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In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F.Supp.2d 539 (2005)
10 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 789

Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct.
2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (“A court may dismiss a
complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted
under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with
the allegations.”).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” “This simplified notice pleading
standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary
judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and
to dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152
L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), Leatherman v.
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168–69, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d
517 (1993)). Plaintiffs must still give Defendants fair and
adequate notice of their claims and the grounds on which
they rest. See Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d
Cir.1995). “[W]hile Swierkiewicz made clear that
pleading a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case was not
necessary to survive a motion to dismiss, it did not even
remotely suggest that a pleading could survive dismissal
when it contained only the barest of conclusory
allegations without notice of the factual grounds on which
they purport to be based.” Jackson v. BellSouth
Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1270–71 (11th Cir.2004).

The Court limits its review to the facts stated in the
complaints, documents attached to the complaints as
exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the
complaints. Dangler v. N.Y.C. Off Track Betting Corp.,
193 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir.1999). For purposes of the
RICO claims, the Court also reviews the RICO
statements.

Plaintiffs claim that Defendants in these lawsuits are
liable for the attacks of September 11, in most instances,
as co-conspirators, aiders, or abettors with al Qaeda. The
Court has held that Defendants may be responsible for the
September 11 attacks if they knowingly and intentionally
provided material support to al Qaeda. See Terrorist
Attacks I, 349 F.Supp.2d at 826. The complaints’ various
theories of recovery merit a brief review here. See id. at
825–31.

The ATA provides a civil remedy for “[a]ny national of
the United States injured in his or her person, property, or
business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or
his or estate, survivors, or heirs.” 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). An
act of international terrorism includes the provision of
material support to terrorists, which is also a criminal act
under the ATA. Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1015. The ATA’s

criminal provisions define “material support or resources”
as “currency or other financial securities, financial
services, lodging, training, safehouses, false
documentation or identification, communications
equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal explosives,
personnel, transportation, and other physical assets,
except medicine or religious materials.” 18 U.S.C. §
2339A(b); see also Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1015 (finding
conduct that violates § 2339A would be sufficient to meet
the definition of “international terrorism” in § 2333). This
Court adopts the Seventh Circuit’s requirement that
Plaintiffs plead that Defendants knew of al Qaeda’s illegal
activities, “that they desired to help those activities
succeed, and they engaged in some act of helping the
illegal activities.” Id. at 1023–24 (finding allegation that
defendants are “ ‘front’ organizations with ostensibly
legitimate purposes which are actually engaged in *565
fund-raising and money laundering in support of terrorist
activities” and that those defendants “supplied money to
Hamas to fund terrorist operations” were sufficient to
survive 12(b)(6) motion).

The ATCA provides a basis for relief when an alien sues
for a tort committed in violation of the law of nations. 28
U.S.C. § 1350; Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d
Cir.1995). Aircraft hijacking is considered a violation of
international law, Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240, and the ATCA
includes “actions premised on a theory of aiding and
abetting and conspiracy.” Presbyterian Church of Sudan
v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F.Supp.2d 289, 311
(S.D.N.Y.2003). The ATCA, therefore, may provide a
basis of recovery for those Plaintiffs who are aliens.

The Federal Plaintiffs include violations of civil RICO in
their complaint. Section 1962(c) makes it unlawful “for
any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in ... interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct
or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Section 1962(d) makes it
“unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.”
Id. § 1962(d). Section 1964 provides for a private right of
action to enforce the statute. Id. § 1964. Plaintiffs must
plead an injury resulting from conduct of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity. Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 491 (1985).

[24] In Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 113 S.Ct.
1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993), the Supreme Court found
that liability under § 1962(c) requires that a defendant be
a participant “in the operation or management of the
enterprise itself.” Id. at 185, 113 S.Ct. 1163. The Court
stated:

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