DOJ-OGR-00005854.jpg

Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 397 Filed 10/29/21 Page 71 of 84

prior to the incident,” or alternatively, if “if a witness gets a good look at the defendant during the
course of a crime”); United States v. Reed, No. 11 Cr. 487 (RJS), 2012 WL 2053758, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2012) (noting that a “witness’s familiarity with a suspect may establish that the
identification . . . is independently reliable”).

This is not a crime in which a victim captures a fleeting glance of the perpetrator. Minor
Victim-4 interacted with the defendant personally on multiple occasions between 2001 and 2004.
She knew the defendant by name and gave a description. In the totality of the circumstances, it is
plain that Minor Victim-4’s identification of the defendant is sufficiently independently reliable to
permit the jury to decide its persuasiveness.

The defense merely replies, again in conclusory fashion, that Minor Victim-4 (1) never
identified the defendant as an abuser, (2) did not have an opportunity to view her during the crime
because the defendant was not involved in a crime, (3) never described the defendant, and (4) the
time between the abuse and the identification was extraordinarily long. (Def. Mot. 9 at 4). The
first three of these points are inaccurate, as set forth above. And the delay in time is untroubling
given Minor Victim-4’s contacts with the defendant and consistent references in the intervening
time. The defense is free to attempt to argue these points to the jury, but none of these arguments
supports a motion to suppress Minor Victim-4’s identification of the defendant.

Minor Victim-4 knows who participated in the sexual abuse she experienced, as she has
for the decades since it happened. This Court should deny the motion.

70

DOJ-OGR-00005854