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630 KB

Extraction Summary

5
People
3
Organizations
0
Locations
2
Events
1
Relationships
3
Quotes

Document Information

Type: Court order / legal filing
File Size: 630 KB
Summary

This page is from a court order (Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN) dated April 16, 2021, addressing Ghislaine Maxwell's motion to dismiss perjury charges. The Court denied the motion, stating that the charges are legally tenable and that arguments regarding the ambiguity of questions asked during her civil deposition are matters for a jury to decide. The document cites several legal precedents (Lighte, Wolfson) regarding perjury and 'knowing falsity'.

People (5)

Name Role Context
Ghislaine Maxwell Defendant
Subject of the motion to dismiss perjury counts; Court rules her defenses are for the jury.
The Government Prosecution
Agreed to disclose names in advance of trial.
Stringer Legal Precedent
Cited case law: 730 F.3d at 126.
Lighte Legal Precedent
Cited case law: United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367.
Wolfson Legal Precedent
Cited case law: United States v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 862.

Organizations (3)

Name Type Context
United States District Court
Implied by 'The Court' and case number format (Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN).
2d Cir.
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, cited in legal precedents.
DOJ
Department of Justice, indicated in footer stamp (DOJ-OGR).

Timeline (2 events)

2021-04-16
Court filing regarding motion to dismiss perjury charges.
Court
Unknown (Past)
Deposition in a civil case where Maxwell allegedly committed perjury.
Civil Case Deposition

Relationships (1)

Ghislaine Maxwell Adversarial/Legal The Government
Maxwell filing motions against Government charges.

Key Quotes (3)

"The Court concludes that the charges are legally tenable and Maxwell’s defenses are appropriately left to the jury."
Source
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Quote #1
"The applicable perjury statute imposes criminal penalties on anyone who “in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court . . . knowingly makes any false material declaration.”"
Source
DOJ-OGR-00020780.jpg
Quote #2
"The existence of some arguable ambiguity does not foreclose a perjury charge against a witness who understood the question."
Source
DOJ-OGR-00020780.jpg
Quote #3

Full Extracted Text

Complete text extracted from the document (2,107 characters)

Case 22-1426, Document 57, 02/28/2023, 3475900, Page162 of 208
A-158
Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 21 of 34
Moreover, the Government has agreed to disclose their names in advance of trial. There is thus
no unfairness here. See Stringer, 730 F.3d at 126. As discussed below, the Court will require
the parties to negotiate and propose a full schedule for all remaining pretrial disclosures.
IV. The perjury charges are legally tenable
The Court turns next to Maxwell’s motion to dismiss the perjury counts stemming from
her answers to questions in a deposition in a civil case. She contends that these charges are
legally deficient because the questions posed were fundamentally ambiguous and the questions
were not material to the subject of the deposition. The Court concludes that the charges are
legally tenable and Maxwell’s defenses are appropriately left to the jury.
The applicable perjury statute imposes criminal penalties on anyone who “in any
proceeding before or ancillary to any court . . . knowingly makes any false material declaration.”
18 U.S.C. § 1623(a). Testimony is perjurious only if it is knowingly false and is material to the
proceeding in which the defendant offered it.
A. The questions posed were not too ambiguous to support a perjury charge
The requirement of knowing falsity requires that a witness believe that their testimony is
false. United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 372 (2d Cir. 1986). As a general matter, “[a] jury is
best equipped to determine the meaning that a defendant assigns to a specific question.” Id.
Courts have acknowledged a narrow exception for questions that are so fundamentally
ambiguous or imprecise that the answer to them cannot legally be false. Id. at 372, 375; see also
United States v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 862, 878 (2d Cir. 1970). A question is fundamentally
ambiguous only if reasonable people could not agree on its meaning in context. Lighte, 782 F.2d
at 375. The existence of some arguable ambiguity does not foreclose a perjury charge against a
witness who understood the question.
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