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marginal utility. That course would either
expose him to be truly weak and ineffectual
or lead to calls to do more. So he's going to
provide non-lethal support and is
apparently prepared to take the hits from
critics who see the president's policy as
passive, cruel, and unforgiving, particularly
now that we know that members of his own
cabinet clearly wanted to do more. The
Iranian nuclear issue, the other potential tar
baby in the SOTU, followed a pretty
predictable rising arc of concern in the list
of presidential foreign-policy worries. In
2009, in Obama's address to a joint session
of Congress (a speech some regard as a
SOTU), Iran wasn't even mentioned. In the
2010 SOTU, Obama threatened that if Iran
ignored its international obligations, there
would be consequences; in 2011, he did the
same; and in 2012, he made it clear that he
would prevent Iran from acquiring a
nuclear weapon and take no option off the
table. Obama repeated half of what he said
in 2012 about preventing Iran from getting
a nuclear weapon, but instead of saying all
options were on the table, he spoke of the
importance of diplomacy. I suspect he'll go
to extreme lengths to avoid war, and won't
greenlight an Israeli attack either until the
arc of diplomacy has run its course. And
then Obama would likely act only if the
mullahs push the envelope by accelerating
their uranium enrichment program and

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