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721 KB
Extraction Summary
5
People
3
Organizations
0
Locations
3
Events
3
Relationships
2
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
721 KB
Summary
This legal document discusses the critical issue of juror impartiality and memory reliability in court proceedings. It references the Sampson v. United States case, where a new penalty-phase hearing was ordered due to a juror's undisclosed personal experiences as a crime victim, drawing parallels to concerns about Juror No. 50's ability to fairly evaluate evidence in the current case. The document also incorporates expert testimony from Dr. Loftus regarding the confidence and accuracy of memories, emphasizing the potential for bias when jurors' personal experiences align with case details.
People (5)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Juror No. 50 | Juror |
Subject of discussion regarding personal experience, belief about memory, and ability to evaluate evidence; his confi...
|
| Ms. Maxwell | Litigant/Defendant (implied) |
Her case involves a challenge to the credibility of her accusers’ memories.
|
| Dr. Loftus | Expert witness |
Provided expert testimony on memory reliability and confidence.
|
| Sampson | Defendant/Litigant |
Party in the precedent case Sampson v. United States.
|
| her husband | Husband of a juror in the Sampson case |
Menaced the juror in the Sampson case with a shotgun, an event she failed to disclose.
|
Organizations (3)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| United States | Government agency |
Party in the case Sampson v. United States.
|
| First Circuit | Government agency (court) |
Affirmed a district court’s decision to order a new penalty-phase hearing in the Sampson case.
|
| Court | Government agency (court) |
Referred to in the context of the Sampson case, stating concerns about juror impartiality.
|
Timeline (3 events)
A new penalty-phase hearing ordered in a death penalty case due to a juror's false denials about being a crime victim.
A bank robbery where the defendant threatened bank tellers at gunpoint, which was the subject of a case where a juror with undisclosed personal experience was seated.
defendant
bank tellers
The process of questioning prospective jurors, during which a juror in the Sampson case and Juror No. 50 gave false answers.
juror
Juror No. 50
Relationships (3)
Juror No. 50's personal experience and beliefs about memory might prevent him from fairly evaluating Ms. Maxwell’s challenge to her accusers’ credibility.
Dr. Loftus provided expert testimony relevant to Ms. Maxwell's case regarding memory reliability.
The juror in the Sampson case was 'menaced by her husband with a shotgun,' an event she failed to disclose during voir dire.
Key Quotes (2)
"“These parallels,” the Court said, “raise a serious concern as to whether an ordinary person in [the juror’s] shoes would be able to disregard her own experiences in evaluating the evidence.”"Source
— The Court (in Sampson case)
(Quoted to highlight the concern about a juror's ability to remain impartial when personal experiences conflict with the evidence.)
DOJ-OGR-00009041.jpg
Quote #1
"“when you have post-event suggestion or intervention, people get very confident about their wrong answers, and you can see that even wrong answers or false information, false memories can be expressed with a high degree of confidence.”"Source
— Dr. Loftus
(Expert testimony on the unreliability of memory and confidence, particularly after post-event suggestion.)
DOJ-OGR-00009041.jpg
Quote #2
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (1,956 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 613 Filed 02/24/22 Page 40 of 66
that occurred at different times and places, bring it together, and construct
what feels like a recollection.
TR at 2427. Given Juror No. 50’s personal experience and belief about memory and its
reliability, there was no way he could fairly evaluate Ms. Maxwell’s challenge to the
credibility of her accusers’ memories or the expert testimony of Dr. Loftus.12
Several decisions support this conclusion. In Sampson v. United States, for
example, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to order a new penalty-
phase hearing in a death penalty case after a juror falsely denied, among other things,
having been a victim of a crime. 724 F.3d at 154, 162. In fact, however, the juror
repeatedly had been menaced by her husband with a shotgun. Id. at 168. But because the
juror had not told the truth during voir dire, she was seated on a jury in a case involving a
bank robbery in which the defendant threatened bank tellers at gunpoint. Id. “These
parallels,” the Court said, “raise a serious concern as to whether an ordinary person in
[the juror’s] shoes would be able to disregard her own experiences in evaluating the
evidence.” Id.
To be sure, the juror in Sampson did not limit her false answers to a single
question. She also answered falsely to several other questions during voir dire, some
material and some not. Id. at 162-63, 166. A combination of factors led the First Circuit
to affirm the order for a new penalty-phase hearing. Id. at 168. Here, Juror No. 50’s false
12 Juror No. 50’s confidence in his memory is not necessarily a predictor of the
memory’s reliability. As Dr. Loftus testified, “when you have post-event suggestion or
intervention, people get very confident about their wrong answers, and you can see that
even wrong answers or false information, false memories can be expressed with a high
degree of confidence.” TR at 2430.
33
DOJ-OGR-00009041
that occurred at different times and places, bring it together, and construct
what feels like a recollection.
TR at 2427. Given Juror No. 50’s personal experience and belief about memory and its
reliability, there was no way he could fairly evaluate Ms. Maxwell’s challenge to the
credibility of her accusers’ memories or the expert testimony of Dr. Loftus.12
Several decisions support this conclusion. In Sampson v. United States, for
example, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to order a new penalty-
phase hearing in a death penalty case after a juror falsely denied, among other things,
having been a victim of a crime. 724 F.3d at 154, 162. In fact, however, the juror
repeatedly had been menaced by her husband with a shotgun. Id. at 168. But because the
juror had not told the truth during voir dire, she was seated on a jury in a case involving a
bank robbery in which the defendant threatened bank tellers at gunpoint. Id. “These
parallels,” the Court said, “raise a serious concern as to whether an ordinary person in
[the juror’s] shoes would be able to disregard her own experiences in evaluating the
evidence.” Id.
To be sure, the juror in Sampson did not limit her false answers to a single
question. She also answered falsely to several other questions during voir dire, some
material and some not. Id. at 162-63, 166. A combination of factors led the First Circuit
to affirm the order for a new penalty-phase hearing. Id. at 168. Here, Juror No. 50’s false
12 Juror No. 50’s confidence in his memory is not necessarily a predictor of the
memory’s reliability. As Dr. Loftus testified, “when you have post-event suggestion or
intervention, people get very confident about their wrong answers, and you can see that
even wrong answers or false information, false memories can be expressed with a high
degree of confidence.” TR at 2430.
33
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