HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020586.jpg
1.78 MB
Extraction Summary
1
People
6
Organizations
2
Locations
3
Events
2
Relationships
4
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Government report / congressional oversight document
File Size:
1.78 MB
Summary
This document appears to be page 127 of a House Oversight report (Section 8) discussing national security concerns regarding foreign students, specifically from China (PRC). It details the FBI's access to the SEVIS database, gaps in mandatory data collection (like passport numbers), and the issue of 'deemed exports' where foreign students access controlled technology in US university labs. While the prompt identifies this as 'Epstein-related,' this specific page contains no direct mentions of Jeffrey Epstein, his associates, or his specific financial dealings; it focuses entirely on US-China technology transfer policy and student visa regulations.
People (1)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Barack Obama | President of the United States |
Directed a broad-based interagency reform of the US export control system in 2009.
|
Organizations (6)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| FBI |
Has access to SEVIS data to investigate foreign students.
|
|
| DHS |
Previously required to give permission for FBI investigations of foreign students.
|
|
| SEVIS |
Database containing student data.
|
|
| GAO |
Provided analysis on missing critical data in SEVIS.
|
|
| Commerce Department |
Defines 'deemed' exports and attempted to change rules regarding foreign nationals in labs.
|
|
| House Oversight Committee |
Implied by the footer 'HOUSE_OVERSIGHT'.
|
Timeline (3 events)
2004-2006
US Commerce Department attempted to change export rules but was opposed by universities.
United States
US Commerce Department
Universities
Research Labs
2009
March 2011
China recorded as having the largest number of students in SEVIS (158,698).
United States
Locations (2)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
Country with the largest number of students in SEVIS as of March 2011; concern regarding technology transfer.
|
|
|
Location where foreign nationals access restricted technology.
|
Relationships (2)
Key Quotes (4)
"As of March 2011, China had the largest number of students in SEVIS, at 158,698."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020586.jpg
Quote #1
"The FBI has access to all of the student data contained in SEVIS, and no longer needs the permission of DHS to initiate investigations of foreign students."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020586.jpg
Quote #2
"According to the Commerce Department, a restricted product or technology is “deemed,” or considered exported, when it is used by a foreign national in the United States."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020586.jpg
Quote #3
"From 2004 to 2006, the US Commerce Department attempted to change these rules, but was stymied by opposition from universities and research labs."Source
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020586.jpg
Quote #4
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,565 characters)
127
education degree level, and authorization for on-campus employment. As of March 2011,
China had the largest number of students in SEVIS, at 158,698.²⁵
China had the largest number of students in SEVIS, at 158,698.²⁵
The FBI has access to all of the student data contained in SEVIS, and no longer needs
the permission of DHS to initiate investigations of foreign students.²⁶ However, the laws,
regulations, and directives governing SEVIS do not require some additional critical pieces
of information, which are nonetheless perceived to be important to manage the program.
According to the Government Accounting Office (GAO):
the permission of DHS to initiate investigations of foreign students.²⁶ However, the laws,
regulations, and directives governing SEVIS do not require some additional critical pieces
of information, which are nonetheless perceived to be important to manage the program.
According to the Government Accounting Office (GAO):
• the nonimmigrant visa number, expiration date, and issuing post are optional and
only captured if entered into the system by the school or exchange visitor program;
only captured if entered into the system by the school or exchange visitor program;
• the nonimmigrant driver’s license number and issuing state were imposed by the
interagency working group and support investigative efforts; and
interagency working group and support investigative efforts; and
• the nonimmigrant passport number, passport expiration date, and passport issuing
country are optional and only captured if entered into the system by the school or
exchange visitor program.²⁷
country are optional and only captured if entered into the system by the school or
exchange visitor program.²⁷
It is difficult to ascertain from open sources whether these problems have been fixed, but
the nonmandatory data are key investigative details that would be critical for federal law
enforcement seeking to assess possible illicit technology transfers by students.
the nonmandatory data are key investigative details that would be critical for federal law
enforcement seeking to assess possible illicit technology transfers by students.
Improved export controls
The second major policy problem involves PRC student access to controlled technology
under the deemed export system. According to the Commerce Department, a restricted
product or technology is “deemed,” or considered exported, when it is used by a foreign
national in the United States.²⁸ However, under these rules, a university or research lab
does not need a deemed export license if a foreign graduate student is merely present in a
lab. It only needs a license if it intends to export that technology to the foreign national’s
country.
under the deemed export system. According to the Commerce Department, a restricted
product or technology is “deemed,” or considered exported, when it is used by a foreign
national in the United States.²⁸ However, under these rules, a university or research lab
does not need a deemed export license if a foreign graduate student is merely present in a
lab. It only needs a license if it intends to export that technology to the foreign national’s
country.
From 2004 to 2006, the US Commerce Department attempted to change these rules,²⁹ but
was stymied by opposition from universities and research labs.³⁰ Yet the continued flow
of controlled technology to the PRC and the findings of GAO studies on the problems
of university oversight³¹ strongly suggest that Commerce’s recommendations should be
reexamined.
was stymied by opposition from universities and research labs.³⁰ Yet the continued flow
of controlled technology to the PRC and the findings of GAO studies on the problems
of university oversight³¹ strongly suggest that Commerce’s recommendations should be
reexamined.
In 2009, then president Obama “directed a broad-based interagency reform of the US export
control system with the goal of strengthening national security and the competitiveness of
key US manufacturing and technology sectors by focusing on current threats and adapting
control system with the goal of strengthening national security and the competitiveness of
key US manufacturing and technology sectors by focusing on current threats and adapting
Section 8
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020586
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020586
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