DOJ-OGR-00003108.jpg
763 KB
Extraction Summary
6
People
1
Organizations
1
Locations
2
Events
1
Relationships
2
Quotes
Document Information
Type:
Legal document
File Size:
763 KB
Summary
This legal document is a portion of the prosecution's (the Government's) argument against a defendant's motion to sever perjury counts from other charges. The Government contends that a full re-litigation of a prior defamation action is not necessary and that any potential for 'spillover prejudice' can be managed through stipulations, using a pseudonym for a witness (Giuffre), and providing limiting instructions to the jury. The document cites several legal precedents to support the argument that juries are presumed to follow such instructions.
People (6)
| Name | Role | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Giuffre |
Mentioned in relation to her allegations in a civil suit, which are central to the perjury counts against the defendant.
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| Pizarro |
Cited in the legal case Pizarro, 2018 WL 1737236.
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| Zafiro |
Cited in the legal case Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540.
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| Page |
Cited in the legal case Page, 657 F.3d at 130-31.
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| Rivera |
Cited in the legal case Rivera, 546 F.3d at 254.
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| Pena |
Cited as a defendant in the legal case United States v. Pena, 932 F. Supp. 2d 464, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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Organizations (1)
| Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Government | Government agency |
Refers to the prosecution, which is arguing against severing perjury counts and is amenable to using stipulations to ...
|
Timeline (2 events)
A defendant's argument that a trial on perjury counts would require a 'full-blown re-litigation of the defamation action.'
defendant
The Government's argument against severing perjury counts, suggesting measures like stipulations and limiting instructions to the jury to mitigate prejudice.
Government
defendant
Locations (1)
| Location | Context |
|---|---|
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Mentioned in the citation for United States v. Pena, indicating the case was in the Southern District of New York.
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Relationships (1)
The document discusses Giuffre's allegations and the defendant's denials in a civil suit, which form the basis of perjury counts against the defendant.
Key Quotes (2)
"full-blown re-litigation of the defamation action."Source
— The defendant
(Quoted from the defendant's motion (Def. Mot. 5 at 9) arguing against the trial on perjury counts.)
DOJ-OGR-00003108.jpg
Quote #1
"[J]uries are presumed to follow their instructions."Source
— Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540
(A legal principle cited to support the argument that a limiting instruction to the jury would be effective in preventing prejudice.)
DOJ-OGR-00003108.jpg
Quote #2
Full Extracted Text
Complete text extracted from the document (2,310 characters)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 174 of 239
of proof of the conspiracy and perjury crimes permitted joinder of the offenses . . . and denial of appellant’s Rule 14 pretrial motion for severance.”); Pizarro, 2018 WL 1737236, at *6-*7.
The defendant argues that the trial on the perjury counts will require a “full-blown re-litigation of the defamation action.” (Def. Mot. 5 at 9). That is a significant exaggeration. To litigate the perjury counts, the parties will need to present evidence about the basic substance of the civil suit—in particular, Giuffre’s allegations and the defendant’s denials—such that the jury will be able to assess materiality and the statements’ context. This can be done briefly—as stated in Section V, the Government is amenable to presenting that information through a stipulation— and, in any event, through minimal additional evidence. The stipulation or other evidence could be crafted to minimize the risk of spillover prejudice, for instance by referring to Giuffre by a pseudonym to avoid any connection she might have to testimony on the substantive counts. And any remaining prejudice could be vitiated by a limiting instruction that the jury should not consider Giuffre’s allegations as evidence of the substantive counts. See Page, 657 F.3d at 130-31 (approving of similar precautions when introducing evidence of a defendant’s prior felony conviction); Pizarro, 2018 WL 1737236, at *7; see also Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540 (“[J]uries are presumed to follow their instructions.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). There is every reason to think a jury could and would follow such an instruction. See, e.g., Rivera, 546 F.3d at 254 (using a limiting instruction to prevent spillover prejudice for counts involving the sexual exploitation of different children, especially in light of admissibility across counts); United States v. Pena, 932 F. Supp. 2d 464, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (using a limiting instruction to address spillover prejudice from two murder for hire conspiracies). Indeed, even if the counts were severed, as noted above, the Government would still seek to offer evidence of the defendant’s false denials of conduct relevant to Counts One through Four as evidence of her consciousness of guilt
The defendant argues that the trial on the perjury counts will require a “full-blown re-litigation of the defamation action.” (Def. Mot. 5 at 9). That is a significant exaggeration. To litigate the perjury counts, the parties will need to present evidence about the basic substance of the civil suit—in particular, Giuffre’s allegations and the defendant’s denials—such that the jury will be able to assess materiality and the statements’ context. This can be done briefly—as stated in Section V, the Government is amenable to presenting that information through a stipulation— and, in any event, through minimal additional evidence. The stipulation or other evidence could be crafted to minimize the risk of spillover prejudice, for instance by referring to Giuffre by a pseudonym to avoid any connection she might have to testimony on the substantive counts. And any remaining prejudice could be vitiated by a limiting instruction that the jury should not consider Giuffre’s allegations as evidence of the substantive counts. See Page, 657 F.3d at 130-31 (approving of similar precautions when introducing evidence of a defendant’s prior felony conviction); Pizarro, 2018 WL 1737236, at *7; see also Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540 (“[J]uries are presumed to follow their instructions.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). There is every reason to think a jury could and would follow such an instruction. See, e.g., Rivera, 546 F.3d at 254 (using a limiting instruction to prevent spillover prejudice for counts involving the sexual exploitation of different children, especially in light of admissibility across counts); United States v. Pena, 932 F. Supp. 2d 464, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (using a limiting instruction to address spillover prejudice from two murder for hire conspiracies). Indeed, even if the counts were severed, as noted above, the Government would still seek to offer evidence of the defendant’s false denials of conduct relevant to Counts One through Four as evidence of her consciousness of guilt
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DOJ-OGR-00003108
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