| Connected Entity | Relationship Type |
Strength
(mentions)
|
Documents | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
person
Ehud Barak
|
Superior subordinate |
8
Strong
|
4 | |
|
person
Ehud Barak
|
Business associate |
6
|
1 | |
|
person
Jibril Rajoub
|
Security coordination |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Barak Obama
|
Professional subordinate |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Bill Clinton
|
Mediator negotiator |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Narrator (Ehud Barak)
|
Business associate |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Jibril Rajoub
|
Counterparts coordinators |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Jibril Rajoub
|
Security counterparts |
5
|
1 | |
|
person
Gili Sher
|
Business associate |
1
|
1 |
| Date | Event Type | Description | Location | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| N/A | N/A | Party Chairman Election | Israel | View |
| N/A | N/A | A nearly five-hour strategy discussion regarding the status of Jerusalem and peace negotiations. | Camp David (implied by cont... | View |
| 2000-07-01 | N/A | Camp David Summit negotiations regarding the West Bank and peace agreement terms. | Camp David | View |
| 2000-07-01 | N/A | Departure from Camp David Summit via Andrews Air Force Base. | Andrews Air Force Base / At... | View |
| 2000-07-01 | N/A | Negotiation Meeting | Camp David | View |
| 2000-07-01 | N/A | Overnight Negotiation Session | Laurel Lodge (Camp David) | View |
| 2000-07-01 | N/A | Camp David Summit negotiations | Camp David (implied by 'Dog... | View |
| 2000-07-01 | N/A | Strategic discussion on Jerusalem boundaries and sovereignty. | Camp David (implied by cont... | View |
| 2000-01-01 | N/A | Camp David Summit | Camp David | View |
This document appears to be page 3 of a memoir or narrative account, stamped with a House Oversight code, likely written by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. It details the departure from the failed Camp David summit in 2000, describing the flight home on an aging Boeing 707. The narrator reflects on his military past with this aircraft model, specifically recounting the 1972 Sabena hijacking rescue where Benjamin Netanyahu served under him and was wounded by friendly fire.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (page 105, Bates stamped House Oversight). It details the aftermath of his election defeat to Ariel Sharon ('Arik'), Sharon's attempts to recruit him as Defense Minister for a unity government, and the internal conflict within the Labor Party regarding joining a Likud-led government. It concludes with a meeting between Barak and Sharon discussing security issues and the West Bank fence.
This document appears to be a page from a manuscript or memoir written by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. It details the political climate in Israel in November 2000, discussing the collapse of peace talks with Yasser Arafat, the rise of the Second Intifada, and Barak's internal political struggles with the Knesset and Ariel Sharon. The text reflects on Barak's decision-making regarding early elections and his defense of his attempts at peace with the Palestinians and Syria.
This document appears to be a page (384) from a memoir or manuscript, likely by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (indicated by the header / BARAK / 98). It details the political situation in Israel following the failure of the Camp David summit and the outbreak of the Second Intifada (late 2000/early 2001). The text describes Barak's refusal to end the Oslo process at Ariel Sharon's demand, his reliance on the Shas party for a safety net in the Knesset, and his authorization of negotiators to continue peace talks under President Clinton's proposal despite escalating terrorist attacks (bombings in Jerusalem, Hadera, and Gaza) by Islamic Jihad and Hamas. The document bears a 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT' Bates stamp, indicating it was part of a production to the US Congress.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or report by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (indicated by the header '/ BARAK /'). It details diplomatic confrontations during the early stages of the Second Intifada (late 2000), focusing on a meeting at the Elysée Palace with French President Jacques Chirac and US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. The text describes Barak's frustration with Yasser Arafat's alleged duplicity regarding violence in the region and Chirac's perceived bias toward the Palestinian narrative regarding casualty figures.
This document appears to be a page from Ehud Barak's memoir regarding the collapse of the Camp David Summit in July 2000. It details President Clinton's final attempts to broker a peace deal regarding East Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, and Arafat's subsequent rejection of the proposals. The text describes the final closing statements where Clinton and Barak expressed frustration while Arafat offered empty praise. Note: While the prompt asks for Epstein-related documents, this specific page contains no mention of Jeffrey Epstein; it is a diplomatic record marked with a House Oversight stamp.
