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alcoholism (Ehlers et al, 1995); do these approaches suggest a new neural dynamical mechanism for the actions of anticonvulsant drugs (Zimmerman et al, 1991); can these measures made on non-verbal, psychomotor tasks yield a non-intrusive measure of personality and character (Selz, 1992); can these approaches to deviant patterns of psychomotor sequencing in schizophrenics give us some insight into potential (cerebeller-basal ganglia?) mechanisms of the thought disorder in schizophrenia (Paulus et al, 1994); does cocaine induce new patterns of behavior that conserve pre-treatment entropy in developing animals (Smotherman et al, 1996); will these quantities applied to objective gait observables supply early diagnoses and quantification of clinical course in patients with extra-pyramidal disorders or taking anti-psychotic medication (Hausdorff et al, 1998); can these transformations of time series on the EEG give us an early diagnostic approach to Alzheimer’s disease (Jeong et al, 1998) or a new acute preventive pharmacological approach to patients with psychomotor and partial seizures (lasemidis et al, 1990).

To end where we began: We think that if neuroscientists “did their own” nonlinear dynamical theory and analysis, shaped and tailored by intuitions growing out of their own experimental work and thinking, abstract and philosophical questions about what is determinism and what is random would retreat in favor of new specific ideas and experiments about brain dynamical mechanisms and their pathophysiology. From the studies reviewed here, it appears that a robust move in this direction in the brain sciences is well underway.

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