DOJ-OGR-00003082.jpg
720 KB
Extraction Summary
11
People
4
Organizations
1
Locations
1
Events
0
Relationships
7
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
720 KB
Summary
This document is a page from a legal filing, specifically a memorandum of law, discussing the legal standards for perjury. The author argues against dismissing a perjury count before trial based on 'fundamental ambiguity,' citing numerous court cases to establish that such challenges are typically evaluated after a trial. The text distinguishes between answers that are literally true but misleading (which may not be perjury) and answers that are outright false, regardless of responsiveness (which can be perjury).
People (11)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Bonacorsa | Party in a cited legal case |
Mentioned in the case citation United States v. Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d 1218, 1221 (2d Cir. 1976).
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| Lighte | Party in a cited legal case |
Mentioned in the case citation Lighte, 782 F.2d at 374.
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| Strohm | Party in a cited legal case |
Mentioned in the case citation Strohm, 671 at 1175.
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| Sarwari | Party in a cited legal case |
Mentioned in the case citation Sarwari, 669 F.3d at 406.
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| Farmer | Party in a cited legal case |
Mentioned in the case citation Farmer, 137 F.3d at 1269.
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| Markiewicz | Party in a cited legal case |
Mentioned in the case citation Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 808.
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| Forde | Party in a cited legal case |
Mentioned in the case citation United States v. Forde, 740 F. Supp. 2d 406, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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| Bronston | Party in a cited legal case |
Mentioned in the case citation Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973).
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| Corr | Party in a cited legal case |
Mentioned in the case citation United States v. Corr, 543 F.2d 1042, 1049 (2d Cir. 1976).
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| Schafrick | Party in a cited legal case |
Mentioned in the case citation United States v. Schafrick, 871 F.2d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 1989).
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| Kaplan | Party in a cited legal case |
Mentioned in the case citation United States v. Kaplan, 758 F. App’x 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2018).
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Organizations (4)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| United States | government agency |
Party in numerous cited legal cases, such as United States v. Bonacorsa.
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| S.D.N.Y. | government agency |
Abbreviation for the Southern District of New York court, mentioned in the citation for United States v. Forde.
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| 2d Cir. | government agency |
Abbreviation for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, mentioned in multiple case citations.
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| DOJ | government agency |
Appears in the footer as part of a document identifier (DOJ-OGR-00003082), likely referring to the Department of Just...
|
Timeline (1 events)
The document discusses the legal standards for evaluating perjury counts, particularly challenges based on 'fundamental ambiguity' of questions, and whether such challenges should occur before or after a trial.
Locations (1)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
|
The Southern District of New York, mentioned as the court in the United States v. Forde case citation.
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Key Quotes (7)
"fundamental ambiguity"Source
— Unnamed defendant
(Cited as the basis on which a defendant is challenging a perjury count before trial.)
DOJ-OGR-00003082.jpg
Quote #1
"arguably misleading by negative implication"Source
— Lighte, 782 F.2d at 374
(Describing answers that are literally true but unresponsive, which cannot support a perjury conviction.)
DOJ-OGR-00003082.jpg
Quote #2
"the answer is false, the fact that it is unresponsive is immaterial."Source
— United States v. Corr, 543 F.2d 1042, 1049
(Stating the legal principle that unresponsiveness does not excuse a false answer in a perjury case.)
DOJ-OGR-00003082.jpg
Quote #3
"could be literally true in isolation"Source
— United States v. Schafrick, 871 F.2d 300, 304
(Describing statements that can still support a perjury conviction if they are 'materially untrue' in context.)
DOJ-OGR-00003082.jpg
Quote #4
"materially untrue"Source
— United States v. Schafrick, 871 F.2d 300, 304
(The standard for statements to be considered perjury, even if they could be literally true in isolation, when considered in 'the context in which the statements were made.')
DOJ-OGR-00003082.jpg
Quote #5
"[U]nless the questioning is fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise, the truthfulness of [the defendant’s] answers is an issue for the jury."Source
— United States v. Schafrick, 871 F.2d 300, 304
(Articulating the standard for when the truthfulness of an answer should be decided by a jury rather than dismissed by a judge.)
DOJ-OGR-00003082.jpg
Quote #6
"were literally true under any conceivable interpretation of the questions"Source
— Lighte, 782 F.2d at 374
(A situation cited where evidence was found insufficient for a perjury conviction.)
DOJ-OGR-00003082.jpg
Quote #7
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,125 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 148 of 239
natural meaning in the context in which words were used they were materially untrue, perjury was established.” United States v. Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d 1218, 1221 (2d Cir. 1976). Critically, and as noted with respect to Lighte above, courts generally evaluate whether a challenge to a perjury count on the basis that a question was fundamentally ambiguous after trial and following the development of a full factual record. See, e.g., Strohm, 671 at 1175 (appeal following conviction); Sarwari, 669 F.3d at 406 (same); Farmer, 137 F.3d at 1269 (appeal following conviction and partial Rule 29 dismissal) Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 808 (appeal following conviction); cf. United States v. Forde, 740 F. Supp. 2d 406, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying a motion to dismiss a perjury count). Indeed, the defendant cites no case in which a court has dismissed a perjury count on the basis of “fundamental ambiguity” before trial.
Because perjury requires a knowing false statement, the law does not permit conviction based on answers that are literally true. See Lighte, 782 F.2d at 374. Nor can a conviction rest on answers that are literally true but unresponsive, and therefore “arguably misleading by negative implication.” Id.; see Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973). But when “the answer is false, the fact that it is unresponsive is immaterial.” United States v. Corr, 543 F.2d 1042, 1049 (2d Cir. 1976). Even statements that “could be literally true in isolation” can support a perjury conviction if they are “materially untrue” in “the context in which the statements were made.” United States v. Schafrick, 871 F.2d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 1989). “[U]nless the questioning is fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise, the truthfulness of [the defendant’s] answers is an issue for the jury.” Id. at 304; see United States v. Kaplan, 758 F. App’x 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2018) (same); cf. Lighte, 782 F.2d at 374 (finding the evidence insufficient where some answers “were literally true under any conceivable interpretation of the questions”).
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DOJ-OGR-00003082
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