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Extraction Summary
3
People
2
Organizations
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Locations
4
Events
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Relationships
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Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
641 KB
Summary
This document is a page from a legal filing, likely a court opinion or brief, dated February 28, 2023. The author argues against the retroactive application of a statute (§ 3283) by analyzing legislative intent, referencing Senator Leahy's remarks and Congress's rejection of a specific retroactivity provision in a 2003 bill. The argument is supported by comparing the rejected language to similar provisions in other statutes (Pub.L. 107-56 and Pub.L. 101-647) to conclude that applying the statute retroactively fails the legal test established in the Landgraf case.
People (3)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Kennedy, J. | Justice (dissenting) |
Cited in a parenthetical as dissenting in a legal opinion.
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| Leahy | Senator |
Mentioned as Sen. Leahy, whose remarks are discussed in the context of Congress's rejection of a provision.
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| Garcia |
Named as a party in the legal case citation 'Garcia v. U.S.'.
|
Organizations (2)
Timeline (4 events)
1984
The year of the Garcia v. U.S. case, cited for the principle that floor statements by a single member are weak legislative history evidence.
Key Quotes (2)
"agree to disagree"Source
— Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 623
(Used to describe an action Congress did not merely take when rejecting a provision, indicating the rejection was intentional.)
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Quote #1
"The amendments made by this section shall apply to the prosecution of any offense committed before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this section."Source
— Pub.L. 107-56, § 809
(Quoted as an example of language in a passed statute that is identical to a retroactivity provision Congress rejected in a different bill.)
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Quote #2
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (1,498 characters)
Case 22-1426, Document 59, 02/28/2023, 3475902, Page72 of 113
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Congress could not have known which point of view would carry the day; Sen. Leahy may very well have thought that any retroactive application of the statute would be of doubtful constitutionality.
In any event, Sen. Leahy’s remark confirms that Congress’s rejection of the provision was intentional—that it did not merely “agree to disagree,” as in Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 623—his reasons why the provision was rejected cannot be ascribed to other members of Congress. See Garcia v. U.S., 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (noting floor statements by a single member are generally weak legislative history evidence). Indeed, we know that when Congress rejected the retroactivity provision in the 2003 House bill it almost certainly did not do so for constitutional-avoidance reasons. We know this because other criminal statutes of limitation passed by Congress contained language identical to the retroactivity provision that Congress rejected in the 2003 amendment to § 3283. See Pub.L. 107-56, § 809, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001) (note to 18 U.S.C. § 3286) (“The amendments made by this section shall apply to the prosecution of any offense committed before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this section.”); Pub.L. 101-647, § 2505, 104 Stat. 4789 (Nov. 29, 1990) (note to 18 U.S.C. § 3293) (similar).
For these reasons, applying § 3283 retroactively fails under step one of Landgraf.
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