| Connected Entity | Relationship Type |
Strength
(mentions)
|
Documents | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
person
GHISLAINE MAXWELL
|
Legal representative |
32
Very Strong
|
72 | |
|
person
Jeffrey Epstein
|
Legal representative |
13
Very Strong
|
10 | |
|
person
Epstein
|
Legal representative |
13
Very Strong
|
19 | |
|
person
MAXWELL
|
Legal representative |
12
Very Strong
|
9 | |
|
organization
Iran
|
Adversarial |
10
Very Strong
|
7 | |
|
person
Davis
|
Legal representative |
10
Very Strong
|
5 | |
|
person
Bodmer
|
Legal representative |
10
Very Strong
|
5 | |
|
person
Dreier
|
Legal representative |
10
Very Strong
|
4 | |
|
person
English
|
Legal representative |
10
Very Strong
|
4 | |
|
person
Boustani
|
Legal representative |
10
Very Strong
|
5 | |
|
person
Torres
|
Legal representative |
10
Very Strong
|
4 | |
|
location
China
|
Unknown |
10
Very Strong
|
4 | |
|
person
Smith
|
Legal representative |
9
Strong
|
5 | |
|
person
Ms. Maxwell
|
Legal representative |
9
Strong
|
4 | |
|
location
China
|
Geopolitical rivals |
9
Strong
|
2 | |
|
person
Sampson
|
Legal representative |
8
Strong
|
4 | |
|
person
Carrillo-Villa
|
Legal representative |
8
Strong
|
2 | |
|
person
Petrov
|
Legal representative |
8
Strong
|
3 | |
|
person
Dominguez
|
Legal representative |
8
Strong
|
2 | |
|
person
Hung
|
Legal representative |
8
Strong
|
2 | |
|
person
Abdellatif El Mokadem
|
Legal representative |
8
Strong
|
2 | |
|
person
Rowe
|
Legal representative |
8
Strong
|
3 | |
|
person
Alindato-Perez
|
Legal representative |
8
Strong
|
2 | |
|
person
Crowell
|
Legal representative |
8
Strong
|
2 | |
|
person
Deutsch
|
Legal representative |
8
Strong
|
2 |
| Date | Event Type | Description | Location | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| N/A | N/A | Modification of the Non-Prosecution Agreement | United States | View |
| N/A | N/A | Discussion of the Syrian situation, including the legitimacy of Mr. Assad, international response... | Global political context, U... | View |
| N/A | N/A | Clarification of provisions in paragraph 7 of the Non-Prosecution Agreement regarding the selecti... | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | Assignment of Independent Third-Party | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | Non-prosecution agreement (NPA) intended for broad, complete resolution of matters, including Eps... | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) entered into by the United States Attorney's Office, Southern Dis... | Southern District of Florida | View |
| N/A | N/A | Agreement regarding Epstein's charges, sentencing, and victim representation. Includes terms for ... | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | War with Iran / U.S.-led attack | Iran | View |
| N/A | N/A | Negotiation and execution of a plea agreement | Eleventh Circuit | View |
| N/A | N/A | Cold War | Global | View |
| N/A | N/A | Non-Prosecution Agreement execution | Unspecified | View |
| N/A | N/A | Epstein agrees to plea deal (NPA) for 18 months imprisonment. | Florida | View |
| N/A | N/A | Potential Iranian nuclear targeting of US logistics hubs. | Middle East / Bahrain | View |
| N/A | N/A | Selection of attorney representative for victims | Unspecified | View |
| N/A | N/A | Public protests and Mubarak's time of need | Cairo, Egypt | View |
| N/A | N/A | Suspension of federal Grand Jury investigation. | N/A | View |
| N/A | N/A | US shipment of battery-operated TV sets to Pacific islands. | Pacific Ocean islands | View |
| N/A | N/A | Hypothetical conflict/coalition warfare between US and Iran | Middle East | View |
| N/A | N/A | Potential U.S. attack on Iran | Iran | View |
| N/A | N/A | Suspension of federal Grand Jury investigation | Federal Court | View |
| N/A | N/A | Proposed peace conference to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. | U.S. | View |
| N/A | N/A | Palestinian bid for full U.N. membership. | United Nations | View |
| N/A | N/A | United States' decision to pursue warmer ties with Tehran. | International | View |
| N/A | Legal case | United States v. Rodriguez, Case No. 9:09-mj-08308-LRJ | N/A | View |
| N/A | Non-prosecution agreement | Epstein agreed to a sentence of eighteen months' imprisonment on two charges, and in return, the ... | N/A | View |
This document appears to be page 215 of a House Oversight Committee report regarding Edward Snowden's flight from Hong Kong to Moscow in June 2013. It details his strategic planning, including job changes, financial preparation, and communications with Laura Poitras and Julian Assange. The text analyzes his lack of visa applications to other regions and suggests his movement to Russia was a calculated decision involving coordination with Russian officials. Note: This document focuses entirely on Edward Snowden and does not mention Jeffrey Epstein.
