DOJ-OGR-00020988.jpg
638 KB
Extraction Summary
12
People
4
Organizations
1
Locations
0
Events
1
Relationships
3
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal filing / court order (appellate record exhibit)
File Size:
638 KB
Summary
This document is page 5 of a 45-page legal filing (Document 657) from the Ghislaine Maxwell case (1:20-cr-00330-AJN), filed on April 29, 2022. It outlines the 'Applicable law' regarding the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, specifically discussing 'multiplicitous' indictments and how courts determine if multiple conspiracy charges constitute the same offense. It cites various Second Circuit and Supreme Court precedents to establish the legal standard for reviewing such claims.
People (12)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Maxwell | Defendant (Cited in Case Law) |
Cited as 'Maxwell, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 322' referencing a prior ruling in the same case regarding double jeopardy.
|
| AJN | Judge (Initials) |
Initials in case number 1:20-cr-00330-AJN, referring to Judge Alison J. Nathan.
|
| Brown | Case Citation |
Cited in Brown v. Ohio.
|
| Morris | Case Citation |
Cited in Morris v. Reynolds.
|
| Reynolds | Case Citation |
Cited in Morris v. Reynolds.
|
| Chacko | Case Citation |
Cited in United States v. Chacko.
|
| Jones | Case Citation |
Cited in United States v. Jones.
|
| Estrada | Case Citation |
Cited in United States v. Estrada.
|
| Araujo | Case Citation |
Cited in United States v. Araujo.
|
| Ansaldi | Case Citation |
Cited in United States v. Ansaldi.
|
| Gaskin | Case Citation |
Cited in United States v. Gaskin.
|
| Diallo | Case Citation |
Cited in United States v. Diallo.
|
Organizations (4)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| United States District Court |
Implied by case number and S.D.N.Y. citation.
|
|
| Department of Justice (DOJ) |
Indicated by footer stamp DOJ-OGR-00020988.
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| Second Circuit Court of Appeals |
Frequently cited as '2d Cir.' in legal precedents.
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| S.D.N.Y. |
Southern District of New York, cited in case law.
|
Locations (1)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Southern District of New York (jurisdiction).
|
Relationships (1)
Implied by the case context and citation 'Maxwell, 534 F. Supp. 3d'.
Key Quotes (3)
"The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall 'be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.'"Source
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Quote #1
"An indictment is multiplicitous... 'when it charges a single offense as an offense multiple times, in separate counts, when, in law and fact, only one crime has been committed.'"Source
DOJ-OGR-00020988.jpg
Quote #2
"If the two offenses at issue are both conspiracies charged under the same statute, then the multiplicity inquiry turns on whether the two conspiracies are the same 'in fact,' meaning they involve the same agreement."Source
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Quote #3
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,153 characters)
Case 22-1426, Document 58, 02/28/2023, 3475901, Page162 of 221
A-362
A-362
Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 657 Filed 04/29/22 Page 5 of 45
A. Applicable law
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall "be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V.
That guarantee "serves principally as a restraint on courts and prosecutors," ensuring that a court
does not "exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same
offense." Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977); see also Morris v. Reynolds, 264 F.3d 38,
48 (2d Cir. 2001). An indictment is multiplicitous, and therefore implicates double jeopardy,
"when it charges a single offense as an offense multiple times, in separate counts, when, in law
and fact, only one crime has been committed." Maxwell, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 322 (quoting United
States v. Chacko, 169 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 1999)). "A claim of multiplicity cannot succeed,
however, 'unless the charged offenses are the same in fact and in law.'" United States v. Jones,
482 F.3d 60, 72 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir.
2003)).
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V.
That guarantee "serves principally as a restraint on courts and prosecutors," ensuring that a court
does not "exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same
offense." Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977); see also Morris v. Reynolds, 264 F.3d 38,
48 (2d Cir. 2001). An indictment is multiplicitous, and therefore implicates double jeopardy,
"when it charges a single offense as an offense multiple times, in separate counts, when, in law
and fact, only one crime has been committed." Maxwell, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 322 (quoting United
States v. Chacko, 169 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 1999)). "A claim of multiplicity cannot succeed,
however, 'unless the charged offenses are the same in fact and in law.'" United States v. Jones,
482 F.3d 60, 72 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir.
2003)).
If the two offenses at issue are both conspiracies charged under the same statute, then the
multiplicity inquiry turns on whether the two conspiracies are the same "in fact," meaning they
involve the same agreement. United States v. Araujo, No. 17-CR-438 (VEC), 2018 WL
3222527, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2018) (citing United States v. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118, 124–25
(2d Cir. 2004)); United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 454 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[T]o survive a
double jeopardy attack, the government would have to show that the two schemes involved
'distinct' agreements."). Yet "whether the evidence shows a single conspiracy or more than one
conspiracy is often not determinable as a matter of law or subject to bright-line formulations."
Jones, 482 F.3d at 72. Rather, the parties agree that the Court's inquiry is guided by the Second
Circuit's Korfant factors. See, e.g., United States v. Diallo, 507 F. App’x 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2013)
multiplicity inquiry turns on whether the two conspiracies are the same "in fact," meaning they
involve the same agreement. United States v. Araujo, No. 17-CR-438 (VEC), 2018 WL
3222527, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2018) (citing United States v. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118, 124–25
(2d Cir. 2004)); United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 454 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[T]o survive a
double jeopardy attack, the government would have to show that the two schemes involved
'distinct' agreements."). Yet "whether the evidence shows a single conspiracy or more than one
conspiracy is often not determinable as a matter of law or subject to bright-line formulations."
Jones, 482 F.3d at 72. Rather, the parties agree that the Court's inquiry is guided by the Second
Circuit's Korfant factors. See, e.g., United States v. Diallo, 507 F. App’x 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2013)
5
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