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Legal document
File Size:
670 KB
Summary
This legal document analyzes the application of the § 3283 statute of limitations, particularly in cases involving child sex abuse and war frauds. It examines arguments made by 'Maxwell' and contrasts interpretations from Supreme Court cases like *Bridges v. United States* with those from the Second Circuit in *Weingarten* and the PROTECT Act. The document concludes that the legislative history and plain meaning of the statute support a broader application rather than a narrow one.
Organizations (6)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Government | government agency |
Would need to prove conduct beyond the elements of the offense; this approach requires the Government to prove some a...
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| United States | government agency |
Party in Bridges v. United States and United States v. Dodge; mentioned in context of 'defrauding the United States'.
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| Supreme Court | government agency |
In Bridges addressed a statute that extended the limitations period; first concluded that making false statements was...
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| Second Circuit | government agency |
Explained in Weingarten that Congress had the opposite intent in enacting the PROTECT Act.
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| Congress | government agency |
Intended the statute to apply only to a narrow class of war frauds; had the opposite intent in enacting the PROTECT A...
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| 11th Cir. | government agency |
Cited as the court for United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
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Timeline (1 events)
Discussion and interpretation of the application of § 3283 statute of limitations, referencing Supreme Court and Circuit Court precedents regarding war frauds and child sex abuse statutes.
Relationships (3)
Maxwell nonetheless contends that... the Government would need to prove...
Maxwell relies primarily on Bridges v. United States
quoting United States v. Dodge
Key Quotes (1)
"cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses against children as possible."Source
— Congress
(Describing Congress's general intention in passing recent statutes related to child sex abuse, including extensions of the § 3283 limitations period.)
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Case 22-1426, Document 57, 02/28/2023, 3475900, Page153 of 208
A-149
Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 12 of 34
A-149
Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 12 of 34
865 F.3d at 60. Maxwell nonetheless contends that using a case-specific approach for § 3283
would be impractical because the Government would need to prove conduct beyond the elements
of the offense. It may be true that this approach requires the Government to prove some
additional facts, but any statute-of-limitations defense presents factual issues (including, at least,
when the alleged conduct took place). This is not a serious practical problem and does not
justify setting aside the statute’s language and apparent purpose.
Maxwell relies primarily on Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953), to urge this
Court to cast Weingarten aside. The Supreme Court in Bridges addressed a statute that extended
the limitations period for defrauding the United States during the Second World War. In that
case, the Supreme Court first concluded that making false statements at an immigration hearing
was not subject to the extended limitations period because it lacked any pecuniary element as
required by the statute. Id. at 221. Then, as an alternative basis for its holding, it explained that
the offense did not require fraud as an “essential ingredient.” Id. at 222. It reached that
conclusion in large part because the statute’s legislative history made clear that Congress
intended it to apply only to a narrow class of war frauds causing pecuniary loss. Id. at 216.
As the Second Circuit explained in Weingarten, Congress had the opposite intent in the
enacting in the PROTECT Act. Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 59 & n. 10. “In passing recent statutes
related to child sex abuse, including extensions of the § 3283 limitations period, Congress
‘evinced a general intention to “cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses against children as
possible.”’” Id. at 60 (quoting Schneider, 801 F.3d at 196 (quoting United States v. Dodge, 597
F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc))). The primary basis for Bridges’ holding—
legislative history supporting a narrow interpretation—does not exist here. Instead, both the
statute’s plan meaning and its legislative history suggest it should apply more broadly.
would be impractical because the Government would need to prove conduct beyond the elements
of the offense. It may be true that this approach requires the Government to prove some
additional facts, but any statute-of-limitations defense presents factual issues (including, at least,
when the alleged conduct took place). This is not a serious practical problem and does not
justify setting aside the statute’s language and apparent purpose.
Maxwell relies primarily on Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953), to urge this
Court to cast Weingarten aside. The Supreme Court in Bridges addressed a statute that extended
the limitations period for defrauding the United States during the Second World War. In that
case, the Supreme Court first concluded that making false statements at an immigration hearing
was not subject to the extended limitations period because it lacked any pecuniary element as
required by the statute. Id. at 221. Then, as an alternative basis for its holding, it explained that
the offense did not require fraud as an “essential ingredient.” Id. at 222. It reached that
conclusion in large part because the statute’s legislative history made clear that Congress
intended it to apply only to a narrow class of war frauds causing pecuniary loss. Id. at 216.
As the Second Circuit explained in Weingarten, Congress had the opposite intent in the
enacting in the PROTECT Act. Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 59 & n. 10. “In passing recent statutes
related to child sex abuse, including extensions of the § 3283 limitations period, Congress
‘evinced a general intention to “cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses against children as
possible.”’” Id. at 60 (quoting Schneider, 801 F.3d at 196 (quoting United States v. Dodge, 597
F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc))). The primary basis for Bridges’ holding—
legislative history supporting a narrow interpretation—does not exist here. Instead, both the
statute’s plan meaning and its legislative history suggest it should apply more broadly.
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