| Connected Entity | Relationship Type |
Strength
(mentions)
|
Documents | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
person
Saleh Abdullah Kamel
|
Business associate |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Saleh Abdullah Kamel
|
Corporate leadership |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Saleh Abdullah Kamel
|
Chair |
5
|
1 | |
|
organization
al Qaeda
|
Financial |
5
|
1 |
| Date | Event Type | Description | Location | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| N/A | N/A | Alleged provision of material support to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. | Sudan (implied context) | View |
| N/A | N/A | Alleged support to al-Qaeda by Defendants Dallah al Baraka and Saleh Abdullah Kamel | Unspecified | View |
| 1983-01-01 | N/A | Facilitation of jihad operations | Sudan | View |
| 1982-01-01 | N/A | Beginning of alleged financial support | Unspecified | View |
The document is a page from the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2011 participant list, bearing the Bates stamp HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017082. It provides an alphabetical directory (J through K) of high-profile attendees including corporate executives, politicians (such as Boris Johnson and Paul Kagame), and journalists, listing their roles, organizations, and countries of origin. Of note in the context of Epstein-related inquiries is Scott B. Kapnick of Highbridge Capital Management, a firm with historical ties to Glenn Dubin and Epstein.
This document is page 834 from a Federal Supplement (349 F. Supp. 2d) concerning 9/11-related litigation (Ashton and Burnett complaints). It details the court's decision to grant Saudi American Bank's motion to dismiss claims that it provided material support to al Qaeda. It also introduces allegations against Arab Bank regarding its financial support for terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda and Hamas, and its alleged role in facilitating the September 11 attacks. The document bears a 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT' Bates stamp.
This document is a page from a 2012 Westlaw legal opinion regarding litigation surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (In re: Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001). It details legal arguments concerning the liability of entities including DMI Trust, Dallah al Baraka, and individual Saleh Abdullah Kamel for providing material support to al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden in the 1990s. The text discusses pleading standards under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) and criticizes a lower court for applying an incorrect standard regarding the causal connection between 1990s support and the 2001 attacks. The document bears a 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT' Bates stamp.
This document is a page from a Westlaw printout of a 2012 legal opinion (In re: Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001) stamped with a House Oversight Committee Bates number. It details the legal standards for detaining individuals as 'part of' al-Qaeda, referencing the 'Golden Chain' document which identifies financiers such as Saleh Abdullah Kamel and Suleiman Abdel Aziz al Rajhi. The text analyzes D.C. Circuit precedents regarding habeas corpus petitions from Guantanamo Bay detainees and the evidentiary standards required to prove material support for terrorism.
This document is page 35 of a legal opinion (2012 WL 257568) related to 'In re: Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001', bearing a House Oversight Committee stamp. It details allegations against Saudi financial institutions, including Al Rajhi Bank, Saudi American Bank, and DMI Trust, regarding their financing of Al Qaeda, Hamas, and other terrorist groups through complex networks of charities and investments. The text specifically highlights a $50 million capital injection by Osama bin Laden into Al Shamal Bank and names various Saudi royals and businessmen as knowingly supporting terrorism. While labeled as Epstein-related in the prompt, the text itself focuses exclusively on 9/11 litigation and terror financing.
This document is a page from a legal filing (2012 WL 257568) related to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks litigation. It details allegations against financial institutions Dallah al Baraka, ABID Corp, and DMI Trust (and individual Kamel) regarding their long-term financial support of Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, dating back to the early 1980s. The text describes money laundering, the maintenance of bank accounts for terrorist front organizations, and the facilitation of funds transfers to operatives in Europe and Sudan. The document bears a House Oversight stamp (HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023390).
This document is a page from a legal brief retrieved from Westlaw, bearing a House Oversight Committee Bates stamp. It argues that a lower district court erred in dismissing Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) claims against Al Rajhi Bank, Saudi American Bank, and others related to the financing of al-Qaeda. The text focuses on legal standards (Rule 8 and Rule 12), arguing the court applied an incorrectly heightened standard of scrutiny to the plaintiffs' pleadings regarding the defendants' intent and support for terrorism.
This document is a page from a legal brief or court opinion (specifically 2012 WL 257568) regarding the 'In re: Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001' litigation. It details procedural history concerning the dismissal of claims against numerous defendants, including Saudi banks (Al Rajhi, SAMBA), organizations (Saudi Red Crescent), and individuals (multiple members of the Bin Laden family). The text discusses the impact of the 'Doe v. Bin Laden' decision on jurisdictional arguments under the FSIA (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act) and mentions motions to vacate previous dismissals. The document appears to be part of a House Oversight Committee production (Bates stamped HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023376).
This document is a preliminary statement from a legal appeal (cited 2012) concerning the 'In re: Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001' litigation. The Plaintiffs-Appellants (victims' families) are appealing a district court's dismissal of claims against five defendants, including Al Rajhi Bank, Saudi American Bank, and Saleh Abdullah Kamel, whom they allege knowingly provided material support to al-Qaeda. The text argues that the lower court applied improper pleading standards and misinterpreted statutes such as the Alien Tort Statute and the Anti-Terrorism Act. The document bears a 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT' Bates stamp, indicating it was part of a document production to the U.S. House Oversight Committee.
This document is a Table of Contents from a legal filing related to the case 'In re: TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001,' printed from Westlaw in 2019 as part of a House Oversight production. The text outlines legal arguments accusing several financial institutions and individuals (including Al Rajhi Bank, Saudi American Bank, and Saleh Abdullah Kamel) of knowingly or recklessly supporting al-Qaeda through financial means and charities. While part of the House Oversight production likely related to financial investigations, Jeffrey Epstein's name does not appear on this specific page.
This document is page 55 of a Merrill Lynch financial research report titled 'GEMs Paper #26', dated June 30, 2016. It analyzes the healthcare sector in Saudi Arabia, specifically focusing on management contracts, the capacity of private hospital groups (Dallah, Mouwasat, NMC), and the challenges facing privatization and insurance roll-outs. The text includes specific financial data regarding contract values and hospital bed statistics from the Saudi Ministry of Health.
This document is a page from a Merrill Lynch financial research report (GEMs Paper #26), dated June 30, 2016, included in House Oversight Committee records. It analyzes the Saudi Arabian healthcare sector, specifically focusing on the allocation of SAR 23bn to the Ministry of Health under the National Transformation Program (NTP), the push for "Saudisation" of the workforce, and financial strains caused by the government's non-payment to private providers like Al Hammadi and Dallah. While stamped with a House Oversight Bates number, the content is strictly economic analysis of Saudi public policy and market dynamics.
This document is page 51 of a Merrill Lynch financial research report (GEMs Paper #26) dated June 30, 2016. It analyzes the impact of Saudi Arabia's 'Vision 2030' and 'National Transformation Plan' on the healthcare sector, specifically noting the government's goal to shift funding responsibility to the private sector (from 25% to 35% by 2020) and the potential benefits for listed hospital operators like Al Hammadi and Bupa Arabia. The report highlights risks, including the fact that the Saudi government had not paid private hospitals for public patient referrals for over a year at the time of writing. The document bears a House Oversight Bates stamp.
This document is page 42 of a BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research report (GEMs Paper #26) dated June 30, 2016. It contains a chart analyzing Saudi Arabian market sectors and companies exposed to key National Transformation Program (NTP) themes, alongside a textual analysis of Saudi market valuations compared to emerging market indices. The document bears a 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_016152' stamp, indicating it was part of a document production for a congressional investigation.
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