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Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page51 of 93

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certain discrimination claims, and held that applying
the new statute in a case "filed after its enactment, but
arising out of events that predate its enactment," is not
impermissibly retroactive under Landgraf. Id. at 889-
90. As the Court explained, "[t]he conduct to which the
statute of limitations applies is not the primary con-
duct of the defendants, the alleged discrimination, but
is instead the secondary conduct of the plaintiffs, the
filing of their suit." Id. at 890. The 2003 amendment to
Section 3283 likewise applies only to the secondary
conduct of filing a criminal case; it does not apply to
the primary conduct of Maxwell's child sexual abuse
by, for example, modifying the elements of an offense
to criminalize conduct that previously had not consti-
tuted a crime. See id. at 891 ("Landgraf and other
cases countenance treating statutes of limitations dif-
ferently from statutory provisions that affect substan-
tive rights."). Thus, like the new statute in Vernon, the
2003 amendment "impaired no rights possessed by ei-
ther party, increased neither party's liability, nor im-
posed any new duties with respect to past transac-
tions." Id. at 890.
Enterprise does not alter this conclusion. There,
this Court considered whether an amended statute of
limitations operated to "revive already expired securi-
ties fraud claims." Enterprise, 391 F.3d at 405. While
acknowledging that under Vernon, "retroactive appli-
cation of a revised statute of limitations generally does
not have an impermissible retroactive effect," the
Court concluded that "the resurrection of previously
time-barred claims has an impermissible retroactive
effect." Id. at 409-10 (emphasis removed). Enterprise
has no application here, as the limitations period for

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