This document appears to be page 213 of a House Oversight report analyzing Edward Snowden's flight from the US. It details his decision to travel to Hong Kong rather than countries without extradition treaties (like Brazil or Iceland) specifically to utilize Chinese intelligence control as a shield against US interference. The text cites former CIA station chief Tyler Drumheller regarding the 'home court' advantage of Chinese intelligence in Hong Kong and mentions Snowden's subsequent move to Moscow. Note: While the prompt identifies this as 'Epstein-related,' the text exclusively concerns Edward Snowden and the NSA leaks.
This document appears to be page 212 of a House Oversight Committee report detailing the actions of Edward Snowden. It characterizes his move to contractor Booz Allen as a calculated 'expanding penetration' designed solely to steal sensitive NSA, GCHQ, and other allied intelligence files. The text discusses his awareness of the damage he caused, his communications with journalists (Risen, Lam, Poitras, Greenwald), and his strategic decision to flee to Hong Kong rather than face trial in the U.S. or flee to a non-extradition country like Brazil.
The document appears to be page 210 (Chapter 28) of a manuscript or report stamped by House Oversight regarding Edward Snowden. It analyzes his motivations for switching employment from Dell to Booz Allen in March 2013, arguing the move was not financially motivated nor necessary for access to documents, as he already possessed significant classified material (including Presidential Policy Directive 20) while at Dell. The text suggests the job switch actually increased his risk of apprehension.
This document excerpt details an interview with Kucherena, Edward Snowden's Russian lawyer, regarding Snowden's dossier, potential possession of CIA files, and the fictionalized account in Kucherena's novel. The conversation also covers the logistics of interviewing Snowden, involving his American lawyer Ben Wizner, and concludes with Kucherena soliciting a financial contribution for Snowden's legal defense fund.
This document page, part of a House Oversight record, details an interview with Russian lawyer Anatoly Kucherena regarding his representation of Edward Snowden. It describes their first meeting on July 12, 2013, at Sheremetyevo Airport, where Kucherena advised Snowden to withdraw asylum petitions to other countries to secure sanctuary in Russia. The text also covers a subsequent meeting with human rights organizations where Snowden formally requested asylum in Russia.
This document appears to be page 187 of a narrative report or book submitted to the House Oversight Committee (Bates stamp 020339). The text details the 2013 flight of Edward Snowden from Hong Kong to Russia, the inability of US intelligence to capture him, and the strategic fallout of the NSA leaks. It discusses intelligence tradecraft (referencing James Angleton) regarding how foreign adversaries (Russia/China) would likely obscure their involvement or the intelligence gained from the leak. Note: This specific page contains no references to Jeffrey Epstein, despite the user's prompt context.
This document appears to be page 184 from a book (likely by Edward Jay Epstein regarding Edward Snowden) included in a House Oversight Committee production. It details Edward Snowden's arrival in Hong Kong in May 2013, his possession of critical NSA documents, and the geopolitical risks involved, specifically regarding China and Russia. The text analyzes Snowden as a 'single point of failure' for US intelligence and discusses the potential for hostile foreign intelligence services to access the stolen data.
This document page, stamped HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020334, details the intelligence and cyber warfare capabilities of China and its cooperation with Russia. It discusses the hacking of Anthem to gain leverage over US government employees, quotes General Hayden on the legitimacy of such intelligence targets, and outlines a 1992 intelligence-sharing treaty between Russia and China. The text also highlights the geopolitical alignment of Putin and Xi Jinping in 2014 against US global dominance.
This document appears to be page 181 of a larger report or book, stamped with a House Oversight footer, detailing the history and tactics of Chinese cyber-espionage against the United States. It discusses the organizational structure of Chinese intelligence, specific hacking campaigns against US contractors like Booz Allen and tech companies like Google and Adobe, and the massive data breach at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) that exposed millions of federal employee records. The text mentions Paul Strassmann and Edward Snowden but does not contain any specific references to Jeffrey Epstein or his associates.
This document appears to be a page from a book (Chapter 22) produced as evidence in a House Oversight investigation. It details Chinese military advancements, specifically a 2014 submarine missile test in the Atlantic monitored by the NSA, and alleges that China's nuclear and stealth capabilities were largely achieved through espionage against the US and technology licensing from Russia. It references a 1998 Congressional Committee established to investigate these security concerns.
This document page, stamped as part of a House Oversight production, appears to be an excerpt from a narrative report or book. It discusses NSA surveillance capabilities regarding TOR users, specifically referencing the tracking of Silk Road founder Ross Ulbricht's server in Iceland. It also discusses NSA security vulnerabilities highlighted by the Edward Snowden leaks and comments by former CIA Deputy Director Morell regarding the SVR (Russian intelligence) and cyber security.
