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many as possible of the Arab inhabitants to come under the authority of the
Palestinians, and as few as possible under our rule.” Amnon’s bottom line was that
we could not give up Israeli sovereignty over the Temple Mount, which, although
he was a non-observant Jew, he called “the cradle of Jewish history.” But equally,
we couldn’t and shouldn’t “run the Al-Aqsa mosque.” He was also in favor of
agreeing to what Clinton had asked of me: giving Arafat a base in the Muslim
Quarter of the Old City. His one caveat was that we should not do any of this
unless it was part of a genuine, final, peace agreement with the Palestinians.

Danny Yatom urged us to move beyond our emotions and look for a practical
solution. “We all know how the boundaries of Jerusalem were drawn,” he said,
referring to the post-1967 expansion of the city. “They’re not holy. It is important
to get down to our real red lines.” Eli Rubinstein, the attorney general, agreed.
Even though he was an observant, Orthodox Jew, and more sympathetic politically
to Likud than Labor, he concluded that we needed to include “as few Arabs as
possible” under Israeli sovereignty, and to cede the outer villages to the
Palestinians, adding: “This is a moment of truth.”

It was nearly five hours before I brought the discussion to a close. “This is as
grave a decision as when Ben-Gurion accepted the partition plan in 1947; the
declaration of the state; or the most tense moments of the Yom Kippur War,” I
said. “Or the decisions which Begin took in this same place.” Of course, Begin
hadn’t even been willing to enter into discussion on Jerusalem. But we were in a
different situation. If we were going to get a true end to our conflict, the question
of Jerusalem had to be addressed. “We can’t delay the decision. We can’t avoid it.
We will have to decide.” My own red line was the same as Amnon Lipkin’s:
“sovereignty over the site of our First and Second Temples.” Even shared
sovereignty elsewhere within the Old City seemed to me a step too far at this stage,
but I didn’t rule it out as part of a full peace. “Without disengagement from the
Palestinians, without an end of conflict,” I reminded our negotiating team, “we’re
heading toward further tragedy. We can’t pretend we don’t see the iceberg.”

I asked several members of the team, under Shlomo Ben-Ami, to draft a paper
based on our discussion. Since I knew that Clinton, and Arafat too, could do
nothing of substance until I’d resolved how far to go on Jerusalem, I went to see
the President. I told him about our session. I said that we were now crystallizing
what had been said into a formal position, and I hoped to be able to return in a few
hours with “the furthest point we can go.” Clinton said that would be a critical

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