On their way out, Israeli troops destroyed the fedayeen’s military installations, and cross-border attacks from the south ceased.

Unlike in 1948, the Sinai War touched me directly. I never felt Israel’s existence was in danger. The fighting was brief and far away. But Mishmar Hasharon had a small role in the war plan. Ben-Gurion and Dayan were concerned that the co-ordinated attack might lead to a wider war, with the possibility that Egyptian warplanes might get involved as they had in 1948.

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