HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019629.jpg
1.64 MB
Extraction Summary
4
People
5
Organizations
0
Locations
2
Events
2
Relationships
4
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Book excerpt / investigative report (evidence production)
File Size:
1.64 MB
Summary
This document is page 141 from a book or report (identified by ISBN in the footer as Edward Jay Epstein's 'How America Lost Its Secrets') marked with a 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT' Bates stamp. The text analyzes Edward Snowden's theft of NSA documents in April and May 2013, arguing that employment records from Booz Allen and the NSA show he lacked the necessary passwords and training for the access he claimed. The author suggests, using a metaphor about a diamond heist at Tiffany's, that it is logical to suspect Snowden had an accomplice, though the FBI chose to investigate under the assumption that the NSA's security was simply flawed.
People (4)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Snowden | Subject of investigation |
Accused of stealing NSA documents; formerly employed by Booz Allen.
|
| Former top NSA official | Source |
Provided information regarding NSA password protocols and Snowden's lack of access.
|
| Source on the House Intelligence Committee | Source |
Provided information regarding the FBI's investigative choices in summer 2013.
|
| Cleaning personnel | Comparison |
Used as a metaphor for Snowden's level of legitimate access.
|
Organizations (5)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| NSA |
National Security Agency; victim of document theft.
|
|
| Booz Allen |
Snowden's employer; employment records cited.
|
|
| FBI |
Investigating agency determining how Snowden gained access.
|
|
| House Intelligence Committee |
Legislative body overseeing the investigation.
|
|
| Tiffany |
Used in a metaphorical example regarding diamond theft.
|
Relationships (2)
Booz Allen's employment records showed that Snowden had not yet completed his requisite on-the-job training
Text suggests it is logical to assume he might have had help, unwitting or witting.
Key Quotes (4)
"millions of records that [he] could walk out the door with at any time with no accountability, no oversight, no auditing, the government didn't even know they were gone."Source
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Quote #1
"Snowden, at least during the period of the thefts in April and May 2013, had no more legitimate access to the compartments than the cleaning personnel."Source
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Quote #2
"If a hundred top-quality diamonds were stolen from locked vaults at Tiffany by a recently hired trainee... the police would be expected to consider that the trainee might have had help from a current or former insider"Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019629.jpg
Quote #3
"The FBI could assume either that the NSA's security regime was so badly flawed... or that there was another individual at the center who might have assisted or directed Snowden."Source
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Quote #4
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,423 characters)
The Crime Scene Investigation | 141
had to consider the possibility that his whistle-blowing was, partly if
not wholly, a cover for another enterprise.
not wholly, a cover for another enterprise.
Snowden told journalists he had access to "millions of records
that [he] could walk out the door with at any time with no account-
ability, no oversight, no auditing, the government didn't even know
they were gone." However, he was not among the limited number
of individuals at the center who had access to these documents.
Both the NSA's and Booz Allen's employment records showed that
Snowden had not yet completed his requisite on-the-job training
when he carried out the theft. Consequently, he had not yet been
provided with the passwords he needed to get the documents. Even
if he had remained at the NSA long enough to finish his training,
he would only have been provided with the password to the particu-
lar compartment relevant to his work, not to all compartments. The
tight control over these passwords was, according to a former top
NSA official, a critical part of the NSA's security framework. He told
me that Snowden, at least during the period of the thefts in April
and May 2013, had no more legitimate access to the compartments
than the cleaning personnel. Somehow, though, Snowden converted
his proximity to access.
that [he] could walk out the door with at any time with no account-
ability, no oversight, no auditing, the government didn't even know
they were gone." However, he was not among the limited number
of individuals at the center who had access to these documents.
Both the NSA's and Booz Allen's employment records showed that
Snowden had not yet completed his requisite on-the-job training
when he carried out the theft. Consequently, he had not yet been
provided with the passwords he needed to get the documents. Even
if he had remained at the NSA long enough to finish his training,
he would only have been provided with the password to the particu-
lar compartment relevant to his work, not to all compartments. The
tight control over these passwords was, according to a former top
NSA official, a critical part of the NSA's security framework. He told
me that Snowden, at least during the period of the thefts in April
and May 2013, had no more legitimate access to the compartments
than the cleaning personnel. Somehow, though, Snowden converted
his proximity to access.
If a hundred top-quality diamonds were stolen from locked vaults
at Tiffany by a recently hired trainee who, it turned out, did not have
the combination to open these vaults, the police would be expected to
consider that the trainee might have had help from a current or for-
mer insider at the company who knew the combinations. Snowden,
who had accomplished a similarly inexplicable feat, said in his video
confession that he was solely responsible. However, it is perfectly
logical to assume, given the circumstances, that he might have had
help, unwitting or witting.
at Tiffany by a recently hired trainee who, it turned out, did not have
the combination to open these vaults, the police would be expected to
consider that the trainee might have had help from a current or for-
mer insider at the company who knew the combinations. Snowden,
who had accomplished a similarly inexplicable feat, said in his video
confession that he was solely responsible. However, it is perfectly
logical to assume, given the circumstances, that he might have had
help, unwitting or witting.
The FBI could assume either that the NSA's security regime was
so badly flawed that Snowden could trick his fellow workers into
providing him with access or that there was another individual at
the center who might have assisted or directed Snowden. When the
investigation came to this fork in the road in the summer of 2013,
according to a source on the House Intelligence Committee, it chose
the former route.
so badly flawed that Snowden could trick his fellow workers into
providing him with access or that there was another individual at
the center who might have assisted or directed Snowden. When the
investigation came to this fork in the road in the summer of 2013,
according to a source on the House Intelligence Committee, it chose
the former route.
Finally, there was the question of whether Snowden had gone to
Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 141 9/30/16 11:09 AM
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