This document appears to be page 178 of a House Oversight Committee report focused on the Edward Snowden leaks. It details operational security failures by Snowden and his journalist contacts (Poitras, Greenwald) in 2013, noting that Poitras shared information with multiple people and Greenwald shared details with his partner, David Miranda. The text also analyzes Russian cyber espionage capabilities, noting their focus on breaking TOR networks and their advanced tools capable of bypassing US government security.
This document, page 176 of a House Oversight report, analyzes Russian intelligence (SVR) strategies for penetrating the NSA, contrasting the difficulty of recruiting NSA officers versus CIA officers. It details the shift in the 1990s toward targeting civilian technologists and hacktivists, specifically mentioning Edward Snowden as a donor to Ron Paul's campaign, and discusses the use of 'false flag' operations to recruit dissidents.
This document page details Cold War era espionage cases involving the KGB and SVR, specifically mentioning spies Ronald Pelton and David Sheldon Boone. It primarily focuses on the recruitment of CIA officer Harold Nicholson by the Russian SVR in the 1990s, explaining how he was manipulated from a "dangle" operation into a mole due to psychological vulnerabilities.
This document details the history of KGB infiltration within the NSA during the Cold War, specifically focusing on defectors like Victor Norris Hamilton and moles like Sgt. Jack Dunlap. It describes the fates of these individuals, ranging from defection to Moscow and institutionalization to mysterious deaths, and outlines the methods used by the KGB to recruit and exploit them for secret intelligence.
This document discusses the asymmetrical intelligence capabilities between the NSA and Russian intelligence services (SVR/KGB) circa 2013 and historically. It details Russia's efforts to counter NSA dominance through espionage and defection, highlighting the historical case of NSA defectors William Martin and Bernon Mitchell in 1960.
This document details the failure of NSA surveillance to detect the Russian invasion of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014, attributed to Russia's ability to hide electronic traces. It discusses Vladimir Putin's geopolitical motivations to restore Russian power and counter U.S. hegemony, while contrasting the legal constraints on the NSA regarding domestic surveillance with the broad powers of Russian intelligence services under the SORM system.
This document appears to be a page (164) from a narrative report or book included in House Oversight records. It details the history of cybersecurity vulnerabilities within US intelligence, specifically the NSA's reliance on civilian contractors and system administrators. It draws parallels between the KGB's recruitment of hackers in the 1980s and the NSA's hiring of 'hacktivist' culture technicians post-9/11 to compete with tech giants. It specifically mentions that by 2013, sensitive NSA work was outsourced to firms like Booz Allen Hamilton and Microsoft.
This document page (158) details the history of NSA surveillance expansion following the 9/11 attacks, specifically focusing on the USA Patriot Act of 2001 and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. It discusses the conflict between government intelligence gathering and privacy advocates (hacktivists), the technical measures taken to bypass encryption/TOR, and the subsequent bureaucratic compliance framework established involving the DOJ and DOD. While part of a larger House Oversight cache, this specific page contains no direct mention of Jeffrey Epstein or his associates.
This document serves as a historical overview of the National Security Agency's (NSA) capabilities and its relationship with allied nations. It details the immense cost of NSA infrastructure, its ability to monitor global communications via cables and satellites, and the reliance of the CIA and foreign allies on NSA data. The text specifically mentions the 9/11 conspiracy's origins in Hamburg and financing in the Middle East to justify surveillance in friendly nations.
This document page (156) outlines the history of NSA surveillance capabilities and international alliances. It details specific operations such as the 1971 cable tapping in the Sea of Okhotsk, the 1980 Executive Order 12333 by Reagan, and the formation of the 'Five Eyes' alliance. It concludes by mentioning the 2013-2014 Snowden leaks which revealed the extent of data sharing between the NSA and foreign allies like the GCHQ. Although labeled within a 'House Oversight' production, this specific page contains no direct mention of Jeffrey Epstein.
This document appears to be page 154 of a manuscript titled 'Chapter Nineteen: The Rise of the NSA.' It discusses the history of US intelligence, specifically focusing on the impact of the Edward Snowden leaks in 2013 and tracing the history of US code-breaking back to World War I and the 'Black Chamber' in New York City under Herbert O. Yardley. The document bears a House Oversight Bates stamp, indicating it was part of a document production for a congressional investigation.
This document appears to be a page from a book or detailed report (possibly provided to the House Oversight Committee) discussing US intelligence failures related to the Edward Snowden leaks. It details the NSA's offensive cyber strategy, the vulnerability exposed by Snowden at the National Threat Operations Center in Hawaii, and General Michael Hayden's assessment that the leaks significantly aided Chinese and Russian intelligence capabilities.
This document, page 149 of a House Oversight production, details the 2010 FBI arrest of Russian sleeper agents (the 'Illegals Program') and the subsequent compromise of the CIA's mole, Poteyev. It describes concerns within the NSA regarding potential SVR penetration at Fort Meade and the logistical impossibility of vetting all employees against insider threats. The text explains how an FBI sting operation against agent Anna Chapman inadvertently revealed Poteyev's identity, necessitating his urgent exfiltration from Russia to the U.S. via Belarus.
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