This document appears to be page 80 of a manuscript or book (likely by Ehud Barak, given the header) included in House Oversight evidence (Bates stamped HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011837). It details the breakdown of peace negotiations, likely during the 2000 Camp David Summit, focusing on the refusal of Yasser Arafat to accept American proposals regarding sovereignty over Jerusalem's Old City (Muslim and Christian Quarters). The narrator (Barak) describes conversations with President Clinton about ending the summit or deferring the Jerusalem issue.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or manuscript by Ehud Barak (stamped with House Oversight codes), detailing the 2000 Camp David Summit. It describes intense private negotiations between Barak and President Bill Clinton regarding peace terms with Yasser Arafat, specifically mentioning tensions over Jerusalem, red lines, and Arafat's refusal to offer counter-positions. The narrative captures Clinton's frustration and a late-night 3:30 AM meeting on the terrace of the Aspen lodge at Camp David.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or manuscript by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, marked with a House Oversight stamp. It details high-stakes internal discussions among the Israeli negotiating team (likely at the Camp David Summit in 2000) regarding sovereignty over Jerusalem, the Temple Mount, and the Old City. The text describes Barak's consultations with advisors like Danny Yatom and Amnon Lipkin-Shahak before presenting their 'red lines' to President Bill Clinton.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or manuscript (likely by Ehud Barak, indicated by the header) detailing the Camp David 2000 Summit negotiations. The text describes the narrator's frustration with the lack of reciprocity from Palestinian negotiators (Erekat and Dahlan) despite significant Israeli concessions regarding East Jerusalem and the West Bank. It includes the content of a note written by the narrator to President Clinton, expressing that the talks had become manipulative rather than a genuine negotiation.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or manuscript by Ehud Barak (indicated by the header), recounting the 2000 Camp David Summit negotiations. It details a tense interaction where President Clinton became angry with Palestinian negotiator Abu Ala'a, followed by an overnight 'make-or-break' negotiation session at Laurel Lodge involving Shlomo Ben-Ami and Gili Sher. The document bears a House Oversight Bates stamp, suggesting it was produced during a congressional investigation, likely due to Barak's associations with Jeffrey Epstein, though Epstein is not mentioned in this specific text.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or manuscript by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, marked with a House Oversight Committee evidence stamp. It details the internal deliberations and diplomatic friction during the 2000 Camp David Summit, specifically highlighting interactions with US envoy Dennis Ross and President Bill Clinton regarding Palestinian negotiations. The text focuses on the deadlock over the West Bank and Barak's refusal to offer concessions without reciprocal movement from Yasser Arafat.
This document appears to be a page from Ehud Barak's memoir or a detailed witness statement regarding the 2000 Camp David Summit, produced as part of a House Oversight investigation (likely related to Epstein due to Barak's association). The text details the breakdown of negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian delegations mediated by President Clinton, specifically focusing on the refusal of Palestinian negotiators (Abu Ala'a and Abu Mazen) to discuss borders or refugees without prior Israeli concessions on land swaps and the 'right of return'. The document highlights the diplomatic impasse despite US efforts to facilitate compromise.
This document is page 62 from a manuscript or book by Ehud Barak, contained within House Oversight Committee files (likely related to Epstein investigations due to Barak's association, though Epstein is not mentioned on this specific page). The text details Barak's preparations for the Camp David 2000 Summit, the selection of his negotiating team (including Dan Meridor and Elyakim Rubinstein), and the logistical constraints imposed by President Clinton's schedule. It highlights Barak's strategy to include right-of-center political voices to legitimize potential concessions.
This document is an excerpt from page 343 of a memoir by Ehud Barak (indicated by the header and context), marked as a House Oversight exhibit. It describes the political maneuvering prior to the 2000 Camp David Summit, specifically detailing a casual Shabbat meeting with US diplomat Dennis Ross at Danny Yatom's home in Kochav Yair. Barak discusses his reliance on President Clinton to facilitate peace talks with Yasser Arafat.
