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727 KB
Extraction Summary
8
People
2
Organizations
3
Locations
3
Events
3
Relationships
4
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
727 KB
Summary
This legal document is a court order from case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE, filed on February 11, 2022. The Court denies two separate requests: first, it denies Juror 50's motion to intervene in the criminal case, and second, it denies the Defendant's requests to either strike or seal Juror 50's motion. The Court's reasoning relies on legal precedent, stating that motions to strike are disfavored and that Juror 50's motion qualifies as a judicial document subject to the presumption of public access.
People (8)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Juror 50 | Juror |
Subject of the document, whose motion to intervene was denied. The Defendant also sought to strike or seal Juror 50's...
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| Bailey | Party in a cited case |
Mentioned in the citation 'Bailey v. Pataki' to support the argument that motions to strike are disfavored.
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| Pataki | Party in a cited case |
Mentioned in the citation 'Bailey v. Pataki'.
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| Brown | Party in a cited case |
Mentioned in the citation 'Brown v. Maxwell' to argue Juror 50's motion is not scandalous.
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| Maxwell | Party in a cited case |
Mentioned in the citation 'Brown v. Maxwell'.
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| Lugosch | Party in a cited case / Name of a legal test |
Mentioned in reference to the 'three-part Lugosch test' for sealing documents and in a case citation.
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| Amodeo | Party in a cited case |
Mentioned in the citation 'United States v. Amodeo' to define a judicial document.
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| Defendant | Defendant |
A party in the case who requested to strike or seal Juror 50's motion.
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Organizations (2)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| The Court | Government agency |
The judicial body making the rulings described in the document.
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| United States | Government agency |
Party in cited cases, specifically 'United States v. All Right, Title & Int. in Prop...' and 'United States v. Amodeo'.
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Timeline (3 events)
Locations (3)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
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Mentioned as the property in a cited civil forfeiture case.
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Location of the property in a cited civil forfeiture case.
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Southern District of New York, the court district for two of the cited cases.
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Relationships (3)
The Defendant filed a motion requesting the Court to strike or seal a motion filed by Juror 50.
The Court denied the Defendant's requests to strike or seal a motion.
Key Quotes (4)
"motions to strike are disfavored and should not be granted ‘unless there is a strong reason for so doing.’"Source
— Bailey v. Pataki
(Cited by the Court to explain why it is denying the Defendant's request to strike Juror 50's motion.)
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Quote #1
"redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous."Source
— Brown v. Maxwell
(Quoted to state that Juror 50's motion does not meet the criteria for being struck from the record.)
DOJ-OGR-00008914.jpg
Quote #2
"relevant to the performance of a judicial function and useful in the judicial process."Source
— United States v. Amodeo
(Cited as the definition of a judicial document, which the Court applies to Juror 50's motion, subjecting it to the presumption of public access.)
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Quote #3
"until a district court knows the disposition of the underlying motion, any attempt at calling something a judicial document is premature"Source
— Lugosch
(An argument rejected in the cited Lugosch case, which the Court uses to counter the Defendant's reasoning for sealing the motion.)
DOJ-OGR-00008914.jpg
Quote #4
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,170 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 596 Filed 02/11/22 Page 6 of 7
to have falsely represented information on pre-selection questionnaire and during oral voir dire). Juror 50 is the potential subject of a post-verdict inquiry, not a party with an interest in the criminal case. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Juror 50’s motion to intervene.
The Court also DENIES the Defendant’s request to strike or seal the motion. The Defendant first requests that the Court strike Juror 50’s motion, relying on the example of a civil forfeiture action and on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). See Defense Motion, at 53 (citing United States v. All Right, Title & Int. in Prop., Appurtenances, & Improvements Known as 479 Tamarind Drive, Hallendale, Fla., No. 98 CIV. 2279 (DLC), 2011 WL 1045095, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2011)). Such authority is unpersuasive. Even in the civil context, “motions to strike are disfavored and should not be granted ‘unless there is a strong reason for so doing.’” Bailey v. Pataki, No. 08 Civ. 8563 (JSR), 2010 WL 234995, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2010). And Juror 50’s motion is certainly not “redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous.” Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 51-52 (2d Cir. 2019). Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Defendant’s request to strike the motion.
The Defendant alternatively requests that the Court seal Juror 50’s motion until her motion for a new trial is resolved. Defense Motion, at 54; see also Defense Ltr., Jan. 13, 2022. The three-part Lugosch test, as outlined above, compels denial of this request. First, Juror 50’s motion is a judicial document and accordingly subject to the presumption of access. It is clearly “relevant to the performance of a judicial function and useful in the judicial process.” United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995). Whether this Court grants or denies the motion does not alter this conclusion. See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 121 (rejecting the argument that “until a district court knows the disposition of the underlying motion, any attempt at calling something a judicial document is premature”). The Defendant’s effort to liken the motion to
The Court also DENIES the Defendant’s request to strike or seal the motion. The Defendant first requests that the Court strike Juror 50’s motion, relying on the example of a civil forfeiture action and on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). See Defense Motion, at 53 (citing United States v. All Right, Title & Int. in Prop., Appurtenances, & Improvements Known as 479 Tamarind Drive, Hallendale, Fla., No. 98 CIV. 2279 (DLC), 2011 WL 1045095, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2011)). Such authority is unpersuasive. Even in the civil context, “motions to strike are disfavored and should not be granted ‘unless there is a strong reason for so doing.’” Bailey v. Pataki, No. 08 Civ. 8563 (JSR), 2010 WL 234995, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2010). And Juror 50’s motion is certainly not “redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous.” Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 51-52 (2d Cir. 2019). Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Defendant’s request to strike the motion.
The Defendant alternatively requests that the Court seal Juror 50’s motion until her motion for a new trial is resolved. Defense Motion, at 54; see also Defense Ltr., Jan. 13, 2022. The three-part Lugosch test, as outlined above, compels denial of this request. First, Juror 50’s motion is a judicial document and accordingly subject to the presumption of access. It is clearly “relevant to the performance of a judicial function and useful in the judicial process.” United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995). Whether this Court grants or denies the motion does not alter this conclusion. See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 121 (rejecting the argument that “until a district court knows the disposition of the underlying motion, any attempt at calling something a judicial document is premature”). The Defendant’s effort to liken the motion to
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