DOJ-OGR-00004864.jpg
715 KB
Extraction Summary
3
People
3
Organizations
0
Locations
3
Events
2
Relationships
4
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal filing / court opinion exhibit
File Size:
715 KB
Summary
This document is page 52 of 80 from a legal filing (Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE, USA v. Ghislaine Maxwell) filed on July 2, 2021. The text appears to be an excerpt from a judicial opinion (likely the PA Supreme Court case J-100-2020 regarding Commonwealth v. Cosby) discussing whether former D.A. Bruce Castor's promise not to prosecute Bill Cosby constituted a binding immunity agreement. The court concludes that Castor's actions were a unilateral exercise of prosecutorial discretion rather than a formal contract or quid pro quo exchange. This legal precedent regarding Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) was likely cited in the Maxwell case to argue the validity or scope of the Epstein NPA.
People (3)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Castor | Former District Attorney (D.A.) |
Testified regarding his intent to bar prosecution of Cosby; stated actions were prosecutorial discretion not a contract.
|
| Cosby | Defendant/Subject |
Subject of prosecution and civil deposition; argued immunity based on D.A. Castor's statements.
|
| Ferman | District Attorney (D.A.) |
Recipient of an email from Castor regarding the intent of the press release.
|
Organizations (3)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Commonwealth |
Refers to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (prosecution).
|
|
| Trial Court |
Lower court that made initial findings regarding the lack of a formal immunity agreement.
|
|
| DOJ |
Department of Justice (indicated in footer stamp DOJ-OGR).
|
Key Quotes (4)
"intent in 'signing off' on the press release was to assure Cosby that nothing that he said in a civil deposition could or would be used against him in a criminal prosecution."Source
DOJ-OGR-00004864.jpg
Quote #1
"a prosecution is not precluded."Source
DOJ-OGR-00004864.jpg
Quote #2
"what occurred between him and Cosby was not an agreement, a contract, or any kind of quid pro quo exchange."Source
DOJ-OGR-00004864.jpg
Quote #3
"the question becomes whether, and under what circumstances, a prosecutor’s exercise of his or her charging discretion binds future prosecutors’ exercise of the same discretion."Source
DOJ-OGR-00004864.jpg
Quote #4
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,082 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 310-1 Filed 07/02/21 Page 52 of 80
Although former D.A. Castor stated that he intended permanently to bar
prosecution of Cosby, he also testified that he sought to confer some form of transactional
immunity. In his second email to D.A. Ferman, former district attorney Castor suggested
that his intent in “signing off” on the press release was to assure Cosby that nothing that
he said in a civil deposition could or would be used against him in a criminal prosecution.
N.T., 2/2/2016, Exh. D-7. In the same email, he simultaneously expressed his belief that
“a prosecution is not precluded.” Id. As such, the evidence suggests that D.A. Castor
was motivated by conflicting aims when he decided not to prosecute Cosby. On one
hand, the record demonstrates that D.A. Castor endeavored to forever preclude the
Commonwealth from prosecuting Cosby if Cosby testified in the civil case. On the other
hand, the record indicates that he sought to foreclose only the use in a subsequent
criminal case of any testimony that Cosby gave in a civil suit.
prosecution of Cosby, he also testified that he sought to confer some form of transactional
immunity. In his second email to D.A. Ferman, former district attorney Castor suggested
that his intent in “signing off” on the press release was to assure Cosby that nothing that
he said in a civil deposition could or would be used against him in a criminal prosecution.
N.T., 2/2/2016, Exh. D-7. In the same email, he simultaneously expressed his belief that
“a prosecution is not precluded.” Id. As such, the evidence suggests that D.A. Castor
was motivated by conflicting aims when he decided not to prosecute Cosby. On one
hand, the record demonstrates that D.A. Castor endeavored to forever preclude the
Commonwealth from prosecuting Cosby if Cosby testified in the civil case. On the other
hand, the record indicates that he sought to foreclose only the use in a subsequent
criminal case of any testimony that Cosby gave in a civil suit.
The trial court was left to resolve these seeming inconsistencies. The court
concluded that Cosby and D.A. Castor did not enter into a formal immunity agreement.
Because the record supports the trial court’s findings in this regard, we are bound by
those conclusions. Pertinently, we are bound by the trial court’s determination that D.A.
Castor’s actions amounted only to a unilateral exercise of prosecutorial discretion. This
characterization is consistent with the former district attorney’s insistence at the habeas
hearing that what occurred between him and Cosby was not an agreement, a contract,
or any kind of quid pro quo exchange.
concluded that Cosby and D.A. Castor did not enter into a formal immunity agreement.
Because the record supports the trial court’s findings in this regard, we are bound by
those conclusions. Pertinently, we are bound by the trial court’s determination that D.A.
Castor’s actions amounted only to a unilateral exercise of prosecutorial discretion. This
characterization is consistent with the former district attorney’s insistence at the habeas
hearing that what occurred between him and Cosby was not an agreement, a contract,
or any kind of quid pro quo exchange.
We are not, however, bound by the lower courts’ legal determinations that derive
from those factual findings. Thus, the question becomes whether, and under what
circumstances, a prosecutor’s exercise of his or her charging discretion binds future
prosecutors’ exercise of the same discretion. This is a question of law.
from those factual findings. Thus, the question becomes whether, and under what
circumstances, a prosecutor’s exercise of his or her charging discretion binds future
prosecutors’ exercise of the same discretion. This is a question of law.
[J-100-2020] - 51
DOJ-OGR-00004864
Discussion 0
No comments yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this epstein document