This document appears to be an excerpt from a memoir or statement by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (labeled 'BARAK / 50'), contained within a House Oversight Committee file. The text details the political complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in the spring of 2000, specifically focusing on negotiations regarding villages near East Jerusalem (Abu Dis), internal Israeli coalition fragility involving Shas and the National Religious Party, and security concerns surrounding Al-Naqba Day on May 15, 2000. It mentions coordination with President Clinton to prevent violence during planned protests.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or book manuscript by Ehud Barak (indicated by context and the header '/ BARAK / 43'). It details his inner circle and negotiating team, noting they were mostly military veterans of the 1967 and 1973 wars. The text reflects on the psychological impact of those wars on Israeli leadership and discusses the diplomatic stalemate with Syrian President Assad regarding the Golan Heights in late 1999. The document bears a House Oversight Bates stamp.
This document is a page from a memoir or autobiography (likely Ehud Barak's) recounting the night of the 1999 Israeli General Election. It details Barak's landslide victory over Benjamin Netanyahu, his emotional interactions with his family and Leah Rabin at the Dan Hotel, and congratulatory calls from world leaders including Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. The page bears a House Oversight stamp, suggesting it was collected as evidence, likely related to investigations involving Barak's associations.
This document appears to be a page from Ehud Barak's memoir, produced as evidence for the House Oversight Committee (likely related to investigations involving his associations). The text details Barak's victory in the Labor party chairmanship election (winning 57% of the vote) and his subsequent strategy to defeat Benjamin Netanyahu (Bibi) by securing funding through his brother-in-law Doron Cohen and Jean Frydman to hire international political strategists. It also references his military background and political goals regarding peace with Syria and the Palestinians.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or manuscript by Ehud Barak (indicated by the header) produced during a House Oversight investigation. It details the aftermath of the 1996 Israeli election where Shimon Peres lost to Benjamin Netanyahu shortly after the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. The text reflects on the political climate of Israel at the time, the narrator's personal relationships with Peres and Rabin, and the impact of the assassination on the peace process.
This document appears to be a page (105) from a memoir or book draft by Ehud Barak, included in House Oversight evidence files. It details the aftermath of the 2001 Israeli election where Barak lost to Ariel Sharon ('Arik'). The text describes Sharon's attempts to recruit Barak as Defense Minister, the internal conflict within the Labor Party regarding joining a unity government, and a subsequent meeting between Barak and Sharon regarding the West Bank security fence and rising casualty numbers from terror attacks.
This document is a page (385) from a memoir, likely by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, produced as evidence in a House Oversight investigation (Bates stamp HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028233). The text details the political situation in Israel in late November (presumably 2000), discussing the collapse of peace talks with Yasser Arafat, the political pressure from Ariel Sharon and the Likud party, and Barak's internal deliberations regarding early elections and his responsibility for the failure of the Camp David summit. While the document is part of an Epstein-related production (Barak was an associate of Epstein), the content of this specific page is strictly political history regarding the Middle East peace process.
This document appears to be page 384 of a memoir or book by Ehud Barak (indicated by the header), included in House Oversight evidence files. The text details the political fallout after the failure of the Camp David summit, Barak's refusal to form a coalition with Ariel Sharon due to disagreements over the Oslo process, and his reliance on a 'safety net' deal with the Shas party. It describes escalating violence by Islamic Jihad and Hamas in late 2000/early 2001 and Barak's decision to continue peace talks via negotiators (Ben-Ami, Sher, etc.) despite the violence, at President Clinton's insistence.
This document appears to be a page from a memoir or manuscript by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (indicated by the header '/ BARAK /'), produced as part of a House Oversight investigation (likely related to Epstein due to Barak's association, though Epstein is not mentioned on this page). The text details diplomatic tensions during the Second Intifada (circa late 2000), focusing on a contentious meeting at the Elysée Palace with French President Jacques Chirac, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and Yasser Arafat. Barak describes his frustration with Arafat's alleged duplicity regarding violence and Chirac's demand for an international force.
This document is a page from a manuscript (likely Ehud Barak's memoir) describing the events leading up to the Second Intifada in September 2000. It details the political maneuvering behind Ariel Sharon's controversial visit to the Temple Mount, the security consultations Barak held with Israeli officials and Palestinian counterparts, and the subsequent outbreak of violence despite US diplomatic intervention. The text highlights the tense political atmosphere following the collapse of Camp David and attributes the escalation of violence to Arafat's inaction.
Rajoub asked for two conditions: not on a Friday, and not entering mosques.
Rajoub asked for no Friday visit and no entering mosques
Rajoub asked for no Friday visit and no entry into mosques; Shlomo agreed.
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